Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs purchased furniture from the Fortunoff Department Store. Along with the furniture, Plaintiffs purchased a protection plan. The plan was a contract in which Valspar Corporation agreed to provide service for damages to the furniture during the contract period. The plan contained a store closure provision providing that if the store location where customers purchased furniture closed, the purchase price of the plan would be refunded. Fortunoff subsequently closed, and Valspar tendered Plaintiffs a refund of their payment made to the plan. Plaintiffs brought a diversity action against Valspar for breach of contract under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 395, which forbids the termination before expiration of any "maintenance agreement covering parts and/or service" and for damages under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, claiming that section 395 rendered the store closure provision ineffective and that, by denying claims based on this provision, Valspar breached its contracts with Plaintiffs. The district court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals accepted certification to answer questions of law and held (1) section 395(a) does not make contract clauses that contradict its terms null and void; and (2) a violation of section 395(a) alone does not give rise to a cause of action under section 349. View "Schlessinger v. Valspar Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree for stealing property from the apartment of Complainants, a husband and wife. The wife spoke Cantonese. Prior to her testimony at trial, the court arranged for a state-employed court interpreter to translate the wife's testimony into English. Because the interpreter was acquainted with Complainants, defense counsel requested that the trial court replace the interpreter. The court denied the request. Defendant was subsequently found guilty as charged. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, on the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request that the court reporter be removed. View "People v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a number of corporations and an individual, Ariq Vanunu, alleging that he had provided telephone service to Defendants pursuant to a written agreement and had not been paid. The complaint alleged that Vanunu was a "principal officer in all the corporate defendant entities." A default judgment was later entered against all Defendants. Vanunu moved to vacate the judgment, asserting that his default was excusable and that he had meritorious defenses to the action. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that Vanunu was personally liable for the stated claims, the default judgment was a nullity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defect in this case was not jurisdictional. View "Manhattan Telecomms. Corp. v. H & A Locksmith, Inc." on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were married in 1997. A week before the wedding, they each separately signed a prenuptial agreement. Neither party was present when the other executed the document, and the signatures were witnessed by different notaries public. In the acknowledgment relating to Husband's signature, a key phrase was omitted. As a result, the certificate failed to indicate that the notary public confirmed the identity of the person executing the document. In 2010, Husband filed for divorce. Wife commenced a separate action seeking a divorce and a declaration that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable. Supreme Court denied Wife's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding (1) the certificate of acknowledgment was defective, but (2) the deficiency could be cured after the fact, and the notary public affidavit raised a triable question of fact as to whether the prenuptial agreement had been properly acknowledged when it was signed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prenuptial agreement was invalid where, even assuming a defect in a certificate of acknowledgment could be cured, the notary public's affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable question of fact as to the propriety of the original acknowledgment procedure. View "Galetta v. Galetta" on Justia Law

A minor plaintiff commenced a civil action against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and one of its priests alleging sexual molestation by the priest. The Diocese settled the action for $2 million and additional consideration. At issue on appeal was a dispute between the Diocese and one of its insurance carriers (National Union) regarding the Diocese's demand for reimbursement for the settlement. The Diocese sought a declaratory judgment that National Union was required to indemnify the Diocese for the settlement and certain defense costs and fees. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the Diocese. At issue on appeal was whether the incidents of sexual abuse constituted a single occurrence or multiple occurrences that spanned several years and several policy periods. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the alleged acts of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences and that the settlement amount should be allocated on a pro rata basis over the seven policy periods. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the incidents of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences and that any potential liability should be apportioned among the several insurance policies, pro rata. View "Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by felony complaint with numerous crimes relating to Defendant's procurement of loans to purchase properties using the personal identifying information of four mortgage loan applicants. Defendant waived his right to be prosecuted by indictment and pleaded guilty under a superior court information (SCI) to one count of grand larceny in the first degree and one count of scheme to defraud in the first degree. The appellate division vacated Defendant's plea, concluding that the SCI was jurisdictionally defective because it named victims not identified in the felony complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the SCI served as a proper jurisdictional predicate for Defendant's guilty plea and was not defective. View "People v. Milton" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree for their respective roles in a drug-trafficking operation involving the movement of 400 pounds of cocaine from California to New York. The appellate division affirmed. Defendants appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred when it did not conduct an in-camera inquiry of a juror, who, prior to deliberations, wrote a note asking a question about the case. Defendants claimed that the use of the word "we" in the note implied that at least two of the jurors had been engaged in premature deliberations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) absent some indication that the note-writing juror had engaged in some disqualifying conduct, the fact that one or more jurors may have engaged in premature deliberations or requested additional evidence was not sufficient to trigger a Buford inquiry; and (2) the remainder of Defendant's arguments were without merit. View "People v. Mejias" on Justia Law

This case arose from efforts of Verizon New England to collect a judgment awarded in 2009 by the U.S. district court against Global NAPs (GNAPs). Verizon served a restraining notice on GNAPs and companies with which it did business, one of which was Transcom Enhanced Services. Verizon subsequently commenced this special proceeding seeking a turnover of property and debts of the judgment debtor held by Transcom. Supreme Court denied turnover and dismissed the petition with prejudice, concluding that Transcom did not owe any debt to GNAPs and it did not hold property in which GNAPs had any interest. At issue on appeal was whether the at-will, prepayment service agreement between the parties, which lacked any obligation to continue services or a commitment to engage in future dealings, constituted a property interest or debt subject to a N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) restraining notice. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, based on the nature of the agreement, the restraining notice was unenforceable. View "Verizon New England, Inc. v Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of murder in the second degree. After retaining a new attorney for his appeal, Defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. County Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that, although trial counsel's representation may have been "unorthodox," it was not ineffective. The Court of Appeals reversed after noting that defense counsel's actions throughout this case showed an unfamiliarity with or disregard for basic criminal procedural and evidentiary law. The Court held that while defense counsel's errors in this case individually may not constitute ineffective assistance, the cumulative effect of counsel's actions deprived Defendant of meaningful representation. View "People v. Oathout" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when the van she was driving hit a cow on a public road. Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the owner of the property where the cow was kept and the two men who may have owned the cow. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for two of the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed as to those defendants and also granted summary judgment as to the third defendant, concluding that, pursuant to Bard v. Jahnke, injuries inflicted by domestic animals "may only proceed under strict liability based on the owner's knowledge of the animal's vicious propensities, not on theories of common-law negligence." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the rule of Bard does not bar a suit for negligence when a farm animal has been allowed to stray from the property where it is kept. View "Hastings v. Sauve" on Justia Law