Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a dispute over the status of a negotiated settlement agreement pertaining to New York City's duty to provide mental health services to certain inmates in its jails. At issue was whether the terms of the agreement expired before plaintiffs filed a motion in Supreme Court seeking to extend the City's obligations. Applying the state's traditional principles of contract interpretation, the court held that plaintiffs sought relief prior to termination of the settlement agreement and their motion was therefore timely filed. View "Brad H., et al. v. The City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an electrician working on a construction project site, brought a personal injury suit against defendants asserting claims under Labor Law 200, 240(1), and 241(6), and common law negligence. At issue was whether defendants-property owners (property owners) were entitled to common law indemnification from defendant-general contractor (general contractor). The court held that the general contractor's demonstrated lack of actual supervision and/or direction over the work was sufficient to establish that it was not required to indemnify the property owners for bringing about plaintiff's injury. The court also held that the property owner's vicarious liability could not be passed through the general contractor, the non-negligent, vicariously liable general contractor with whom they did not contract. Therefore, the court held that, under the facts and circumstances, the property owners were not entitled to common law indemnification from the general contractor. View "McCarthy, et al. v. Turner Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for a 2003 drug transaction and sentenced to prison. On November 25, 2009 defendant filed an application for resentencing under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA), CPL 440.46. On December 3, 2009, before the application had been ruled on, she was released on parole. At issue was whether defendant was eligible for resentencing because she was not presently in custody. The court held that a prisoner who applied for resentencing before being paroled was not barred from obtaining resentencing after her release where the statute's plain language only stated that an offender must be in custody when he or she applied for resentencing but did not require that custody continue until the application was decided. View "People v. Santiago" on Justia Law

Defendants committed class B felonies involving narcotics and were sentenced to indeterminate prison terms. All defendants were subsequently paroled, violated their parole, and were sent back to prison. After the enactment of the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA), CPL 440.46, defendants applied for resentencing. At issue was whether the DLRA provided relief to reincarcerated parole violators. The court held that prisoners who have been paroled, and then reincarcerated for violating their parole, were not for that reason barred from seeking relief under the statute where the statute's plain language stated no such exception. View "People v. Paulin; People v. Pratts; People v. Phillips " on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between MBIA Insurance Corporation (MBIA) and certain of its policyholders who hold financial guarantee insurance policies. The principal question presented was whether the 2009 restructuring of MBIA and its related subsidiaries and affiliates authorized by the Superintendent of the New York State Insurance Department precluded these policyholders from asserting claims against MBIA under the Debtor and Creditor Law and the common law. The court held that the Superintendent's approval of such restructuring pursuant to its authority under the Insurance Law did not bar the policyholders from bringing such claims. Accordingly, the court held that the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion. View "ABN AMRO Bank, N.V., et al. v. MBIA Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Claimants in these four cases were convicted of crimes for which they received indeterminate sentences. A statute required that such a sentence include a period of post-release supervision ("PRS"), but in each claimant's case, the sentencing judge failed to pronounce a PRS term. Claimants were nevertheless subjected to PRS, and in three of the four cases, were imprisoned for a PRS violation. They now seek damages from the State, asserting that they were wrongfully made to undergo supervision and confinement. The court held that all of the claims were without merit where the only error in Jonathan Orellanes' case was by the sentencing judge, which was barred by judicial immunity, and where Farrah Donald, Shakira Eanes, and Ismael Ortiz sued for false imprisonment but failed to plead the essential elements. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division in each case was affirmed. View "Donald v. State; Eanes v. State; Orellanes v. State; Ortiz v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the former spouse of Stephen Walsh, who was a defendant in related actions brought by plaintiffs, alleging that the property derived from Walsh's illegal securities activities went into the former spouse's possession under the parties' separation agreement and divorce decree. At issue, in certified questions to the court, was whether the former spouse had a legitimate claim to those funds, which would prevent plaintiffs from obtaining disgorgement from her. The court held that an innocent spouse who received possession of tainted property in good faith and gave fair consideration for it should prevail over the claims of the original owner or owners consistent with the state's strong public policy of ensuring finality in divorce proceedings. View "Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Walsh, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Reliance Group Holdings, Inc.'s ("RGH") and Reliance Financial Services Corporation's ("RFS") voluntary petitions in Bankruptcy Court seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and the trust that was established as a result. The trust subsequently filed an amended complaint alleging actuarial fraud and accounting fraud against respondents. At issue was whether the trust qualified for the so-called single-entity exemption that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"), 15 U.S.C. 77p(f)(2)(C); 78bb(f)(5)(D), afforded certain entities. The court held that the trust, established under the bankruptcy reorganization plan of RGH as the debtor's successor, was "one person" within the meaning of the single-entity exemption in SLUSA. As a result, SLUSA did not preclude the Supreme Court from adjudicating the state common law fraud claims that the trust had brought against respondents for the benefit of RGH's and RFS's bondholders. Accordingly, the court reversed and reinstated the order of the Supreme Court. View "The RGH Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminal possession of a controlled substance where defendant was arrested for a shooting death, defendant's gray minivan was subsequently searched, and cocaine was recovered from a compartment behind the ashtray of the front console. After a jury convicted defendant of some of the charges, defendant appealed the Supreme Court's denial of his motion to suppress physical evidence. At issue was whether the Appellate Division erred by upholding the denial of suppression on a basis that the Supreme Court had squarely rejected. The court held that the Appellate Division's decision with respect to the suppression was clearly erroneous under People v. LaFontaine where CPL 470.15(1) precluded that court from affirming denial of suppression on the basis of consent because the trial judge ruled in defendant's favor on the issue. Consequently, the court had to decide whether granting suppression would be harmless with respect to defendant's conviction for the other crimes. The court held that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence supporting the potentially tainted count, a drug possession crime related to the cocaine discovered, had a spillover effect on the guilty verdicts for weapon possession and assault. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by remitting to the Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion, and as modified, affirmed. View "The People v. Concepcion" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of weapon possession crimes, reckless endangerment, and menacing and endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether there was a conflict of interest where the newly-elected district attorney, who had previously represented defendant, immunized a witness from prosecution. The court held that the prosecutor possessed discretion to decide when to immunize a witness from prosecution and the County Court was a competent authority to confer immunity when expressly requested by the district attorney to do so. Therefore, the district attorney's "permission" did not vest the special prosecutor with any more authority than he already enjoyed. Accordingly, defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice or a substantial risk of an abused confidence to warrant vacatur of his conviction. View "The People v. Abrams" on Justia Law