Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants, Makeda Davis and Fayola McIntosh, where charged with offenses stemming from an altercation at a nightclub. The primary issue on appeal was whether the People's withdrawal of their cases from the first grand jury presentation due to witness unavailability constituted the functional equivalent of a dismissal pursuant to CPL 190.75 and the court's holding in People v. Wilkins. In Davis, the court held that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed because the People had instructed the first grand jury that only McIntosh was the target of the proceedings. Since the People never sought an indictment from the first grand jury against Davis, Wilkins was irrelevant since there were no charges against Davis to be withdrawn. With respect to McIntosh, it was undisputed that she was a target of both grand jury presentations. The court held that the People's withdrawal of the charges under the circumstances did not constitute a dismissal under Wilkins and the People were not therefore required to obtain court authorization before re-presenting the case to another grand jury. Accordingly, the orders of the Appellate Division in both Davis and McIntosh were reversed and the cases remitted for reconsideration. View "People v. Davis; People v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction, upon a jury verdict, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance at or near school grounds. Defendant argued that the withdrawal of the presented counts from the first grand jury constituted a dismissal under People v. Wilkins. The Appellate Division held, instead, that as a matter of statutory interpretation, a failure of a grand jury to agree on either an indictment or a dismissal was not a dismissal and thus did not require leave to re-present. The court held that, although Criminal Procedure Law 190.75(3), read literally, required the People to obtain judicial permission for the resubmission of charges only where the charges have been actually dismissed, it had long been the law that a charge could, under certain circumstances, be deemed "dismissed" within the meaning of CPL 190.75(3) when a prosecutor prematurely took the charge from the grand jury, as is the case here. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the indictment dismissed with leave to the People to apply for an order permitting resubmission of the charges to another grand jury. View "People v. Credle" on Justia Law

This case arose when petitioner formally requested the list of names and addresses of veterinarians licensed by the Department of Schenectady County under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers law 87[2][b], 89[2-a]. The Department offered to provide names and cities but refused to provide street addresses because the Department's computerized files were unable to distinguish a licensee's business address from a residential address. The court held that an agency responding to a demand under FOIL could not withhold a record solely because some of the information in that record could be exempted from disclosure. Where it could do so without unreasonable difficulty, the agency must redact the record to take out the exempt information. View "Matter of Schenectady County Socy. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. v Mills" on Justia Law

In these criminal proceedings, the Appellate Division dismissed defendants' direct appeals from their judgments of conviction prior to their hearing and disposition. Both defendants filed timely notices of appeal, but were involuntarily deported by the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau while their appeals were pending. The common issue presented was whether the Appellate Division abused its discretion in dismissing these appeals. The court held that the Appellate Division did abuse its discretion where, inter alia, as a matter of fundamental fairness, all criminal defendants should be permitted to avail themselves of intermediate appellate courts as the State had provided an absolute right to seek review in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the orders should be reversed and the cases remitted for consideration of the merits. View "People v. Ventura" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendant alleging violations of Labor Law 240(1) and Labor Law 241(6), the latter pursuant to 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(b)(3) and (c) after plaintiff was injured while working on a demolition project on premises owned by defendant. At issue was whether the court's decision in Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co. precluded recovery under labor Law 240(1) where a worker sustained an injury caused by a falling object whose base stood at the same level as the worker. The court held that such a circumstance did not categorically bar the worker from recovery under section 240(1). The court held that, however, in this case, an issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff's injury resulted from the lack of a statutorily prescribed protective device. View "Wilinski v. 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendants, Corey Becoats and Jason Wright, of second degree (depraved indifference) murder and first degree robbery. The Appellate Division modified by reducing the murder convictions to manslaughter in the second degree, and otherwise confirmed. Defendants subsequently appealed their convictions. The court rejected most of defendants' arguments, but concluded that Wright was entitled to a new trial because of an error in excluding evidence he tried to present in his defense. Accordingly, in Becoats, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed and in Wright, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the case remitted to the Supreme Court for a new trial. View "People v. Becoats; People v. Wright" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living (NYCQAL), a not-for-profit association of members who operate adult homes and assisted living facilities that were regulated pursuant to 18 NYCRR Parts 485 through 48, commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring, among other things, that its guidelines were enforceable and enjoining defendants from violating such guidelines. The court held that the Appellate Division properly concluded that the guidelines impermissibly restricted advocate access to facility residents and violated 18 NYCRR 485.14 and the DOH's interpretation of that regulation. The Appellate Division had a sound basis for concluding that the guidelines, which called for facility representatives to serve as intermediaries between advocates and the residents and prohibited advocates from walking through the facility without the intention of visitng with a particular resident, conflicted with the regulations and the DOH's interpretation of them. Likewise, the Appellate Division properly concluded that the guideline providing that a vistors' failure to comply with any of the guidelines would "constitute reasonable cause to restrict access" conflicts with 18 NYCRR 485.14(g). View "NY Coalition for Quality Assisted Living, Inc. v MFY Legal Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The primary issue in these appeals was whether the jury verdicts convicting defendants of assault but acquitting them of criminal possession of a weapon were legally repugnant. The court concluded that, based on the instructions that were given to the juries and viewed from a theoretical perspective without regard to the evidence presented at defendants' trials, it was possible for the juries to acquit defendants of weapon possession but convict them of assault because the former crime contained an essential element that the latter did not: possession. Because the repugnancy analysis required the court to review the elements of the offenses as charged to the jury without regard to the proof that was actually presented at trial, the court could not say that the convictions were repugnant. Therefore, under the People v. Tucker test, the court held that, based on the instructions that were used to the juries, the verdicts in these cases need not be invalidated. In Muhammad, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. In Hill, the order of the Appellate Division was modified by remitting to that court for further proceedings. View "People v. Muhammad; People v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment to be followed by 5 years postrelease supervision. In this case, turning on the accuracy of eyewitnesses' recognition of an assailant's partially concealed face, at issue was whether two additional eyewitness identifications sufficiently corroborated the victim's identification of defendant, so as to render expert testimony on eyewitness recognition memory unnecessary. The court held that they did not and that it was error to exclude much of the proposed testimony. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and a new trial ordered. View "People v. Santiago" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice action against defendants. At issue was whether the five-day extension under CPLR 2103(b)(2) applied to the 15-day time period prescribed by CPLR 511(b) to move for change of venue when a defendant served its demand for change of venue by mail. The court held that, in this instance, defendants who served their motion papers by mail 20 days after they served their demand to change venue were entitled to a five-day extension of the 15-day period prescribed in CPLR 511(2). Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the case remitted for further proceedings. View "Simon v. Usher" on Justia Law