Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, among other charges. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the count of the indictment charging him with attempted murder was rendered duplicitous due to events that unfolded during the course of the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, concluding that the duplicity argument was unpreserved. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a duplicity argument based on trial evidence must be preserved for appeal where the count is not duplicitous on the face of the indictment; and (2) none of the other issues raised by Defendant warranted reversal. View "People v. Allen" on Justia Law

Mahesh Gandhi and his two associates held equal interests in three corporations. The corporations secured a loan, part of which was loaned to the partners, of which Gandhi received a portion pursuant to promissory notes he signed and for which he made interest payments. Litigation among the partners and the corporations soon followed. The parties eventually executed a Settlement Agreement under which Gandhi sold his interest in the corporations to his associates. The corporate successors-in-interest to the corporations made monthly payments to Gandhi until Gandhi ceased paying interest on the notes. The corporations sued, asserting that they were entitled to offset the amount they owed Gandhi against the amount he owed them under the notes. At trial, Gandhi sought to assert a counterclaim for money current owed him under the Settlement Agreement. Supreme Court granted Gandhi’s motion to amend and entered judgment in his favor on the counterclaim. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment on Gandhi’s counterclaim, concluding that Gandhi’s request should have been barred by the doctrine of laches based on Gandhi’s delay in seeking leave to amend. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no prejudice to the corporations in allowing Gandhi’s amendment to assert the counterclaim for outstanding payments. View "Kimso Apts., LLC v. Gandhi" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Lewiston Golf Course Corporation, an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of the Seneca Nation of Indians, a federal recognized Indian tribe, was protected from suit by the Seneca Nation’s sovereign immunity. Supreme Court ruled that Lewiston Golf did not qualify as an “arm” of the Seneca Nation and denied Lewiston Golf’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s foreclosure action with respect to its mechanic’s liens. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the most significant factors set forth in Matter of Ranson v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund counted against sovereign immunity on the part of Lewiston Golf. View "Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Corporation" on Justia Law

Allstate Insurance Company issued a policy of liability insurance to the landlord of a two-family house. The policy, which was renewed annually for the next two years, stated a $500,000 limit for “each occurrence” and contained a “noncumulation clause.” Felicia Young and her children and, subsequently, Lorenzo Patterson and his children lived in one of the apartments during the years covered by the policy. In 2004, Young, on behalf of her children, and Jannie Nesmith, on behalf of the Patterson children, her grandchildren, brought two separate actions against the landlord for personal injuries allegedly caused by lead paint exposure. Young’s action was settled for $350,000, which Allstate paid. Nesmith’s action was settled for $150,000, which Allstate claimed was the remaining coverage. Nesmith then brought the present action against Allstate seeking a declaration that a separate $500,000 limit applied to each family’s claim, entitling her grandchildren to an additional $350,000. Supreme Court granted Nesmith the declaration she sought. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Young’s children and Nesmith’s grandchildren were injured by exposure to the same general conditions, their injuries were part of a single loss, and only one policy limit was available to the two families. View "Nesmith v Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The owner and managing agent of an apartment building (collectively, the insureds) were insureds under two different policies: they were named insureds under their own policy and additional insureds under a policy obtained by a contractor they hired. When an employee of the contractor was injured, the contractor’s insurer, seeking to disclaim liability, sent written notice to the insureds’ own carrier but not to the insureds themselves. The insureds brought third party claims against the contractor and the contractor’s insurer, asserting that the contractor’s insurer was required to provide them with a defense and indemnification. Supreme Court granted summary judgment against the contractor’s insurer. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the contractor’s insurer had failed to comply with N.Y. Ins. Law 3420(d)(2) because it had not sent its disclaimer notice to its additional insureds. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the contractor’s insurer failed to comply with section 3430(d)(2) under the circumstances of this case. View "Sierra v. 4401 Sunset Park, LLC" on Justia Law

The defendants in these two separate criminal cases were convicted of criminal offenses by a jury. The two juries each sent notes to the court requesting specific information for use in deliberations. The transcripts did not show in either case that the courts were aware of the juries’ submission of some of the notes. Defendants appealed, contending that the trial courts committed mode of proceedings errors under People v. O’Rama and its progeny by accepting the verdicts without acknowledging or responding to the jury notes at issue. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding that because the substantive jury notes, marked as court exhibits, were neither revealed to the attorneys nor addressed by the courts, a mode of proceedings error occurred under O’Rama in both cases, and the defendants were entitled to new trials. View "People v. Silva" on Justia Law

Strauss Painting, Inc./Creative Finishes, Ltd. contracted with the Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. to perform work on the Met’s premises. At the time Strauss/Creative contracted with the Met, Strauss had in place a CGL policy issued by Mt. Hawley Insurance Company. Manuel Mayo, a Creative employee, was injured while working at the Met. Mayo sued the Met for negligence. The Met brought a third-party action against Strauss in the Mayo suit. Strauss then commenced this action against Mt. Hawley and the Met, seeking a declaration that Mt. Hawley was obligated to defend and indemnify it in the Met’s third-party action. The Met cross-claimed against Mt. Hawley seeking a declaration that it was an additional insured on Strauss’s CGL policy, thereby requiring Mt. Hawley to defend and indemnify it in the Mayo litigation. The lower courts concluded (1) Mt. Hawley was required to defend the Met in the Mayo lawsuit because the Met was an additional insured on Strauss’s CGL policy; and (2) Strauss’s notice of the accident to Mt. Hawley was untimely, and Mt. Hawley timely disclaimed coverage on that ground. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division by denying the Met’s motion for summary judgment on its first cross-claim, holding (1) the Met was not an additional insured on Strauss’s CGL policy with Mt. Hawley; and (2) Strauss’s notice to Mt. Hawley was untimely as a matter of law. View "Strauss Painting, Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff, Jandy Coleson, applied for an order of protection from her husband, Samuel Coleson (Coleson), New York City police officers escorted Plaintiff to a safe house and assured Plaintiff that Coleson had been arrested and was going to be sentenced to prison “for a while.” Two days later, Coleson stabbed Plaintiff in the back. Plaintiff’s son witnessed Coleson chasing Plaintiff with the knife. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her son, commenced this negligence action against the City of New York and the NYPD (together, the City). Plaintiffs also alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress, arguing that the child was in the zone of danger during the incident. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment for the City, concluding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that the City assumed an affirmative duty to protect Plaintiff from attacks by her husband; and (2) based on the lack of a special relationship, the claim’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should also be dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the acts of the police officers in this case were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to justifiable reliance. View "Coleson v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for second-degree murder as a hate crime and second-degree murder. A jury convicted Defendant of the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and acquitted him of the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter. Defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the verdict was repugnant because the crimes of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and ordinary first-degree manslaughter share the same basic elements. The sentencing judge denied Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict on repugnancy grounds without elaborating on his reasoning. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing Defendant’s conviction for first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime, concluding that the verdict was repugnant because the jury necessarily found that one of the essential elements of ordinary manslaughter in the first degree was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals held that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent, and thus repugnant, and modified the order of the Appellate Division by granting the People leave to submit the charge of manslaughter in the first degree as a hate crime to another grand jury. View "People v. DeLee" on Justia Law

In these three putative class actions, Plaintiffs, current or former tenants of separate apartment buildings, sought damages for rent overcharges. All plaintiffs initially sought treble damages but then waived that demand. At issue was whether Plaintiffs’ claims could properly be brought as class actions. Defendants argued, among other things, that these actions were to “recover a penalty” because, even without trebling, the remedy provided by the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) 26-516 is a penalty. In each case, the Appellate Division certified a question to the Court of Appeals. The Court answered (1) N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b), which prohibits any claim for penalties to be brought as a class action, permits otherwise qualified plaintiffs to utilize the class action mechanism to recover compensatory overcharges even though the RSL 26-516 does not specifically authorize class action recovery and imposes treble damages upon a finding of willful violation; and (2) maintaining these actions as class actions does not contravene the letter or the spirit of the C.P.L.R. or the RSL. View "Borden v. 400 E. 55th St. Assoc., L.P." on Justia Law