Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in October, 2012
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Respondent had an extensive criminal record that included various sexual offenses involving nonconsenting or underage, adolescent victims. A licensed psychologist examined Respondent and concluded that he suffered from a mental abnormality within N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 that predisposed him to the commission of sexual offenses and made it difficult for him to control such behavior. Thereafter, the State filed a petition commencing a proceeding under article 10 for the civil management of Respondent. Supreme court concluded Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality under article 10. Respondent was found to be a dangerous sex offender and was ordered to be civilly committed. The appellate division affirmed. Respondent appealed, contending that absent a diagnosis of a mental disease or disorder listed within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the evidence was legally insufficient to support a determination that an individual suffers from a mental abnormality under the Mental Hygiene Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence showed Respondent was diagnosed by the State's experts as suffering from paraphilia NOS, a mental condition included in the DSM; and (2) the evidence supported a finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality within article 10. View "State v. Shannon S." on Justia Law

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The lawyer who represented Defendant at a pre-trial hearing and at trial was simultaneously representing, in an unrelated matter, a police officer who testified for the People that Defendant had confessed to one of the charged crimes. Defendant appealed, contending that his lawyer's conflict denied him the effective assistance of counsel. The appellate division affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant's waiver of any conflict of interest was invalid, but (2) Defendant failed to establish that any conflict affected the conduct of the defense. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that, because there was no valid waiver of the lawyer's conflict of interest, Defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "People v. Solomon" on Justia Law

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The question presented by these consolidated appeals was whether a defendant must preserve the argument that he was deprived of the right to a public trial when his family members were excluded from the courtroom during a portion of voir dire. In People v. Alvarez, the appellate division rejected Alvarez's argument that he had been deprived of a public trial as unpreserved and, in any event, without merit. In People v. George, the appellate division found George's argument that his right to a public trial had been violated was unpreserved and, in any event, without merit. The Court of Appeals (1) affirmed in George, as preservation is required; and (2) reversed in Alvarez and remitted for a new trial, as the issue was adequately preserved. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

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At issue in this appeal was whether the City of New York's 2010 plan for indigent defense, permitting representation by both institutional providers and private attorneys in cases in which a conflict of interest precludes representation by the initial provider, constitutes a valid combination plan within the meaning of County Law 722. Petitioners, various county bar associations, challenged the proposed plan and its implementing regulations as violative of N.Y. County Law 722 and N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law 11(1)(e). The Court of Appeals concluded that the City may assign conflict cases to institutional providers, that its ability to do so is not contingent on the consent of the county bar associations, and that the City's proposed indigent defense plan did not run afoul of the County Law or Municipal Home Rule Law. View "Matter of N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Bloomberg" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff broke her hip when she tripped and fell while rollerblading in her residential neighborhood in the Town of Amherst. Plaintiff and her husband brought a negligence action against the Town. Supreme court granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding that Plaintiff assumed the risk of her injuries. A divided appellate court reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk did not apply to Plaintiff's activity and that a triable issue of fact existed on the question of proximate cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) assumption of the risk did not apply to the fact pattern in this appeal; and (2) Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of proximate causation. View "Custodi v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs acquired a homeowners' insurance policy from Defendant effective as of the closing date of the home they had entered into a contract to purchase. The closing date was scheduled to take place on March 31 but was delayed until May 20. On May 15, a fire completely destroyed the house. Defendant disclaimed coverage on the pertinent grounds that the dwelling was unoccupied at the time of the loss, and therefore, it did not qualify as a "residence premises" under the policy. Supreme court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The appellate division modified the order, concluding that the "residence premises" requirement in the policy failed to define what qualifies as "resides" for the purpose of attaching coverage and that the policy was ambiguous in the circumstances of this case, and otherwise denied summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there were issues of fact as to whether Plaintiffs' daily presence in the house, coupled with their intent to eventually move in, was sufficient to satisfy the policy's requirements; and (2) the term "residence premises" in the contract was ambiguous. View "Dean v. Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law

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Defendant was arrested and arraigned on charges of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. The accusatory information was titled "Complaint/Information" and contained some factual information. Defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor. Defendant violated the terms of his conditional discharge and was sentenced to thirty days incarceration. Defendant subsequently challenged his conviction by arguing that the accusatory instrument was a facially insufficient misdemeanor complaint because it omitted an element of the offense charged. The police department answered that the accusatory instrument was a simplified traffic information, which required no factual allegations. The appellate term held that the accusatory instrument was a sufficient simplified traffic information and that the title of the instrument was not controlling. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly held that that the accusatory instrument was sufficient as a simplified traffic information despite its title and the fact that it included more factual detail than was required. View "People v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

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Shareholders commenced this action against Corporation seeking a declaration that Corporation must repurchase their shares of preferred stock after Corporation merged with two other corporations. Shareholders owned preferred stock by Corporation by way of an agreement that conferred special benefits requiring that Corporation repurchase the preferred stock in the event that a "fundamental change" occurred. Shareholders argued that a fundamental change took place when the merger occurred. Supreme court denied Corporation's motion to dismiss. The appellate division reversed and dismissed the complaint, finding that details of the merger triggered an exception of the fundamental change provision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the facts presented, there was ambiguity in the interpretation and effect of the preferred stock agreement and, as such, Corporation was not entitled to dismissal of Shareholders' complaint. View "Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v. Superior Well Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

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Travelers Indemnity Company issued to Plaintiff an insurance policy covering direct physical loss of or damage to a building. The policy contained an exclusion for loss or damage caused by earth movement, which included earth sinking whether "naturally occurring or due to made made or other artificial causes." The building suffered cracks as a result of an excavation being conducted on the lot next door to it. Travelers rejected Plaintiff's claim, relying on the earth movement exclusion. Plaintiff sued for breach of the policy. Supreme court denied Travelers' motion for summary judgment, and the appellate division affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Pioneer Tower Owners Ass'n v. State Farm, in which the Court held that an "earth movement" exclusion in an insurance policy did not unambiguously apply to excavation, applied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the policy in the instant case had added language expressly making the earth movement exclusion applicable to "man made" movement of earth, the exclusion was unambiguous and the loss caused by excavation was excluded from the policy. View "Bentoria Holdings, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

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Defendant contested his second violent felony offender adjudication, predicated upon a prior conviction in Pennsylvania that occurred when he was eighteen years old, contending (1) because he could have been accorded youthful offender status had he committed that crime in New York, he was entitled to such status for the purpose of enhanced sentencing, and (2) N.Y. Penal Law 70.04(1)(b)(v)'s tolling provision violated the equal protection clause of the State Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant did not receive youthful offender treatment for the underlying offense at issue, he was not now entitled to a retroactive application of youthful offender status to a foreign felony conviction; and (2) section 70.04(1)(b)(v)'s tolling provision, as applied to persons with differing years of incarceration may result in disparate punishment, does not violate the equal protection clause. View "People v. Meckwood" on Justia Law