Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery, menacing, and possession of a weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing that the People violated N.Y. Crim. Proc. 710.30, which Defendant argued entitled him to the suppression of testimony about the victim's post-arrest identification. Defendant also argued that trial counsel's failure to raise that issue deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, assuming there was a section 710.30, if defense counsel did make a mistake in failing to object to the evidence, the mistake was not so egregious and prejudicial as to deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

After his vehicle was stopped by a police officer, Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, and a breathalyzer test computed his blood alcohol content at close to twice the legal limit. Defendant was subsequently indicted for felony DWI. During the jury trial, the People offered into evidence documents pertaining to the routine calibration and maintenance of the breathalyzer machine used in Defendant's breath test to demonstrate it was in proper working order at the time Defendant was tested. Defendant raised a Confrontation Clause challenge to the documents, contending that he was entitled to cross-examine the authors of the records. The county court allowed the documents to be received in evidence, and Defendant was convicted of felony DWI. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that documents pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance, and calibration of breathalyzer machines are nontestimonial, and consequently, the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in this case, and the trial judge did not err in declining Defendant's request to cross-examine the authors of the testing records before the court ruled on their admissibility. View "People v. Pealer" on Justia Law

The Bath Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD), a not-for-profit fire corporation, obtained its own financing for the construction of a new firehouse and hired Petitioner as the general contractor. The Department of Labor subsequently concluded that the firehouse project was a public work subject to the prevailing wage law. BVFD agreed to indemnify Petitioner and its subcontractors against any liability resulting from their failure to pay the prevailing wages, and thereafter, the project was completed. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination that the project was subject to the prevailing wage law. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because no public agency, as contemplated by N.Y. Labor Law 220, was a party to the contract, the prevailing wage law did not apply. View "M.G.M. Insulation, Inc. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

These three cases stemmed from a residency policy that called for employees of the City of Niagara Falls School District hired or promoted after the policy's effective date to reside in the City and maintain residency there during their employment. Here the District's Administrator for Human Resources notified three employees that they were suspected of violating the residency policy. The Board then terminated the employees' employment for failure to comply with the policy. On appeal, the Appellate Court (1) found that the District did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the employee had changed her domicile in the first case; (2) found the Board's determination was not arbitrary and capricious in the second case; and (3) determined that the third employee's termination was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals reversed in the first case, affirmed in the second case, and reversed and remanded in the third case, holding (1) the residency policy and its implementing regulations were clear and unambiguous; (2) the District's notice-and-hearing procedures easily complied with due process; and (3) in the majority of these cases, the Board's determinations were not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. View "Beck-Nichols v. Bianco" on Justia Law

A building zone ordinance of the Town of Hemptead provided that in any use district, with the exception of two districts, check-cashing establishments were expressly prohibited. In a memorandum supporting the provision, the deputy town attorney discussed the perceived social evil of check-cashing services and that public policy was served by this use of the zoning power. Several check-cashing establishments brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was invalid, and an injunction against its enforcement. Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the ordinance was not a legitimate object of the zoning power, nor could it be justified on the ground that it protected the health and safety of the community against the dangers created by armed robbery. View "Sunrise Check Cashing & Payroll Servs., Inc. v. Town of Hempstead" on Justia Law

In one agreement, Cammeby's Equity Holdings LLC (Cam Equity) received an option to acquire 99.99 percent of the ownership units of SVCare at the strike price of $100 million. In a second agreement, Cammeby's Funding III LLC (Cam III) agreed to lend $100 million to SVCare. Cam III and Cam Equity were controlled by the same person. In anticipation that Cam Equity would exercise the option, SVCare commenced an action alleging that the option was unenforceable because the consideration underlying its agreement to offer the option was contingent on Cam III loaning it $100 million, which SVCare claimed was never paid. Cam Equity brought a separate lawsuit seeking specific performance of the option agreement. Supreme Court (1) found in in favor of Cam Equity in the first action, concluding that the option and loan were entirely separate agreements and that SVCare could not offer extrinsic evidence regarding the $100 million loan obligation that was not mentioned in the option agreement; and (2) in the second action, determined that Cam III had, in fact, fully funded the $100 million loan to SVCare pursuant to the loan agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower court did not err in its judgment. View "Schron v. Troutman Saunders LLP" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a tenant in a New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) public housing apartment. After Petitioner became employed, she failed to disclose her new earnings to her landlord, an omission that allowed her to pay a substantially lower rent than she would have had she revealed the income. After NYCHA discovered the misrepresentation, Petitioner was criminally charged for failing to report her income. Petitioner pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of petit larceny and received a conditional discharge upon her agreement to pay restitution to NYCHA. Thereafter, NYCHA ordered that Petitioner's tenancy be terminated. Petitioner subsequently challenged that determination, claiming that eviction might leave her and her children homeless. Supreme Court affirmed NYCHA's determination. The Appellate Division reversed and vacated the penalty of termination, concluding that the termination of tenancy was so disproportionate to the offense, in light of the circumstances, as to shock the judicial conscience. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NYCHA's decision to terminate Petitioner's tenancy was not so disproportionate to her misconduct as to shock the judicial conscience. View "Perez v. Rhea" on Justia Law

Cammeby's Funding LLC (Cam Funding) and Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings LLC (Fundamental) entered into an option agreement entitling Cam Funding to acquire one-third of Fundamental's membership units for a strike price of $1,000. Cam Funding subsequently notified Fundamental that it was exercising the option and sent Fundamental a check for $1,000. Fundamental respondent that, pursuant to its operating agreement, no membership units in Fundamental would be issued until Cam Funding provided a required capital contribution of 33.33 percent. Fundamental then sought a declaration that Cam Funding was bound by the membership requirements in the operating agreement. Cam Funding filed a counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Supreme Court ruled that the option agreement unambiguously granted Cam Funding the right to acquire a one-third interest in Fundamental upon payment of $1,000 and that enforcement of the operating agreement would interfere with Cam Funding's rights under the terms of the option agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mere reference in the option agreement to the operating agreement was not enough to evidence clear intent for the two separate contracts to be read as one. View "Fund. Long Term Care Holdings, LLC v. Cammeby's Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant and three codefendants - Eric Young, Marvin Howard and Nathaniel Williams - were jointly indicted on a theory of accomplice liability for second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession. Young and Howard waived their right to a jury, and Defendant and Williams were tried jointly. Howard testified during the trial. Defendant and Williams were convicted of both crimes, and the judge acquitted Howard. Defendant appealed on the ground that the judge's refusal to direct Howard to testify outside the jury's presence deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The appellate division agreed and reversed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by the judge's decision to allow the jury to hear Howard's defense. View "People v. Warren" on Justia Law

Under the Sex Offender and Registration Act (SORA), offenders are assessed fifteen points if they have a history of drug or alcohol abuse or if they were abusing drugs or alcohol at the time of their sex offense. At issue in these two appeals was the extent of proof necessary to constitute clear and convincing evidence of drug or alcohol abuse under the SORA guidelines. At a SORA hearing for Defendant Michael Palmer, Supreme Court assessed Palmer fifteen points for drug or alcohol abuse based upon his admission that he was using alcohol at the time of his sexual offense. At Defendant Cornell Long's SORA hearing, Long was assessed fifteen points under the history of alcohol abuse risk factor because he admitted to drinking alcohol 1 1/2 hours prior to committing his sexual offense. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted both cases, holding that the extent of proof in these cases failed to meet the statutory standard of clear and convincing evidence of drug or alcohol abuse under the SORA guidelines. View "People v. Palmer" on Justia Law