Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a property owner, and Defendant, a tenant, entered into a one-year commercial rental lease agreement. Prior to the end of the one-year term, the parties extended the lease for a nine-year term. Several months after executing the lease extestion, Defendant vacated the premises and ceased paying rent. Plaintiff commenced this action for rent arrears and an amount equal to the future remaining rent owed on the lease. Supreme Court entered judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $1,488,604, consisting of the rent remaining due under the lease, reduced by the amount of rent Plaintiff was able to collect by reletting the premises. Defendants appealed, arguing that Plaintiff was barred from collecting unpaid future rents pursuant to an acceleration clause in the leasehold agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the court below erred by limiting the damages hearing to whether Plaintiff relet the premises without allowing Defendants the opportunity to present evidence that the undiscounted accelerated rent amount was disproportionate to Plaintiff’s actual losses, notwithstanding that Plaintiff had possession and no obligation to mitigate. View "172 Van Duzer Realty Corp. v Globe Alumni Student Assistance Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the validity of a rule promulgated by the New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Respondent) mandating out-of-competition race horse drug testing. Petitioners commenced this hybrid article 78/declaratory judgment proceeding, alleging that the rule, referred to as the Out of Competition Testing Rule (OCTR) was not authorized by Respondent’s enabling legislation. Supreme Court granted the petition, finding that Respondent had acted in excess of its legislatively delegated power. The Appellate Division modified by effectively denying the petition, concluding that the OCTR was, for the most part, valid and that the rule’s promulgation lay within Respondent’s legislatively conferred authority to regulate and supervise race meets at which pari-mutuel wagering is permitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent possesses the power to promulgate rules mandating warrantless, out-of-competition equine testing for proscribed doping agents. View "Ford v. N.Y. State Racing & Wagering Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a police officer with the New York City Police Department when she was injured while loading wooden police barriers onto a police flatbed truck. Plaintiff sued the City of New York and the New York City Police Department seeking damages, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law (GML) 205-e for failure to comply with N.Y. Labor Law 27-a, otherwise known as the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA). Plaintiff based her claims, in part, on the alleged unsafe and dangerous condition of the truck. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the general duty clause of Labor Law section 27-a(3)(a)(1) could not serve as a statutory predicate to Plaintiff’s GML 205-e cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion in part, concluding that Labor Law 27-a(3)(a)(1) may serve as a predicate for a violation of GML 205-e. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PESHA’s general duty clause serves as a predicate to Plaintiff’s GML 205-e cause of action for damages. View "Gammons v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to sex offenses, including sexual abuse in the first decree. When Respondent’s term of imprisonment neared its end, the State commenced a civil commitment proceeding against him pursuant to N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10. After a bench trial, Supreme Court imposed strict and intensive supervision (SIST) rather than confinement. Respondent was required to attend a sex offender treatment program, but due to his failure to cooperate, Respondent was discharged and later arrested. Supreme Court subsequently revoked Respondent’s release on SIST and committed him to a secure treatment facility, determining that the State had proven that Respondent was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement. The Appellate Division affirmed on the merits. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Mental Hygiene Law envisages a distinction between sex offenders who have difficulty controlling their sexual conduct and those who are unable to control it; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Respondent had such an inability to control his behavior that he was likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility. View "State v. Michael M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, which owns a residential co-op complex with 1,674 residential apartments, was incorporated in 1961 as a Mitchell-Lama cooperative housing corporation pursuant to the Limited-Profit Housing Companies Law. In 2007, Plaintiff terminated its participation in the Mitchell-Lama program and reconstituted itself as a corporation under the Business Corporation Law by amending its certification of incorporation. In 2010, the New York City Department of Finance issued a notice of determination to Plaintiff of a tax deficiency in the amount of $21,149,592, concluding that Plaintiff had engaged in a transaction that qualified as a conveyance of the underlying real property, and therefore, Plaintiff was required to pay a real property transfer tax (RPTT). Plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the RPTT was inapplicable. The Appellate Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that the conversion from a Mitchell-Lama cooperative housing corporation to a cooperative housing corporation under the Business Corporation Law does not constitute a conveyance that is subject to the RPTT. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that no taxable event occurred in this case. View "Trump Vill. Section 3, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for burglary and, in an attempt to obtain leniency, told the police that a friend of his admitted that he stabbed a man at the supermarket. Defendant was represented by his lawyer at the meeting. After Defendant was released from jail, he discussed the supermarket stabbing with the police outside of the presence of his lawyer. Defendant was later charged with and convicted of attempted murder and assault. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the police officers were not barred from questioning Defendant about the stabbing despite the fact that he was represented by counsel on the pending burglary charge, as the two charges were unrelated. The Court of Appeals reversed, suppressed Defendant’s statements, and ordered a new trial, holding (1) Defendant’s right to counsel encompassed his conversations with the police about the stabbing, as long as those conversations were part of an effort to obtain leniency in the burglary case in which his lawyer represented him; and (2) Defendant did not waive his right to be represented by counsel at the second meeting with law enforcement officers. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Nick Rigano purchased certain property and George Vignogna, through Vibar Construction Corp., agreed to develop the property. Vibar constructed a common driveway to access the property, but Rigano failed to compensate it. Vibar filed a notice of mechanic’s lien on the property to recover the cost of constructing the road. The notice listed Fawn Builders, Inc. as the owner of the property rather than Rigano, the true owner and Fawn Builders’ sole shareholder and president. Rigano sought to have the lien discharged on the ground that the notice did not comply with the Lien Law requirements. Supreme Court ultimately granted the petition and discharged the mechanic’s lien. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the notice was jurisdictionally defective because it misidentified the true owner of the property. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the particular circumstances presented here, the defect was a misdescription and not a misidentification, did not constitute a jurisdictional defect, and was curable by amendment. View "Rigano v. Vibar Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1981, Defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and attempted robbery in the first degree. During trial, Defendant pursued a mistaken identity defense. Defendant later moved to vacate his conviction and for a new trial pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10(1) on the ground that newly discovered evidence in the form of mitochondrial DNA testing excluded him as the perpetrator of the crimes. Defendant sought an evidentiary hearing as part of his postjudgment motion. Supreme Court summarily denied Defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of a hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) because the rule announced in People v. Crimmins that the power to review a discretionary order denying a motion to vacate judgment on the ground of newly discovered evidence cease at the Appellate Division needlessly restricts the Court of Appeals’ power of review concerning section 440.10(1)(g) motions, that part of the decision is overruled; and (2) in this case, the Appellate Division abused its discretion in summarily denying Defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. Remanded. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped the car Defendant was driving due to traffic violations. After observing that Defendant appeared to be intoxicated, the officer asked Defendant to step out of the car and then patted him down. The officer found a switchblade knife in Defendant’s pocket and arrested him. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the knife. The motion was denied on the ground that the pat-down was justified as a search incident to arrest. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the police officer’s search of Defendant was not incident to Defendant’s arrest because, although there was probable cause to arrest Defendant before the search, Defendant would not have been arrested if the search had not produced evidence of a crime. View "People v. Reid" on Justia Law