Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three police officers pulled over Defendant's vehicle because of a defective rear brake light. While the vehicle was stopped, one of the officers asked the vehicle's occupants if they possessed any weapons. The offices subsequently discovered weapons in the vehicle. An ensuing misdemeanor information charged Defendant with two counts of misdemeanor possession of an air pistol or rifle. Supreme Court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the air rifles recovered from his vehicle, holding that the officer's inquiry into the presence of weapons required suspicion of criminality and that mere nervousness on the part of occupants did not give rise to such suspicion. Upon reargument, Supreme Court reversed its prior order, finding that the officer's inquiry was permissible even though the officer lacked a foundation of criminality. The Appellate Division reversed, granted Defendant's suppression motion, and dismissed the information. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the appellate division did not err in suppressing the air guns; but (2) the case should be remitted for consideration of the People's alternative claim that officers would have inevitably discovered the disputed physical evidence. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant Inepar S.A. Industria e Construc es (IIC) was a Brazilian power company that held a sixty percent stake in Defendant Inepar Investments, S.A., a corporation organized under the laws of Uruguay. Plaintiff IRB-Brasi Resseguros S.A. (IRB), a fifty percent state-owned corporation organized under the laws of Brazil, purchased $14 million of Inepar's global notes. After the interest payments ceased, and IRB never received the payment of the principal, Plaintiff sued IIC and Inepar seeking payment of the global note principal and the unpaid accrued interest. Inepar defaulted in this action. IIC moved for summary judgment, arguing that the guarantee IIC provided to guarantee the punctual payment of principal and interest under the terms of the global notes was void under Brazilian law and that New York's choice-of-law principals should apply, resulting in the application of Brazilian substantive law. Supreme Court ruled the express choice of New York law in the parties' contract should be given mandatory effect and ruled in favor of IIC. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a conflict-of-laws analysis need not be undertaken when there is an express choice of New York law in the parties' agreement. View "IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a national satellite television provider, purchased equipment used to deliver programming to its customers. Between March 2000 an February 2004, Petitioner did not pay sales or use taxes on its equipment purchases from manufacturers, and instead, collected sales taxes from its customers at the time the equipment was leased to them. Following an audit in 2005, the Department of Taxation and Finance issued a notice of determination assessing Petitioner an additional $1.8 million in use taxes in use taxes for the same period on the basis that Petitioner owed taxes at the time it purchased the equipment from manufacturers. The Tax Appeals Tribunal upheld the notice of determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Tribunal's determination. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner's purchases of equipment used to deliver programming to its customers were exempt from sales and use taxes under New York's Tax Law. View "EchoStar Satellite Corp. v. State Tax Appeals Tribunal" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, among other charges. At his initial trial, the jury deadlocked on that charge but rendered a partial verdict convicting Defendant of the lesser included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. Prior to the second trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, arguing that reprosecution for that offense would violate double jeopardy. The court denied the motion and proceeded to trial, convicting Defendant of third degree criminal possession. The appellate division reversed and dismissed the count of the indictment charging Defendant with third degree criminal possession, finding that Defendant's conviction of the lesser included offense of seventh degree criminal possession was deemed an acquittal of third degree possession and that double jeopardy barred Defendant's retrial for the greater offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that by opting for a mistrial and a retrial on the remaining counts, Defendant could not now claim his retrial was barred. View "People v. McFadden" on Justia Law

Each of these consolidated appeals involved a police officer who responded to provide assistance at the World Trade Center following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Two officers sought accidental disability retirement benefits (Bitchatchi and Macri), and the surviving spouse of another officer made a claim for line-of-duty death benefits (Maldonado). The primary issue was whether the pension fund Respondents produced competent evidence to rebut the statutory World Trade Center (WTC) presumption accorded to Petitioners' claims. The WTC presumption states that an officer's disability or death as a result of a qualifying condition is presumed to be caused by his or her exposure at the WTC site for purposes of benefit upgrades. The Supreme Court held that Respondents in these cases did not meet their burden of disproving that the officers' disabilities or death were causally related to their work at the WTC and related sites, thus affirming in Bitchatchi and Macri and reversing in Maldonado. View "Bitchatchi v. N.Y. City Police Dep't Pension Fund Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

Supreme Court convicted Defendant of three crimes of terrorism under N.Y. Penal Law 490.25 premised on first-degree manslaughter, attempted second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession, as well as second-degree conspiracy for agreeing to commit first-degree gang assault as a crime of terrorism. The Appellate Division modified by reducing the terrorism convictions to the three primary offenses, holding that the People established that Defendant only engaged in gang-related street crimes, not terrorist acts. Both parties appealed. On the People's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence in this case was insufficient to establish Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under Penal Law 490.25, as Defendant's criminal acts as a member of a gang were not acts of terrorism under the statute. On Defendant's cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial on the underlying offenses specified in the terrorism counts because the theory of terrorism should not have been charged, and the People were therefore permitted to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence that unduly prejudiced the jury's ability to fairly adjudicate Defendant's guilt or innocence. View "People v. Morales" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of real property in the Town of Chester (Town), New York. Plaintiffs then lived in New Jersey, and their address there appeared on the deed. Plaintiffs subsequently moved without informing the Town taxing authorities of their new address. After Plaintiffs failed to pay taxes on their New York property for three years, Plaintiffs defaulted in a foreclosure proceeding brought by the County on their New York property. The property was later sold. Plaintiffs subsequently sued the County, asserting that the attempts to give them notice of the foreclosure were constitutionally inadequate and seeking a declaration that they still owned the property. Supreme Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when notice mail to Plaintiffs at their last known address proved undeliverable, the tax collector was not constitutionally required to find some means of making personal service on them, or to address a notice to "occupant" at the former address, or to search New Jersey public records for a new address; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs were not deprived of their property without due process of law. View "Naughton v. Warren County" on Justia Law

Defendants were two owners of an apartment in a condominium (the Tomchinskys) and a company the Tomchinskys hired to renovate their unit (Company). Additional defendants were the condominium, its board of managers, and the Trump Corporation (collectively, the condominium defendants). Plaintiff, an employee of Company, was allegedly injured while working in the Tomchinskys' apartment. Plaintiff sued Defendants, claiming common-law negligence and violations of N.Y. Labor Law. Several parties moved for summary judgment, including Plaintiff, who cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his cause of action alleging a violation of N.Y. Labor Law 241 (6). Supreme Court denied the motions and cross motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed in part, granting the condominium defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims asserted against them. Plaintiff appealed the denial of his cross motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division did not err in affirming Supreme Court's denial of Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability under the Labor Law. View "Guryev v. Tomchinsky" on Justia Law