Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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In this case, the petitioners, who are members of Local 461, a union representing lifeguards employed by the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, sought to enforce certain provisions in the union's local and parent constitutions governing the eligibility of seasonal lifeguard members to vote and run for office in union elections. However, the court below dismissed the petition on the grounds of a precedent case, Martin v Curran, which states that unless every individual member of the union authorized or ratified the challenged conduct, the case cannot move forward.The Court of Appeals clarified that Martin does not apply when union members seek non-monetary injunctive relief against a union. The court nevertheless upheld the lower courts' decisions denying the petition and dismissing the proceeding. The court found that the union had reasonably interpreted and applied the relevant provisions of the union's constitutions, which require members to maintain good standing through regular payment of dues to be eligible to vote and run for office. Even assuming that seasonal lifeguards were granted a six-month dues credit, they still would not meet the requirements for good standing in the 12 months before the election.Thus, the court affirmed the orders below, concluding that the union's interpretation of its constitutional provisions regarding member eligibility to vote and run for office was reasonable under the circumstances. View "In re Agramonte v Local 461" on Justia Law

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The case involves a plaintiff, Nafeesa Syeed, an Asian-American woman who sued Bloomberg L.P., alleging employment discrimination. She claimed she was subjected to discrimination due to her sex and race while working for Bloomberg's Washington, D.C. bureau, and was denied promotions for positions she sought within Bloomberg's New York bureau.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed her claims under both the State and City Human Rights Laws, stating that she could not show how Bloomberg's conduct impacted her in New York State or City, as she neither lived nor worked there. The court held that the Human Rights Laws applied only to people who live or work in New York.This decision was appealed, and the Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether a nonresident plaintiff not yet employed in New York City or State satisfies the impact requirement of the New York City Human Rights Law or the New York State Human Rights Law if the plaintiff pleads and later proves that an employer deprived the plaintiff of a New York City- or State-based job opportunity on discriminatory grounds.The Court of Appeals held that the New York City and New York State Human Rights Laws each protect nonresidents who are not yet employed in the city or state but who proactively sought an actual city- or state-based job opportunity. The court reasoned that a nonresident who has been discriminatorily denied a job in New York City or State loses the chance to work, and perhaps live, within those geographic areas, and such a prospective inhabitant or employee fits within the Human Rights Laws' protection. The court highlighted that their decision was in line with the policy considerations addressed in the Human Rights Laws, protecting New York institutions and the general welfare of the state and city. View "Syeed v Bloomberg L.P." on Justia Law

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In two cases, People v Boone and People v Cotto, the Court of Appeals of New York State ruled on a central question related to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The question was whether the 30-day deadline for conducting a risk level classification hearing should be measured from the date an offender is released from the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), even if proceedings to civilly commit the offender under the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA) are pending or contemplated. The court ruled that the deadline should indeed be measured from the offender's release by DOCCS upon the completion of a prison sentence, irrespective of whether the state is considering instituting, or has already instituted, proceedings under SOMTA. The court also ruled that offenders are not denied due process by having a SORA hearing at a time when they may be civilly committed under SOMTA.In both cases, the defendants had been convicted of sex offenses against minors and were sentenced to prison terms. Prior to their release dates, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders classified both as level three (highest risk) offenders. Before the SORA hearings were held, the Attorney General filed petitions to civilly commit both defendants. The defendants argued that the SORA hearings were premature and violated their right to due process because they were not permitted to challenge their SORA risk assessment at a meaningful time—i.e., when they would actually be released into the community. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals also affirmed, concluding that the hearings were not premature and did not deny the defendants due process. View "People v Boone" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves a defendant who was charged with burglary in the second degree as a sexually motivated felony, which required the prosecution to prove both that the defendant committed the burglary and that his motivation was his own sexual gratification. The trial court also charged second-degree burglary as a lesser included offense. The defendant was acquitted of the sexually motivated felony but convicted of second-degree burglary. The Appellate Division reversed the burglary conviction, stating that the prosecution had so limited their theory of the case to the sexually motivated felony that the defendant did not have adequate notice to defend against the lesser offense. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed the Appellate Division's decision.According to the Court of Appeals, the lesser-included offense of second-degree burglary was properly submitted to the jury. The court held that the prosecution had not abandoned their pursuit of a conviction for second-degree burglary, nor had they so restricted their theory of the crime that the defendant was deprived of notice. The court also stated that the indictment charging the defendant with second-degree burglary as a sexually motivated felony provided sufficient notice of the lesser included offense. As such, the defendant's conviction of burglary in the second degree and sentence were reinstated, and the case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the defendant's excessive sentence claim regarding that conviction. View "People v Seignious" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In the case of a sex offender diagnosed with severe schizophrenia and psychosis, the New York Court of Appeals held that due process does not require a competency examination before a sex offender's risk level can be determined under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The defendant, who was found not mentally fit to stand trial, argued that his risk classification hearing should have been adjourned until he was deemed competent to understand the proceedings. The court disagreed, stating the numerous safeguards already provided under SORA, including the rights to notice, counsel, disclosure of relevant information, and an opportunity to object and present evidence at a hearing, adequately balance the interests involved. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the classification hearing was premature under SORA itself, holding that SORA authorizes risk-level determinations "[30] calendar days prior" to a registrant's release from incarceration, regardless of pending civil commitment proceedings. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to designate the defendant as a level two (moderate risk) sex offender. View "People v Watts" on Justia Law

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In 2016, Venezuela's state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), offered a bond swap whereby its noteholders could exchange unsecured notes due in 2017 for new, secured notes due in 2020. PDVSA defaulted in 2019, and the National Assembly of Venezuela passed a resolution declaring the bond swap a "national public contract" requiring its approval under Article 150 of the Venezuelan Constitution. PDVSA, along with its subsidiaries PDVSA Petróleo S.A. and PDV Holding, Inc., initiated a lawsuit seeking a judgment declaring the 2020 Notes and their governing documents "invalid, illegal, null, and void ab initio, and thus unenforceable." The case was taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals, in answering the first question, ruled that Venezuelan law governs the validity of the notes under Uniform Commercial Code § 8-110 (a) (1), which encompasses plaintiffs' arguments concerning whether the issuance of the notes was duly authorized by the Venezuelan National Assembly under the Venezuelan Constitution. However, New York law governs the transaction in all other respects, including the consequences if a security was "issued with a defect going to its validity." Given the court's answer to the first certified question, it did not answer the remaining questions. View "Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. v MUFG Union Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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In the case before the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, the defendant was initially charged with a felony, released on bail, and then arrested three more times for additional violent felonies. The People sought to revoke the defendant's bail on the basis that he had allegedly committed additional felonies. The court remanded the defendant, and his counsel sought his release via a habeas proceeding. The Appellate Division decided that before the court could revoke the defendant's bail, it had to follow certain procedural requirements under CPL 530.60 (2) (c) and determine that there was reasonable cause to believe the defendant had committed the additional crimes.The Court of Appeals held that where a defendant is initially charged with a qualifying felony offense, released on bail, and subsequently accused of committing additional violent felonies, the securing order may be modified under either CPL 530.60 (1) or (2) (a), both of which provide a mechanism for revoking a defendant's bail. However, the choice of provision must be supported by the record.Under CPL 530.60 (1), the court must consider relevant factors to assess the defendant's risk of flight and determine how the alleged additional crimes have changed the defendant's risk profile. The court must make clear on the record that its decision is based on consideration of these factors and not merely on the allegation that the defendant committed additional felonies.Under CPL 530.60 (2) (a), the court may consider whether, after observing certain procedural safeguards, there is reasonable cause to believe the additional crimes have been committed such that the defendant poses a danger to the community requiring remand.In this case, the Court of Appeals found that the record did not sufficiently demonstrate that the modification was based on factors informing the defendant's likelihood of returning to court. Therefore, the determination was presumed to rest upon the fact of the subsequent arrest and the danger the defendant posed to the community, and the failure to follow the procedural requirements of subdivision (2) (c) was considered error.The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, the habeas corpus proceeding was converted into a declaratory judgment action, and judgment was granted in accordance with the opinion. View "People ex rel. Rankin v Brann" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In a dispute involving a fatal stabbing outside a Manhattan bar in 2000, defendant Gonzalo Aguilar appealed his conviction of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and assault in the first degree. Aguilar asserted that the trial court erred by not including a reinstruction on the justification defense in its response to a jury note, and that the court's interested witness charge violated his constitutional right to due process.The Court of Appeals of the State of New York disagreed with Aguilar's claims. The court held that the trial court's response to the jury's note was meaningful and appropriate. It reasoned that the jury's note had specifically requested the definitions of the charges, not a reinstruction on the justification defense. Furthermore, the court noted that the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the jury's request and had significant discretion in determining the scope and nature of its response. The court also pointed out that the jury did not seek further instruction or clarification after the recharge, indicating that the trial court's response was satisfactory.In addition, the court found that Aguilar's argument concerning the interested witness charge was unpreserved as it had not been raised in the trial court and no exception to the preservation rule applied in this case. Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division. View "People v Aguilar" on Justia Law

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In the case of People v. Ramirez, Fernando Ramirez, the defendant, was convicted of causing a three-car collision while intoxicated, resulting in one death and four serious injuries. During the trial, which took place amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, safety protocols such as social distancing and mask-wearing were implemented. The defendant objected to these measures, claiming they impeded his ability to fully observe the facial expressions of prospective jurors, thereby infringing on his rights to be present at all material stages of his trial and to meaningfully contribute to his defense. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that neither a defendant's right to be present during jury selection nor due process requires that a defendant have a simultaneous, unobstructed view of the entirety of every prospective juror's face during jury selection. The Court affirmed that the safety protocols did not violate the defendant's right to be present and observe the jury selection process, and there was no violation of due process.The defendant also requested a mistrial after observing the deceased victim's surviving spouse crying in the courtroom. He argued that this could induce undue sympathy from the jury. However, the trial court denied the motion, as the crying was not conspicuous and there was no indication the jury was aware of it. The court further offered a curative instruction to prevent sympathy, which the defense counsel declined. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that there were no grounds for a mistrial. View "People v Ramirez" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Srecko Bazdaric, was injured while painting an escalator during a renovation project. The escalator was covered with a plastic sheet, which Bazdaric slipped on, sustaining injuries that left him unable to work. He and his wife sued the owners of the premises and the general contractor, alleging violations of Labor Law § 241 (6), which requires employers to provide safe working conditions. The Court of Appeals of New York held that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment as to liability on their Labor Law § 241 (6) claim. The court found that the plastic covering was a slipping hazard that the defendants failed to remove, in violation of Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d), making the defendants liable under Labor Law § 241 (6). The court also found that the plastic covering was not integral to the paint job but was a nonessential and inherently slippery plastic that caused Bazdaric's injuries. The court reversed the lower court's conclusion to the contrary. View "Bazdaric v Almah Partners LLC" on Justia Law