Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The New York City Department of Homeless Services (DHS) is the entity charged with providing temporary housing assistance to homeless men and women in the City. In 2011, DHS announced the adoption of a new eligibility procedure that required applicants to meet a need standard and to cooperate with investigations of need. The New York City Council brought a declaratory judgment action asserting that the new procedure could not be implemented because DHS failed to comply with the notice and hearing provisions in the City Administrative Procedure Act (CAPA). Supreme Court and the Appellate Court concluded that DHS violated CAPA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because DHS did not follow the notice and hearing steps necessary to formally promulgate the eligibility procedure, the provision was unenforceable until compliance was achieved. View "Council of the City of N.Y. v. Dep't of Homeless Servs. of the City of N.Y." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when a van operated by Dennis Feliciano and owned by Paragon Cable Manhattan rear-ended the car in which Plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff filed this suit against Feliciano and Paragon Cable (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants' negligence caused her to suffer nasal and vertebra fractures. A jury returned a verdict in Defendants' favor. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred in failing to give a "missing witness" charge, which instructs a jury that it may draw an adverse inference based on the failure of a party to call a witness who would normally be expected to support that party's version of events. As a precondition for the charge, the witness is expected to give noncumulative testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) when a missing witness charge is requested in a civil case, the uncalled witness's testimony may be considered cumulative only when it is cumulative of testimony or other evidence favoring the party controlling the witness; and (2) Supreme Court erred in denying Plaintiff's request for a missing witness charge, and the error was not harmless. View "Devito v. Feliciano" on Justia Law

On October 18, 2000, Tenant leased Landlord's billboard for fifteen years, commencing on December 1, 2000 and ending September 30, 2015. The lease obligated Tenant to pay the full annual basic rent for 2007 to Landlord on January 1, 2007. Tenant later terminated the lease, effective January 8, 2007, and gave Landlord a check representing rent for the period of January 1, 2007 through January 8, 2007. Landlord filed suit against Tenant seeking the balance of the basic rent for 2007. Tenant moved for summary judgment, suggesting that Landlord agreed to pro-rate rent for 2007 during an oral communication. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Tenant. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment for Landlord. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tenant was obligated to pay the full annual basic rent for the calendar year 2007, the parties did not agree in the lease to apportion rent post-termination except in specified circumstances not relevant here, and Tenant's claim that the parties orally agreed to such apportionment was barred by the lease's "no oral modification" clause. View "Eujoy Realty Corp. v. Van Wagner Commc'ns, LLC" on Justia Law

On January 14, 2010, Plaintiff received a $4.4 million judgment against The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ("Port Authority"). The Nash judgment became final as of July 13, 2011 due to the Port Authority's failure to appeal. The Court of Appeals subsequently issued Matter of World Trade Center Bombing Litig. ("Ruiz"), which held that the Port Authority was insulated from tortious liability for injuries sustained in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The Port Authority moved to vacate the Nash judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5105. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to vacate her judgment because the judgment in her case was final and beyond the scope of review. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Nash's judgment became final when the Port Authority failed to appeal within the requisite time period; and (2) Supreme Court erred in concluding that (i) the Court of Appeals' decision in Ruiz divested Supreme Court of its authority to review the equities with respect to the parties in determining whether the vacate the judgment, and (ii) Ruiz mandated that the court must grant a section 5015(a) motion by rote. Remitted. View "Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with arson in the third degree, insurance fraud in the second degree, and reckless endangerment in the first degree. Defendant's first trial ended in a hung jury. At his second trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of insurance fraud in the second degree but acquitted him of the other charges. Defendant appealed, arguing that because the jury acquitted him of arson, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for insurance fraud. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the factual inconsistency in the jury verdict acquitting Appellant of one count but convicting him of another did not render the evidence legally insufficient to support the conviction. View "People v. Abraham" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of first-degree robbery. Defendants appealed, arguing, among other things, that their counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to assert as an affirmative defense that one of two weapons displayed during the gunpoint robbery was not "a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or serious physical injury, could be discharged" pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 160.15. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) defense counsel were not ineffective for neglecting to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or for failing to put the affirmative defense before the jury; and (2) the record supported the lower courts' determination that the robbery victim's showup identification of Defendants was proper. View "People v. Howard" on Justia Law

Nelson D. was a convicted sex offender who suffered from mental retardation. The State filed a N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 petition seeking to subject Nelson to civil management. After a dispositional hearing, Supreme Court found the State failed to establish that Nelson was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement but concluded that Nelson required strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST). Supreme Court ordered Nelson's placement at Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment was an appropriate SIST regimen as authorized under article 10. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) absent a finding of the type of condition that statutorily subjected Appellant to confinement, his placement at Valley Ridge constituted involuntary confinement in violation of article 10; and (2) involuntary commitment, as part of a SIST plan, deprived Nelson of the statutorily proscribed procedures mandated for confinement under article 10. View "State v. Nelson D." on Justia Law

After an altercation with police officers at a train station, Defendant and his brother fled the scene, leaving a bag on the platform. Based on the bag's contents, Defendant was arrested and charged with second-degree criminal possession of a weapon and resisting arrest. The police officers later identified Defendant in a photo array. Defendant moved to suppress the contents of the bag and the identifications. Supreme Court initially granted the motion but subsequently reopened the suppression hearing and denied the motion to suppress. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Supreme Court (1) erred when it reopened the suppression hearing because the People had been given the opportunity to present their evidence the first time around, and (2) should have granted reargument rather than reopening and, upon reargument, adhered to its initial suppression order because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the principles underlying People v. Havelka preclude a trial judge from reopening a suppression hearing to give the People an opportunity to shore up their evidentiary or legal position absent a showing they were deprived of a full and fair opportunity to be heard. View "People v. Kevin W." on Justia Law

Defendants in these three consolidated appeals were convicted of depraved indifference murder for driving in an outrageously reckless manner while intoxicated by alcohol or drugs and causing the death of at least one other person. Defendants challenged their convictions, contending that the evidence was not legally sufficient to support their convictions. Specifically, Defendants asserted that there was insufficient proof they had the requisite mental state of depraved indifference. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that there was sufficient evidence in each case that Defendants were aware of and appreciated the risks caused by their behavior. View "People v. Heidgen" on Justia Law

In 2011, Petitioner was convicted several crimes. In 2012, Petitioner was convicted of additional crimes. In all, Petitioner was sentenced to five definite one-year terms of imprisonment, four of which were imposed to run consecutively. Respondents calculated Petitioner's consecutive definite sentences by awarding Petitioner jail time credit for time served prior to the commencement of his 2011 sentences as well as good time credit. Respondents then applied these credits against Petitioner's court-imposed aggregate term of imprisonment, reducing it to 868 days. Because this term was longer than two years imprisonment, Respondents adjusted Petitioner's discharge date to exactly two years from the date his sentences commenced. Petitioner filed a petition seeking to compel Respondents to recalculate his sentence by applying his jail time and good time credits against the two-year term imposed under N.Y. Penal Law 70.30(2)(b). The Appellate Division ordered Petitioner's immediate release from county jail. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, when Penal Law 70.30(2)(b) limits consecutive definite sentences to an aggregate term of two years imprisonment, jail time credit and good time credit should be deducted from that two-year aggregate term rather than the aggregate term imposed by the sentencing court. View "People ex rel. Ryan v. Cheverko" on Justia Law