Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant was charged following two shootings in Buffalo, New York, that occurred about an hour apart on August 4, 2016, resulting in one death and three injuries. Key evidence included witness accounts and surveillance footage showing a shooter in distinctive clothing matching what the defendant wore earlier that day. Forensic testimony linked the fatal weapon to an individual depicted in the videos. After trial, the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, while acquitting him of two counts of attempted murder.During jury deliberations, a juror raised concerns that another juror had made a racially biased remark. The trial judge questioned both the reporting juror and the accused juror individually, with input from counsel, but did not question other jurors. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on alleged racial bias affecting up to six jurors but declined to request further inquiry or substitution of jurors, relying solely on the mistrial request. The trial judge denied the motion, finding no convincing evidence of grossly unqualified jurors or racial animus affecting deliberations, and subsequently denied a post-verdict motion to set aside the verdict.The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reviewed the trial court’s response and concluded that the judge had conducted an appropriate inquiry into the allegations and did not abuse discretion by denying the mistrial request. Upon further appeal, the New York State Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient, that the record did not convincingly demonstrate a lack of impartiality among the jurors, and that the denial of the motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v Wiggins" on Justia Law

The case concerns a borrower who executed a promissory note and mortgage in 2007, defaulted on the loan in 2009, and faced a foreclosure action that same year by the lender's predecessor. The 2009 foreclosure action included an explicit acceleration of the loan, but the lender’s standing was disputed due to the timing of the assignment of the note and mortgage. The foreclosure case lingered for over a decade, during which the mortgage and note changed hands and were eventually assigned to the current lender. In 2022, the foreclosure action was voluntarily discontinued without prejudice. Shortly thereafter, the borrower brought a quiet title action, contending that the six-year statute of limitations had expired, making further foreclosure unenforceable. The lender then initiated a new foreclosure action, which was also pending.In the Supreme Court of New York County, the lender argued that the loan was never validly accelerated due to lack of standing in the original case. The borrower sought summary judgment, asserting that under the recently enacted Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), the limitations period had expired. While the motions were pending, FAPA took effect. The Supreme Court found that FAPA applied retroactively, estopped the lender from challenging the validity of the 2009 acceleration, and granted judgment for the borrower, cancelling the mortgage. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed this decision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that FAPA’s relevant provisions (sections 4, 7, and 8) apply retroactively to pending actions and do not violate the federal Due Process or Contract Clauses. The Court found that FAPA validly estops the lender from disputing the prior acceleration and that the limitations period had expired, supporting quiet title relief for the borrower. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Van Dyke v U.S. Bank, Natl. Assn." on Justia Law

In this case, the dispute centered on a Brooklyn property subject to both senior and junior mortgages. After the original borrower defaulted on the senior mortgage, a loan servicer (Central Mortgage Company) commenced a foreclosure action in 2007 but later discontinued it without prejudice in 2017. Subsequently, Article 13 LLC acquired the junior mortgage and, in 2020, filed a quiet title action in federal court seeking to have the senior mortgage canceled as time-barred under New York’s statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially found that there were material factual disputes regarding whether the servicer actually held the note at the time it commenced the 2007 foreclosure, denying both parties’ motions for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, the New York Legislature enacted the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), which clarified the statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosures and addressed abusive litigation practices. Article 13 LLC moved for reconsideration, arguing the new law applied retroactively. The district court agreed, concluding that FAPA retroactively applied and precluded the senior mortgage holder from contesting the validity of the prior foreclosure acceleration, and further held that this retroactive effect did not violate due process rights.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the retroactive application of FAPA and its consistency with the New York Constitution’s due process protections. The New York Court of Appeals held that FAPA applies to all foreclosure actions in which a final judgment of foreclosure and sale had not been enforced before its effective date, including those pending at the time of enactment. The court further held that FAPA’s retroactive application does not violate substantive or procedural due process under the New York Constitution. View "Article 13 LLC v Ponce De Leon Fed. Bank" on Justia Law

After an incident in Brooklyn where the defendant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle, he was charged by misdemeanor complaint with several offenses, including aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second and third degrees, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, and failure to obey a traffic control signal. The supporting documents contained allegations for the unlicensed operation charges but lacked factual allegations for the failure to obey a traffic signal charge. Later, the prosecution filed an information and a statement of readiness, certifying compliance with statutory requirements for facial sufficiency for all counts, even though the failure to obey a traffic signal charge was facially insufficient.The defendant moved to dismiss the information on grounds of facial insufficiency and statutory speedy trial violations, arguing that the prosecution’s certification under CPL 30.30 (5-a) was inaccurate, thereby invalidating their statement of readiness. The prosecution conceded the insufficiency of the traffic signal count, which was dismissed by the Criminal Court. The court otherwise denied the motion, finding that the statute only required a certification for readiness and did not mandate dismissal of the entire instrument due to inaccuracies in the certification. The Appellate Term affirmed, holding that the statute did not require further remedy beyond dismissal of the insufficient count.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order. The Court held that CPL 30.30 (5-a) requires only that the prosecution file a certification of facial sufficiency for all counts in a local criminal court accusatory instrument as a condition of readiness. The statute does not provide for invalidation of the statement of readiness or dismissal of the entire instrument when that certification is inaccurate as to a particular count; the appropriate remedy is dismissal of the defective count alone. View "People v Williams" on Justia Law

A county child welfare agency initiated proceedings to terminate a mother's parental rights to her twins, who had been removed from her care at around six months old. The mother was assigned counsel but had not communicated with her attorney prior to the fact-finding hearing. At the hearing, the mother appeared remotely, while her attorney was present in person. The attorney informed the Family Court that he had not discussed the case with his client and intended to remain silent. The court instructed him to participate regardless. Only after the hearing began did counsel request time to speak with the mother. During the proceedings, the mother attempted to represent herself but expressed confusion about the process and later asked to be represented again. The court denied her renewed request for representation and allowed only brief opportunities for her and counsel to communicate.The Family Court determined that the mother had permanently neglected her children and proceeded to the dispositional phase, ultimately terminating her parental rights in favor of adoption by the foster family. The mother appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court's decision, finding that the mother had not been denied effective assistance of counsel and that her waiver of counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the mother was deprived of her right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court held that, in proceedings to terminate parental rights, the right to assigned counsel necessarily includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court found that counsel’s failure to communicate with the mother prior to the hearing, and to request an adjournment to do so, lacked any strategic or reasonable justification, thus rendering the representation ineffective and undermining the fairness of the proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the matter to Family Court for a new hearing. View "Matter of Parker J." on Justia Law

In April 2020, a store manager working for a retail employer contracted COVID-19, followed by a stroke one week later. He alleged that both the infection and the subsequent stroke were caused by exposure to COVID-19 while working in a high-traffic store environment during the early months of the pandemic. The claimant described frequent, close interactions with the public and stated that employer-provided protective measures, such as masks and sneeze guards, were not implemented until mid-April. The claimant also testified that he had minimal contact with others outside of work. Medical evidence linked the stroke to the COVID-19 infection, and it was noted that the claimant lacked typical stroke risk factors.The Workers’ Compensation Law Judge initially established the claim as an occupational disease with a consequential stroke. On review, the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board modified the determination, finding instead that the claimant suffered an accidental injury, not an occupational disease, but otherwise affirmed the compensability of both injuries. The Board applied its “prevalence” framework, which looks to whether the workplace presented an extraordinarily high risk of exposure to COVID-19 due to conditions such as significant public contact in an area where the virus was prevalent. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the Board’s decision.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that the Board’s “prevalence” framework is consistent with New York Workers’ Compensation Law as interpreted by prior case law. The Court found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings that the claimant’s COVID-19 infection and consequential stroke arose out of and in the course of employment, given the extraordinary risk presented by the claimant’s work environment and the credible medical evidence linking the injuries. The Court rejected the employer’s argument that a specific exposure event must be identified. View "Matter of Aungst v Family Dollar" on Justia Law

Four individuals—three transit workers and one teacher—filed claims for Workers' Compensation benefits in 2020, alleging psychological injuries such as PTSD that resulted from workplace exposure to COVID-19. The Workers' Compensation Board determined that the claimants experienced stress comparable to that faced by other employees in similar roles during the pandemic. Therefore, the Board denied the claims, finding that the stress encountered did not meet the threshold for a compensable "accident" under the Workers' Compensation Law.The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the Board’s decisions. It held that the Board erred by not considering each claimant’s individual vulnerabilities and by applying different burdens for psychological injury claims compared to claims for contracting COVID-19 itself. The Appellate Division cited Matter of Wolfe v Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., stating that psychological injuries precipitated by psychic trauma should be compensable to the same extent as physical injuries. It further concluded that the Board should apply its “prevalence rule”—which allows proof of an elevated risk via workplace prevalence of COVID-19—to psychological injury claims as well as physical injury claims.Upon review, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s orders and reinstated the Board’s decisions. The Court of Appeals held that the Board is not required to consider a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities when evaluating psychological injury claims. It clarified that, at the relevant time, claimants needed to show that their workplace stress was greater than that ordinarily experienced by similarly situated workers in the normal work environment for the injury to be deemed accidental. The Court found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion that the claimants’ stress was not exceptional, and ruled that the prevalence of COVID-19 in the workplace does not alter the legal standard for compensable psychological injury. View "Matter of McLaurin v New York City Tr. Auth." on Justia Law

On July 30, 2022, police responded to Omar Johnson's home after a 911 call reported domestic violence. While investigating, officers discovered a loaded pistol in Johnson's moped and determined he did not possess a valid firearm license. Johnson was arrested and indicted for multiple counts of criminal weapon possession and possession of ammunition. These events occurred shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, but before New York amended its firearm licensing laws.Johnson moved to dismiss the indictment in the Supreme Court of New York County, arguing that Bruen invalidated the state's "proper cause" requirement for firearm licenses and, by extension, rendered the entire licensing scheme unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Johnson lacked standing because he had not applied for a license and that Bruen invalidated only the "proper cause" requirement, not the entire scheme. Johnson pleaded guilty, waiving his right to appeal, and was sentenced to probation. On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, concluding that the appeal waiver was valid, Johnson lacked standing, and his conviction was not unconstitutional under Bruen.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that Johnson’s facial constitutional challenge to the licensing scheme was not waived by his appeal waiver, as such claims implicate broader societal interests. The Court determined that Johnson had standing to raise a facial challenge, even though he never applied for a license, because his conviction directly resulted from the licensing scheme. On the merits, the Court concluded that Bruen’s invalidation of only the "proper cause" requirement did not render the entire New York firearm licensing scheme unconstitutional, as the requirement is severable. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Johnson" on Justia Law

Several insurance companies initiated a federal lawsuit against a licensed acupuncturist, three professional service corporations under his control, and two unlicensed individuals. The insurers sought a declaration that one of the corporations was not entitled to no-fault insurance reimbursement for services rendered, alleging the corporation engaged in a scheme to pay unlicensed individuals for patient referrals. The payments allegedly violated New York’s professional conduct rules but did not involve the transfer of control over the corporation to unlicensed persons.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York found that the acupuncturist and his corporations had engaged in an unlawful fee-splitting and kickback scheme, violating New York law. The court ruled that this professional misconduct rendered the corporation ineligible for no-fault reimbursement under the relevant Department of Financial Services (DFS) regulation and granted summary judgment for the insurers. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the referral fees were paid but found it unclear whether this type of professional misconduct made the provider ineligible for reimbursement under the regulation. It certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of whether such misconduct, absent ceding control to unlicensed persons, permits denial of no-fault benefits.The New York Court of Appeals held that the DFS regulation does not authorize insurers to deny no-fault reimbursement based solely on a provider’s alleged professional misconduct, such as paying for patient referrals, unless that misconduct amounts to a failure to meet a foundational licensing requirement—specifically, surrendering control of the professional practice to unlicensed individuals. The court deferred to DFS’s longstanding interpretation that only licensing violations resulting in loss of eligibility to practice, as determined by regulators, justify denial of reimbursement. The court answered the certified question in the negative. View "Government Employees Ins. Co. v Mayzenberg" on Justia Law

A nonprofit religious organization based in Queens purchased a 73-acre parcel in the Town of Callicoon, Sullivan County, in 2018. Although the organization originally intended to use the property as a retreat center, testimony established that its actual use involved farming vegetables on about one cleared acre for charitable distribution to low-income residents in Queens. Occasional overnight stays involved religious activities, but there was no evidence of regular organized religious services or use as a retreat center. The Town Supervisor, who lived nearby and farmed part of the property without a formal agreement, confirmed the farming use but did not observe overnight retreats.After the Town Assessor denied a religious use tax exemption for the property for the 2021 tax year, the organization filed a grievance complaint, which was denied by the Town’s Board of Assessment Review. The organization then initiated an RPTL article 7 proceeding in Supreme Court, challenging the denial. A similar process occurred for the 2022 tax year, and both proceedings were joined. Supreme Court held a nonjury trial, found all witnesses credible, credited the organization’s testimony about actual use, and granted the petitions for both tax years, concluding the property was exempt. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with one Justice dissenting.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the lower courts applied the correct legal standards: the burden to prove entitlement to exemption rests with the party seeking it, while the burden to prove a zoning violation rests with the municipality. The Court of Appeals found record support for Supreme Court’s factual findings and concluded that the Town failed to prove a zoning violation sufficient to defeat the exemption for both years. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Matter of First United Methodist Church in Flushing v Assessor, Town of Callicoon" on Justia Law