Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In these two matters, the State commenced civil commitment proceedings against Kenneth T. and Donald DD under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10. After trials were held in both cases, it was found that the men had a condition, disease or disorder that prdisposed them to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and resulted in their having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct. Following dispositional hearings, both men were ordered to be confined. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conclusion that Kenneth T.’s mental conditions resulted in his having serious difficulty in controlling conduct constituting a sex offense; and (2) in Donald DD’s case, Supreme Court erred in using a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, together with testimony concerning Donald DD’s sex crimes, but without evidence of some independent mental abnormality diagnosis, to ground a finding of mental abnormality within the meaning of article 10. View "Matter of State of New York v. Donald DD" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Queens County District Attorney implemented a central booking pre-arraignment interview program consisting of a structured, videotaped interview conducted by members of the District Attorney’s staff with a suspect immediately prior to arraignment. During these interviews, a detective investigator delivered a scripted “preamble” to the Miranda warnings informing suspects that “this is your opportunity to tell us your story” and “your only opportunity” to speak with the District Attorney staff before going to court. Defendants here made statements in their respective videotaped interviews that they unsuccessfully sought to suppress. The Appellate Divisions reversed and ordered suppression of the statements, concluding that the preamble prevented the Miranda warnings from effectively conveying to suspects their rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the preamble undercut the subsequently-communicated Miranda warnings to the extent that Defendants were not adequately and effectively advised of their rights safeguarded by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before they agreed to speak with law enforcement authorities. View "People v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

Defendant testified at a grand jury proceeding against his brother and received transactional immunity but subsequently refused to testify at his brother's trial. The court cited Defendant for contempt and ordered him to be taken into custody. Defendant’s brother’s trial ended in an acquittal, and Defendant was released from custody. Thereafter, the People charged Defendant with two counts of criminal attempt in the second degree for his refusal to testify at his brother’s trial. City Court dismissed the charges on double jeopardy grounds. County Court affirmed, concluding that the prior contempt proceedings were criminal in nature because the court ordered Defendant’s confinement, and in so doing relied on language in the criminal contempt provisions of the Judiciary Law. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where a court subjects a defendant to conditional imprisonment in an attempt to compel the defendant to testify and does not otherwise adjudicate the defendant to be in criminal contempt or impose punishment that is criminal in nature, double jeopardy will not bar a subsequent prosecution for contempt under the Penal Law. View "People v. Sweat" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1983, Defendant law firm represented Alice Lawrence and her three children in litigation arising from the death of her husband and their father, a real estate developer. For over three decades, Lawrence and Seymour Cohn, the decedent’s brother and business partner, litigated issues surrounding the sale of the decedent’s properties and the distribution of the proceeds. After Cohn and Lawrence settled the matter, this dispute followed between Lawrence and Defendant with respect to the law firm’s fee and the validity of gifts made by Lawrence to three law firm partners. Lawrence died in 2008. Thereafter, the Lawrence estate argued that a revised retainer agreement between the parties was void procedurally and substantively and made claims for refund of the gifts. The Court of Appeals held (1) the revised retainer agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable and was therefore enforceable; and (2) the Lawrence estate’s claim for return of the gifts was time-barred. View "Matter of Lawrence" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Vietnam, was married in New York to Vu Truong, a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner was later granted the status of a conditional permanent resident in the United States on the basis of her marriage. It was subsequently discovered that Petitioner’s mother was Vu Truong’s half—sister, and Petitioner was his half-niece. An immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United States on the ground that her purported marriage was void. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asked the New York Court of Appeals whether the marriage in this case, where the husband was the half-brother of the wife’s mother, was void as incestuous under N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 5(3). The Court of Appeals held that a marriage between a half-uncle and half-niece is not void as incestuous under section 5(3). View "Nguyen v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of predatory sexual assault against a child for engaging in two or more acts of sexual conduct with the Complainant, who was less than thirteen years old. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s references to the Complainant’s prior consistent statements disclosing the abuse and by the trial court’s ruling that Defendant’s mother was precluded from testifying about an allegedly prior inconsistent statement made by the Complainant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he made these evidentiary rulings, as (1) the challenged testimony was admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of explaining to the jury how and when the sexual abuse came to light; and (2) Defendant’s mother’s proffered testimony was inadmissible hearsay not subject to any exception. View "People v. Ludwig" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment charging her with attempted murder in the second degree with the understanding that the county court would impose a fifteen-year term of imprisonment. The county court imposed the sentence promised at the plea, plus five years of postrelease supervision (PRS). The court failed to mention the period of PRS at the plea hearing but did mention the period of PRS during the sentencing proceeding. Defendant appealed, arguing that her plea was involuntary. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that because Defendant had the opportunity to object to the imposition of PRS but failed to do so before sentencing was imposed, her challenge was unpreserved. The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the plea, holding (1) a trial court must notify a defendant of a term of PRS sufficiently in advance of its imposition that the defendant has the opportunity to object to the deficiency in the plea proceeding; and (2) in the absence of a sufficient opportunity to object, preservation is unnecessary. View "People v. Turner" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the “separate entity” rule continues to be valid law and serves to prevent a judgment creditor from ordering a garnishee bank operating branches in New York to restrain a judgment debtor’s assets held in foreign branches of the bank. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified this question of law to the New York Court of Appeals. Plaintiff, the judgment creditor in this case, asked the Court of Appeals to disavow the separate entity doctrine as outmoded and unnecessary. Defendant, the garnishee bank, urged that the rule remains vital in the context of international banking. The Court of Appeals answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that the separate entity remains valid, and thus, a judgment creditor’s service of a restraining notice on a garnishee bank’s New York branch is ineffective under the separate entity rule to freeze assets held in the bank’s foreign branches. View "Motorola Credit Corp. v Standard Chartered Bank" on Justia Law

At issue in this lawsuit was whether workers engaged in testing and inspection of fire protection equipment are covered by New York’s prevailing wage statute. The New York State Department of Labor issued an opinion letter stating that the workers were covered but that the opinion shall be applied prospectively. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified to the Court of Appeals a question regarding what deference a court should pay to an agency’s decision, made for its own enforcement purposes, to construe a statute prospectively only. In its amicus brief in the Court of Appeals, the Department asserted that no deference was due to it by the courts deciding the litigation. The Court of Appeals answered (1) courts should give an agency no more deference than it claims for itself; and (2) a party’s commitment to pay prevailing wages pursuant to the prevailing wage statute binds the party to comply with the statute as correctly interpreted, whether or not the correct interpretation was known to the parties at the time of contracting. View "Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Paul Ellington, an heir and grandson of Duke Ellington, filed this breach of contract action to recover royalties allegedly due under a royalty provision contained in a 1961 United States copyright renewal Agreement between Duke Ellington and Mills Music, Inc., now EMI Music, Inc. The Agreement assigned to a “Second Party” - defined as consisting of a group of music publishers including Mills Music - the right to renew the copyright to certain music compositions written by Duke Ellington, subject to the payment of royalties. The royalty provision of the Agreement required the Second Party to pay Duke Ellington and named members of his family a percentage of the net revenue received from a foreign publication of the musical publication. Plaintiff claimed that by using affiliated foreign subpublishers, EMI breached the Agreement by diluting Plaintiff’s share of the royalties. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the disputed terms of the Agreement were clear and unambiguous and that the Appellate Division correctly held that Plaintiff did not state a cause of action for breach of the Agreement. View "Ellington v. EMI Music, Inc." on Justia Law