Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Jorge Baque's five-month-old daughter was found unresponsive in her crib on July 30, 2016, and was later declared dead. An autopsy revealed injuries consistent with abusive head trauma and violent shaking. Baque was charged with manslaughter in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. At trial, the prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence, including testimony that Baque was the last person with the victim and that the injuries would have caused death within minutes. The jury was instructed on circumstantial evidence and convicted Baque of criminally negligent homicide and endangering the welfare of a child.Baque appealed, arguing that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the conviction, referencing weight of the evidence precedent and concluding that the jury's inference of guilt was reasonable. A Judge of the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Appellate Division properly conducted a weight of the evidence review. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, noting that the lower court had applied the correct legal principles. The Court emphasized that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the jury must ensure that the inference of guilt is the only reasonable conclusion and that all other hypotheses of innocence are excluded beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found no basis for reversal, as the Appellate Division had appropriately considered the circumstantial evidence and the jury's inferences. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v. Baque" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to sell and possession of cocaine after police recovered drugs and paraphernalia during a search of an apartment where he and others were arrested. Defense counsel sought to suppress the seized items, arguing the warrant was inaccurate and unreliable but did not claim the warrant was executed without notice, violating CPL 690.50 (1). Defendant argued on appeal that this omission constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.The Appellate Division, Third Department, reviewed the case and rejected the ineffective assistance claim, noting that the record did not conclusively show a knock-and-announce violation. The court found that the defendant's argument was speculative and unsupported by the record, which was silent on whether the officers announced themselves before entry. The Appellate Division concluded that the defendant failed to establish a no-knock violation.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that defense counsel's failure to raise the knock-and-announce issue did not constitute ineffective assistance because the argument was not so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense attorney would have failed to assert it. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan, which held that a knock-and-announce violation does not require the exclusion of evidence, had not been contradicted by any New York appellate decision. Therefore, the issue was not sufficiently clear to mandate its assertion by defense counsel. The court also found that the defendant's legal sufficiency contention was unpreserved for appellate review and upheld the trial court's admission of evidence regarding an uncharged drug sale. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Hayward" on Justia Law

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The defendant was convicted of third-degree larceny and second-degree forgery after a jury trial. The case involved a scheme where the defendant falsely represented himself as Joe Basil Jr. to steal tires from Exxpress Tire Delivery Company. The defendant instructed the delivery driver to bring the tires to a location adjacent to the Basil Ford Truck Center, where he falsely signed an invoice as Joe Basil Jr. The real Joe Basil Jr. testified that he did not authorize the purchase and that the signature was not his.The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of 3½ to 7 years for the larceny and forgery convictions, explaining that the crimes were separate and distinct acts. The court noted that the forgery occurred during the larceny but constituted a successive act. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that consecutive sentences were permissible because the larceny and forgery were not committed through a single act or omission, nor was one offense a material element of the other. The court explained that the larceny was completed when the tires were loaded onto the defendant's trailer, which occurred before the forgery of the invoice. Additionally, the statutory definitions of the crimes did not overlap in a way that would require concurrent sentences under Penal Law § 70.25 (2). Therefore, the consecutive sentences were lawful. View "People v McGovern" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2006, an individual was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and later subjected to civil management under New York's Mental Hygiene Law due to a "mental abnormality." Initially confined, he was released to a strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) program in 2016. In 2019, he violated SIST conditions by tampering with an alcohol monitoring bracelet, leading to his temporary confinement based on a psychologist's evaluation and a probable cause finding by the court.The Supreme Court initially found probable cause to believe he was a "dangerous sex offender requiring confinement" and ordered his detention pending a final hearing. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the statutory scheme violated procedural due process by not providing an opportunity to be heard at the probable cause stage. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division converted the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action, ultimately declaring the statute constitutional.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court held that the statutory scheme under Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4) appropriately balances individual and state interests. It concluded that the statute provides sufficient procedural safeguards, including a prompt judicial probable cause determination and a full hearing within 30 days, to mitigate the risk of erroneous confinement. The court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to him. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed without costs. View "People ex rel. Neville v Toulon" on Justia Law

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A couple used marital funds to enhance the husband's Foreign Service pension by buying back credits for his pre-marriage military service. The key issue was whether the portion of the pension related to the pre-marriage military service should be considered separate or marital property.The Supreme Court initially ruled that the value of the Foreign Service pension related to the husband's pre-marriage Navy service was marital property because marital funds were used to buy back the credits. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, holding that the Navy pension credits were the husband's separate property since they were the result of his sole efforts and not due to the wife's contributions. However, the Appellate Division remitted the case to the Supreme Court to calculate the equitable distribution of the marital funds used to purchase the credits. The Supreme Court adjusted the award accordingly, and the wife appealed.The New York Court of Appeals held that the portion of the Foreign Service pension related to the pre-marriage military service is entirely marital property. The court reasoned that the use of marital funds to buy back the Navy service credits transformed them into marital property. The court emphasized that separate property commingled with marital property presumptively becomes marital property. The court reversed the Appellate Division's decision and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings, allowing the husband to claim the value of his separate property contribution. The court also noted that marital property need not be distributed equally and that the trial court must consider various factors in making an equitable distribution. View "Szypula v Szypula" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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In this case, the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting three minors between 2007 and 2009. The police obtained a search warrant and found child pornography on the defendant's computers, including an encrypted file they could not access. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including sexual conduct against a child and possession of child pornography. He posted bail and was released but was later remanded to jail for allegedly posting a blog that intimidated a witness.The trial court assigned counsel and experts to assist the defendant, who later chose to represent himself. During the trial, the defendant's daughter testified about a recorded conversation in which one of the victims allegedly recanted her accusations. The prosecution used recorded jail phone calls to challenge the daughter's testimony, revealing that the defendant had discussed trial strategies with her. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of sexual conduct against a child and all child pornography counts but deadlocked on other charges. The defendant entered an Alford plea to the deadlocked counts.The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The primary issue was whether the defendant's right to present a defense was violated by the prosecution's monitoring of his jail phone calls. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's right to present a defense was not violated. The court noted that the defendant had ample time to prepare his defense while out on bail and had other means to communicate with witnesses. The court also found that the defendant's request to proceed pro se was unequivocal and that the trial court had conducted a proper inquiry into the risks of self-representation. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Dixon" on Justia Law

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Anthony Blue was convicted of five counts of second-degree burglary. He argued that his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the trial judge did not inform him of his maximum sentencing exposure. Blue also contended that his indictment should have been dismissed on statutory speedy-trial grounds, asserting that the time between his indictment and arraignment should not be excluded from the speedy-trial calculation.The Supreme Court denied Blue's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the time between his co-defendant's request for an adjournment and Blue's arraignment was excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (d). The court also determined that Blue's waiver of counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, despite not being informed of the maximum sentencing exposure in years. The Appellate Division affirmed these decisions, concluding that the 57 days between the co-defendant's adjournment request and Blue's arraignment were properly excluded from the speedy-trial calculation.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's order. The court held that a defendant can be joined for trial with a co-defendant at the time of indictment, and the exclusion under CPL 30.30 (4) (d) applies to pre-arraignment time. The court also found that Blue's waiver of counsel was valid, as he was adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation and understood the potential sentencing exposure. The court concluded that the 57-day period was excludable, leaving the speedy-trial clock at 180 days, within the statutory limit. Blue's remaining challenges were deemed unpreserved or meritless. View "People v Blue" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing a defaced firearm and unlawfully possessing a loaded firearm outside of his home or place of business. Before the trial, the prosecution filed a Sandoval application to cross-examine the defendant about his prior convictions and pending cases. The trial court held an in-camera conference on this motion without the defendant present. Later, in the defendant's presence, the court announced its decision on the Sandoval application without hearing arguments on the merits or confirming the defendant's understanding.The case proceeded to a bench trial where the prosecution presented evidence, including testimony from an arresting officer and surveillance footage. The trial court found the defendant guilty on both counts and sentenced him to imprisonment and post-release supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting on the grounds that the defendant was denied his right to be present during the Sandoval application consideration. The dissenting Justice granted the defendant leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant's right to be present during a material stage of his prosecution was violated. The court found that the defendant had a right to be present at the initial in-chambers conference on the Sandoval application and that the subsequent in-court proceeding did not cure this violation. The court emphasized that the defendant's presence is crucial for meaningful participation in such hearings. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and granted the defendant a new trial. View "People v Sharp" on Justia Law

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On a snowy day in December 2018, the Superintendent of Highways for the Town of Carmel, Michael J. Simone, drove into an intersection without the right of way and collided with Ana Orellana's vehicle. Simone had been inspecting road conditions during a snowstorm and had directed his team to salt the roads. After completing his inspection, he was returning to his office when the accident occurred. Simone testified that he was not in a rush, did not consider the situation an emergency, and had no intention of conducting further inspections en route.The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that Simone's conduct was protected under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), which exempts municipal employees from liability for ordinary negligence when "actually engaged in work on a highway." The court denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment as academic. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that Simone was not "actually engaged in work on a highway" at the time of the accident, as he had completed his inspection and was merely returning to his office. Therefore, the protections of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) did not apply. The Court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Orellana v Town of Carmel" on Justia Law

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The case involves two defendants, Matthew Corr and Bryan McDonald, who were convicted of sex offenses in other states and were required to register as sex offenders under the laws of those states. After relocating to New York, they were required to register as level-one risk under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Both defendants requested that the Supreme Court order them registered nunc pro tunc to the date when they registered as sex offenders in the state where they were convicted, effectively giving them credit for the time registered in the foreign jurisdiction against the 20-year registration period.The Supreme Court denied their requests, and the Appellate Division affirmed the decisions. The defendants argued that the phrase "initial date of registration" in SORA refers to the date they initially registered in the state of conviction, not the date of subsequent registration in New York. The People countered that SORA's use of the phrase "initial date of registration" refers to the date when an offender first registers under SORA.The Court of Appeals of New York held that the phrase "initial date of registration" refers to the date when an offender first registers under SORA, not the date an offender is required to register under the laws of another jurisdiction. The court found that the defendants' interpretation of the statute would award sex offenders credit for time spent registered under the laws of another state, which is not provided for in SORA. The court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, ruling that the defendants were not entitled to credit for their time registered as sex offenders under the laws of other states. View "People v Corr" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law