Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter, second-degree assault, third-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the second-degree manslaughter and second-degree assault convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the proof was legally sufficient to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence demonstrated that Defendant (1) engaged in conduct exhibiting "the kind of seriously blameworthy carelessness whose seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community's general sense of right and wrong," and (2) acted with the requisite mens rea of recklessness by consciously disregarding the risk he created. View "People v. Asaro" on Justia Law

The Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (OMIG) terminated a physician's participation in the Medicaid program on the basis of a Bureau of Professional Medical Conduct (BPMC) consent order, in which the physician pleaded no contest to charges of professional misconduct and agreed to probation. Supreme Court annulled the OMIG's determination. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding (1) the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in barring the physician from treating Medicaid patients when the BPMC permitted him to continue to practice; and (2) the OMIG was required to conduct an independent investigation before excluding a physician from Medicaid on the basis of a BPMC consent order. The Court of Appeals affirmed but for another reason, holding (1) the OMIG is authorized to remove a physician from Medicaid in reliance solely on a consent order between the physician and the BMPC, regardless of whether BPMC chooses to suspend the physician's license or OMIG conducts an independent investigation; but (2) because OMIG did not explain why the BPMC consent order caused it to exclude the physician from the Medicaid program, the agency's determination was arbitrary and capricious. View "Koch v. Sheehan" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for various drug offenses. At a Huntley hearing, the county court judge informed the parties that he may have either represented or prosecuted Defendant on unrelated criminal matters in the past, but neither party object to the judge's continuing to preside over the matter. Later, however, Defendant requested that the judge recuse himself based on the judge's prior representation of him. The judge denied the motion, ultimately finding no reason to disqualify himself. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several counts of criminal possession of marijuana. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that the judge's recusal was not warranted and that Defendant received meaningful representation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself; and (2) Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. View "People v. Glynn" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested after law enforcement officers noticed him walking on a roadway with wet blood stains on his clothes, hands, and shoes. Because the officers believed a person may have been injured, they continued to question Defendant despite his request for legal assistance. Eventually, officers discovered Defendant's business partner lying dead in his driveway. Defendant was indicted for second-degree murder and moved to suppress statements he made to the police and an acquaintance, as well as the physical evidence, claiming he had been arrested without probable cause and interrogated in violation of his right to counsel and without having received Miranda warnings. The county court ruled that the detention and questioning of Defendant were justified under the emergency doctrine. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the record supported the determination that the emergency doctrine justified the police questioning; and (2) the courts below did not err in finding that Defendant's assertions were voluntary and admissible at trial. View "People v. Doll" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a lifelong resident of a housing complex operated under the Limited-Profit Housing Companies Act and the Private Housing Finance Law. After Petitioner's parents vacated the apartment, Petitioner filed a successive application to succeed to the tenancy. The housing complex rejected the application. The Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) denied Petitioner's appeal, basing its denial on the fact that Petitioner's mother had failed to file an annual income affidavit listing Petitioner as a co-occupant for one of the two years prior to her vacatur. Supreme Court annulled DHCR's denial of Petitioner's appeal and granted his succession petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the evidence of Petitioner's primary residency was overwhelming, and because the was no relationship between the mother's failure to file the income affidavit and Petitioner's income or occupancy, DHCR's determination was arbitrary and capricious. View "Murphy v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner of an apartment building, complained when Armory Plaza, the owner of the lot next to Plaintiff's building, began excavating the lot to make way for a new building. The excavation purportedly caused cracks in the walls and foundations of Plaintiff's building. After Plaintiff's insurer (Defendant) rejected Plaintiff's claims under its policy, Plaintiff brought suit. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, holding that the alleged conduct of Armory and its contractors was not "vandalism" within the meaning of the policy. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) for purposes of construing a property insurance policy covering acts of vandalism, malicious damage may be found to result from an act not directed specifically at the covered property; and (2) the state of mind required to find malicious damage is a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct in question may be called willful or wanton. View "Georgitsi Realty, LLC v. Penn-Star Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner and Ajmal Khan, principal of Verus Investment Holdings, purchased securities in a company to arbitrage a merger between that company and another company (the trade). Petitioner and Khal used Verus' account at Jefferies & Co. and Winton Capital Holding to complete the purchase. After the merger, Jefferies wired to Verus the original investment and profits attributable to the Winton funds. Verus wired the investment money to Winton and the profits to Doris Lindbergh, a friend of Petitioner. Tax authorities later informed Jefferies it owed withholding tax on the trade. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in an agreement between Jefferies and Verus, Jefferies commenced an arbitration against Verus for the unpaid taxes. Verus, in turn, asserted thirty-party arbitration claims against Petitioner, Lindbergh, and others for their share of the taxes. After a hearing, Supreme Court determined that nonsignatories Petitioner and Lindbergh could not be compelled to arbitrate. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Petitioner should be estopped from avoiding arbitration because he knowingly exploited and received direct benefits from the agreement between Jefferies and Verus. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner did not receive a direct benefit from the arbitration agreement and could not be compelled to arbitrate. View "Belzberg v. Verus Invs. Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a weapon not in his home or place of business and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court's admission of a 911 telephone call reporting that a person matching Defendant's description committed an uncharged gunpoint robbery and police testimony describing the radio run they received about the call deprived him of a fair trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the 911 evidence to be admitted, along with several limiting instructions, as background information to explain the aggressive police action toward Defendant. View "People v. Morris" on Justia Law

Appellant owned a part-time residence in New York but intended to make Louisiana his primary residence. Appellant applied for a New York State pistol/revolver license pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 400.00 and inquired whether he would still be eligible for a handgun license. The county court judge denied Appellant's application for a handgun license, concluding that the term "residence" was equivalent to "domicile," and therefore, because Appellant was not domiciled in New York, he was ineligible for the license. Appellant commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the judge had violated his right to keep and bear arms and his right to equal protection by denying his license application on the ground of his domicile. The district court granted the judge summary judgment. Upon Appellant's appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the N.Y. Court of Appeals. The Court answered by holding that an applicant who owns a part-time residence in New York but makes his permanent domicile elsewhere is eligible for a New York handgun license in the city or county where his part-time residence is located. View "Osterweil v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

In 1993, Antonio Hroncich was diagnosed with asbestos-related diseases resulting from his employment at the Consolidated Edison Company of N.Y., Inc. (Con Ed). The Workers' Compensation Board granted Hroncich compensation benefits. Hroncich was later diagnosed with thyroid cancer, a condition that was unrelated to his work at Con Ed. Hroncich died in 2007. Hroncich's widow, Gaudenzia, later field a claim for death benefits from Con Ed. The Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) found that Hroncich's death was causally related to his occupational disease and awarded death benefits. In so doing, the WCLJ concluded that the Workers' Compensation Law does not require apportionment of death benefits between work-related and non-work-related causes. The Workers' Compensation Board and Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute does not mandate the Board to factor out non-work-related causes of death when making an award for death benefits. View "In re Hroncich" on Justia Law