Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for second-degree kidnapping, two counts of second-degree weapon possession, and first-degree reckless endangerment. Defendant pled guilty to the charges. On appeal, Defendant sought reversal of the kidnapping conviction, arguing that his restraint of the victim was incidental to the conduct constituting reckless endangerment, and therefore, the kidnapping count merged with the reckless endangerment offense. The Appellate Division declined to address the merger theory since Defendant's guilty plea forfeited this claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the preservation rule, which states that any claims of error not preserved by appropriate objection in the court of first instance will not be considered by the Court of Appeals, applies to a merger claim in a kidnapping prosecution, and therefore, Defendant's failure to assert the claim in Supreme Court precluded the Court's review. View "People v. Hanley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assaulting three deputy sheriffs while he was an inmate in county jail. At trial, Defendant testified that one deputy, Saeva, had started the physical fight. Defendant also denied kicking at or trying to hurt another deputy, Schliff. The jury acquitted Defendant of assaulting two of the deputies, including Saeva, but convicted him of assaulting Schliff. At issue was a video camera located in the cell block where Defendant and Saeva had their altercation. The video images were destroyed by the State before trial. At trial, the court refused to give an adverse inference charge as to the count on which Defendant was convicted with respect to any video of the incident because Defendant had asked for the preservation of that video before it was destroyed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that Defendant was entitled to have an adverse inference charge given as to all counts. View "People v. Handy" on Justia Law

Complainant, a sitting Rochester City Court Judge, accused Defendant of sending her three offensive text messages. Defendant was charged with two misdemeanor counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree. A visiting judge from a neighboring county was assigned to preside over pretrial hearings. Despite repeated plea negotiations, the District Attorney's office did not offer Defendant a reduced charge or agree to a plea that included a favorable sentence. Defendant filed a motion and a renewed motion to disqualify the District Attorney due to the existence of a conflict of interest and requested that a special prosecutor be appointed. The District failed to rebut the allegations of disparate treatment with a single example of a comparable case it had similarly refused to resolve with a plea that included a favorable sentence. Both motions and requests were denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of one count of aggravated harassment in the second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the District Attorney's office failed to take steps to dispel the appearance of inappropriate disparate treatment in this case, this was one of those rare cases in which a significant appearance of impropriety was created, requiring disqualification. View "People v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were Amazon.com and Overstock.com. Both companies were formed in states other than New York, were located in states other than New York, and sold their merchandise solely through the Internet. At issue was N.Y. Tax Law 1101(b)(8)(vi) (the Internet tax), which was amended in 2008 to provide that vendors who paid New York residents to actively solicit business in the State would be required to pay New York taxes. Plaintiffs challenged the Internet tax, alleging that it was unconstitutional on its face as a violation the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. Supreme Court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Internet tax did not subject online retailers without a physical presence in the State to New York sales and compensating use taxes; and (2) the tax did not create an irrational, irrebuttable presumption of solicitation of business within the State. View "Overstock.com, Inc. v State Dep't of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with various sex crimes pertaining to separate incidents involving two twelve-year-old girls. During the trial, the People presented the testimony of an expert witness on the subject of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the expert's testimony exceeded permissible bounds when the prosecutor tailored hypothetical questions to include facts concerning the abuse that occurred in this case, which improperly bolstered the People's proof that Defendant was the perpetrator; but (2) the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence of Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The appellate division reversed and remitted the matter for a new trial, concluding that the trial court committed prejudicial error in (1) precluding the testimony of a witness who had previously been accused by complainant of sexual abuse, and (2) permitting the prosecutor to adduce testimony from the People's child abuse expert, improperly bolstering the complainant's credibility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit expert testimony regarding the behavior of sexual abusers; but (2) the proffered testimony of the witness should have been permitted at trial, as the proposed testimony went to a material issue of Defendant's defense, and the trial court's error in excluding the testimony was not harmless. View "People v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant executed in May 2009, law enforcement found a single pornographic image of a child on Defendant's computer. In September 2009, Defendant pled guilty to possessing a sexual performance of a child. In January 2010, the forensic examination of a memory card and other media devices seized pursuant to the warrant was performed and resulted in the discovery of hundreds of still-frame digital images depicting Defendant engaged in a sexual act with a child. Defendant subsequently entered a plea to predatory sexual assault in the first degree. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion, concluding that by the time of the forensic examination yielding the inculpatory still-frame images took place, the authority provided by the warrant had lapsed, and therefore the search was illegal and the evidence obtained from it inadmissible. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant had no relevant expectation of privacy in the seized items to ground a Fourth Amendment-based suppression claim; and (2) even so, the claim would not be viable in light of the warrant's continued validity. View "People v. DeProspero" on Justia Law

M&T Real Estate Trust foreclosed on commercial mortgages executed by Defendant. After a public auction, the referee sold M&T the property. M&T's attorney twice declined to accept or retain physical possession of the referee's deed dated May 11, 2010. As a result, the referee took back the deed and other closing documents and ultimately executed a deed on August 9, 2010 when M&T's attorney accepted it on behalf of MAT Properties, Inc. The deed was recorded on August 17, 2010. M&T subsequently filed a motion seeking to confirm the referee's report of sale and enter a deficiency judgment. Defendants argued that M&T's request for a deficiency judgment was untimely. The county court granted M&T's motion, determining that it was timely under the relevant ninety-day period because the consummation of the sale occurred on August 9, 2010 and was recorded on August 17, 2010. The appellate division reversed, concluding that the ninety-day period commenced in May 2010 upon the delivery of the referee's deed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that M&T's motion was timely because it was brought within ninety days after the date of the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the deed to the purchaser on August 9, 2010. View "M&T Real Estate Trust v. Doyle" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant formed a partnership by oral agreement. Defendant later withdrew from the venture after Plaintiff refused his demand for majority ownership of the partnership. Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, claiming that Defendant could not unilaterally terminate his obligations under the agreement. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the complaint failed to allege that the partnership agreement provided for a definite term or a defined objective, and therefore, dissolution was permissible under N.Y. P'ship Law 62(1)(b). The Appellate Division modified by reinstating the breach of contract cause of action, reasoning that the complaint adequately described a definite term and alleged a particular undertaking. The Court of Appeals reversed with directions that the breach of contract cause of action of the complaint be dismissed, holding (1) the complaint did not satisfy the "definite term" element of section 62(1)(b) because it did not set forth a specific or a reasonably certain termination date; and (2) the alleged scheme of anticipated partnership events detailed in the complaint were too amorphous to meet the statutory "particular undertaking" standard for precluding unilateral dissolution of a partnership. View "Gelman v. Buehler" on Justia Law

The Whites signed a contract to buy the Farrells' property and tendered a $25,000 deposit. The Whites later terminated the contract due to a faulty "drainage situation." The Whites subsequently sued the Farrells to recover their down payment, alleging, inter alia, fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation. The Farrells counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court concluded (1) the Whites had breached the contract and were not entitled to a return of their down payment; and (2) the measure of the Farrells' actual damages was the difference between the contract price and the market value of the property at the time of the breach, and thus, the Farrells did not suffer damages on account of the Whites' breach. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the measure of damages for the Whites' breach was the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach; and (2) there was conflicting evidence as to the property's fair market value when the Whites default, which precluded summary judgment. Remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings. View "White v. Farrell" on Justia Law