Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty of attempted rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, and promoting prison contraband in the first degree. On appeal, defendant argued that County Court had failed to articulate a reasonable basis on the record for its determination to restrain him in shackles during the trial. The People appealed County Court's order dismissing the charge of attempted-first degree rape. The Appellate Division reversed, ruling that the use of shackles was reversible error and further held that the trial court had properly dismissed the attempted rape charge. The court held that harmless error analysis was applicable when a trial court had ordered the use of visible shackles without adequate justification articulated on the record under Deck v Missouri. Here, the court held that defendant's shackling during trial was harmless, as was an evidentiary error committed by the trial court. The court also agreed with the People that the count of defendant's indictment charging him with attempted rape should not have been dismissed. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the case remitted for sentencing. View "People v Clyde" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of burglary in the second degree. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the use of leg irons (shackles) on his ankles violated his constitutional rights. The court held that the use of leg irons was a violation of defendant's constitutional rights under Deck v Missouri where the court could not conclude that the shackles were not visible to the jury, or that the jury, seeing the bunting around the defense table and not the prosecutor's, would not have inferred that it was there to hide shackles on defendant's legs. The court also held that the People could not meet their burden of showing that any constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the People conceded that the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and a new trial ordered. View "People v Cruz" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of an action commenced by the New York State Attorney General against defendants, seeking injunctive and monetary relief as well as civil penalties for violations of New York's Executive Law and Consumer Protection Act, Executive Law 63(12) and General Business Law 349, as well as the common law. The primary issue on appeal was whether federal law preempted these claims alleging fraud and violations of real estate appraisal independence rules. The court held that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) governed the regulation of appraisal management companies and explicitly envisioned a cooperative effort between federal and state authorities to ensure that real estate appraisal reports comport with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). The court perceived no basis to conclude that the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) itself or federal regulations promulgated under HOLA preempted the Attorney General from asserting both common law and statutory state law claims against defendants pursuant to its authority under Executive Law 63(12)and General Business Law 349. Thus, defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds of federal preemption was properly denied. The court also agreed with the Appellate Division that the Attorney General had adequately pleaded a cause of action under General Business Law 349 and that the statute provided him with standing. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v First Am. Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant violated several terms of the youthful offender agreement and, at the subsequent sentencing proceeding, Supreme Court imposed a determinate prison sentence of three and one-half years plus five years of post-release supervision. On appeal, defendant contended that reversal was required under People v Catu. The court held that, having elected to advise defendant of the consequences that might flow from the violation of the youthful offender agreement, Supreme Court referenced only a prison term, omitting any mention of the possibility of post-release supervision, thereby giving defendant an inaccurate impression concerning the sentencing options. Accordingly, the court concluded that reversal and vacatur of the plea was appropriate. View "People v McAlpin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of arson in the first degree, one count relating to a fire set on May 25, 2004 (expectation of pecuniary profit), and the other two counts relating to a fire set on May 30, 2004 (expectation of pecuniary profit and use of an incendiary device). On appeal, defendant argued that the prosecutor repeatedly violated the trial court's Molineux rulings by eliciting evidence of an uncharged arson attempt and of his prior bad acts and associations. Defendant further argued that the elicited expert testimony concerning the origins of the fires was inadmissible under People v. Grutz. The court held that, although the People conceded that certain questions asked by the prosecutor at trial clearly violated the trial court's Molineux rulings, the contested testimony elicited, on the whole, was not significant; the trial court also took steps to minimize the impact of arguably improper testimony or prosecutorial statements during the trial; and in any event, to the extent any evidence subject to the trial court's Molineux rulings was improperly admitted, such error was harmless. The court also held that because the evidence adduced at trial conclusively established, apart from the expert testimony, that the subject fires were intentionally set, it could be argued that the admission of expert testimony was largely unnecessary. In any event, any error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "People v Rivers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought lawsuits for personal injuries allegedly resulting from automobile accidents. Here, the court confronted three cases in which the Appellate Division rejected allegations of serious injury as a matter of law. The court concluded that it must reverse Perl v Meher and Adler v Bayer because the evidence of serious injury plaintiffs have put forward was legally sufficient. The court, however, affirmed Travis v Batchi where the court could not tell from the record what Travis's alleged permanent impairment was. View "Perl v Meher; Adler v Bayer; Travis v. Batchi" on Justia Law

Claimant and his wife (collectively, claimants) filed a claim for damages, alleging that the State negligently failed to maintain Colgate Lake and Colgate Lake Dam in a reasonably safe condition. Claimants theorized that the State was liable for claimant's injuries because the water level at Colgate Lake was prone to drop due to leaks in the dam and the State took no steps to warn visitors who swam and dived into the lake about the danger of lowered water levels caused by the leak. The Appellate Division agreed with the Court of Claims that the sole legal cause of claimant's injuries was his own reckless conduct in diving into the water, which he knew or should have known was too shallow for diving. The court agreed and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "Tkeshelashvili v State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of 50 taxpayers of the State of New York, commenced this declaratory judgment action against the State and other defendants, challenging numerous loans and grants issued by public defendants to private entity defendants and other private companies in order to stimulate economic development. At issue was plaintiffs' challenge to appropriations in the New York State 2008-2009 budget. The court held that it could find no constitutional infirmity to the challenged appropriations. Although some could question the wisdom of the policy choices, "the legislature has made a valid legislative judgment." Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "Bordeleau v State" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice suit against defendants for injuries allegedly sustained by Mrs. Cadichon during surgery in July 2002. At issue on appeal was the May 3, 2007 stipulation. The court subsequently concluded that it was apparent from the record that neither plaintiffs nor defendants acted with expediency in moving the case forward. Where, as here, the case proceeded to the point where it was subject to dismissal, it should be the trial court, with notice to the parties, that should make the decision concerning the fate of the case, not the clerk's office. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, was reversed and plaintiffs' complaint reinstated. View "Cadichon v Facelle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree and appealed the judgment of the conviction, arguing, among other things, that the evidence of the show-up identification of a co-defendant was inadmissible. The Appellate Division ruled that any error was harmless and affirmed Supreme Court's judgment. The court concluded that the victim's testimony concerning his identification of the co-defendant was probative of whether defendant had attacked the victim. This was because the victim's accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing of a certain address were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial. Thus, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the material testimony or grant a mistrial. View "People v Thomas" on Justia Law