Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a defendant, Cid Franklin, who was arrested following a road rage incident that involved a firearm. The police searched the basement of Franklin's home, which he shared with his son and stepmother, and found a gun in a closet containing items belonging to both Franklin and his stepmother. Franklin was interviewed by an employee of the Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) while in Queens central booking prior to arraignment. The CJA employee recorded Franklin's address as the basement of his home. This information was central to the prosecution's case at trial, as no DNA or fingerprints were discernable on the gun, and no other direct proof was provided that Franklin lived in the basement.The trial court admitted the CJA form as either "a public document" or "a business record," rejecting the defense's objections that it was hearsay and violated Franklin's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Franklin was convicted of one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the introduction of the report violated Franklin's Confrontation Clause rights.The Court of Appeals of New York, however, reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the primary purpose of the CJA interview report was administrative, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and thus it was not testimonial. The court noted that the CJA report was introduced as a business or public record, and the pedigree information collected, including the defendant's address, was pertinent to establishing community ties; it was only incidentally relevant in this case. Therefore, the introduction of the CJA interview report did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that Court. View "People v Franklin" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an adjunct professor at New York University (NYU), experienced offensive and demeaning conduct from her colleagues, including unsolicited offensive mail and online impersonation. She reported these incidents to NYU, which conducted investigations and took measures to limit the impact on her. However, dissatisfied with NYU's response, she filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against NYU and certain administrators, as well as the individuals she claimed were responsible for the conduct against her. The lawsuit alleged discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The federal court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that NYU responded negligently or that her termination was a pretext for discrimination. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (City HRL), dismissing those claims without prejudice. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her hostile work environment and retaliation claims, and the Second Circuit affirmed.While her appeal was pending, the plaintiff filed a nearly identical suit in the Supreme Court, Bronx County, alleging violations of the State and City HRLs, renewing her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, adding another NYU administrator as a defendant, and asserting a new protected category of disability. The Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as barred by collateral estoppel and for failing to state a claim. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, and the plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the plaintiff's claims were barred by collateral estoppel based on the findings of the federal district court. The court also held that the individual defendants, who were the plaintiff's co-workers rather than her supervisors, could not be held liable under the City HRL. The court noted that while the City HRL provides for individual liability, it does so only for those who have a role in administering the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff's employment. View "Russell v New York Univ." on Justia Law

The defendant, Melvin Baez, was convicted of possessing a quantity of cocaine after a nonjury trial. The conviction was based on evidence obtained during a traffic stop when NYPD officers observed Baez using his cell phone while driving. Upon stopping Baez, the officers noticed his bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of marijuana in his car. During a search, a clear plastic bag containing a white substance fell from Baez's jacket pocket. The bag was retrieved, placed in a latex glove for safekeeping, and later stored in a narcotics envelope at the police station.The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the cocaine was inadmissible because the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of custody and there were no reasonable assurances that the substance examined at trial was authentic. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion and found him guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the decision, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the chain of custody of the cocaine and provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the prosecution had laid a legally sufficient foundation for the admission of the drugs into evidence. The court noted that the prosecution had established a legally adequate chain of custody and provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence. The court also noted that the discrepancies in the record regarding the condition, appearance, or handling of the cocaine were not significant enough to render the drugs inadmissible. The court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted and the defendant's conviction was upheld. View "People v Baez" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of convicted sex offenders who were confined in the Fishkill Residential Treatment Facility (RTF) while on post-release supervision (PRS). The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) used the Fishkill RTF to confine these offenders past their maximum sentence expiration dates because they were unable to find housing that complied with the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA). The plaintiffs initiated a proceeding in 2016, seeking injunctions, declaratory relief, and class certification, arguing that DOCCS's operation of the Fishkill RTF failed to comply with the statutes governing RTFs because it did not offer adequate programming or employment opportunities.The Supreme Court dismissed part of the proceeding and converted the remaining into an action seeking a declaration that DOCCS's operation of the Fishkill RTF was non-compliant with the statutes governing RTFs. The court denied class certification, reasoning that the converted declaratory judgment action would adequately protect the interests of similarly situated offenders. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment and a declaration in their favor. The Supreme Court granted defendants' motion in part, concluding that the internal programming was minimally adequate to satisfy DOCCS's statutory obligations. However, the court agreed with plaintiffs that DOCCS failed to provide adequate community-based opportunities.The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the part that granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs and granted defendants' motion in its entirety. The Court concluded that while the statute requires DOCCS to locate RTFs near a community with employment, training, and educational opportunities, there was no mandate that DOCCS offer such opportunities outside the facility.The Court of Appeals held that DOCCS's wholesale refusal to secure community-based opportunities for Fishkill RTF residents constitutes a violation of the statute. The Court concluded that DOCCS, at a minimum, must undertake reasonable efforts to secure community-based opportunities for those persons subject to its RTF programming. However, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the internal programming at the Fishkill RTF was at least minimally adequate. View "Alcantara v Annucci" on Justia Law

A real estate developer, Audthan LLC, and property owner, Nick & Duke, LLC (N & D), entered into a 40-year lease agreement in 2013 to replace a Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotel with a mixed-use residential and commercial building. The agreement required approval from the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) due to a previous harassment finding against the property. The lease required Audthan to obtain a "cure" agreement from HPD and develop low-income housing on the site. However, disagreements arose over the terms of the cure agreement and the parties disputed who was at fault for the termination of the ground lease.The Supreme Court dismissed parts of Audthan's complaint, including a claim for anticipatory repudiation based on N & D's refusal to sign any cure agreement, and rejected N & D's motion to dismiss the remaining portions of the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, holding that Audthan could not seek separate redress for anticipatory repudiation based on the same conduct that allegedly breached the contract in 2015.The Court of Appeals of New York disagreed with the lower courts' dismissal of Audthan's claim for anticipatory repudiation. The court held that a claim for breach and a claim for anticipatory repudiation could both be stated based on the facts at the pleading stage. The court found that N & D's refusal to sign the 2015 cure agreement could be seen as falling short of its contractual requirements without amounting to a total breach. However, N & D's 2021 statement that it would never sign any agreement could be seen as a clear and unequivocal statement that N & D would never perform its obligations, constituting a repudiation of the contract. The court modified the Appellate Division's order by denying N & D's motion to dismiss in part, affirmed the order as modified, and answered the certified question in the negative. View "Audthan LLC v Nick & Duke, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Harvey Weinstein, a well-known figure in the entertainment industry, who was convicted by a jury for various sexual crimes against three complainants. Weinstein appealed, arguing that he was judged based on irrelevant, prejudicial, and untested allegations of prior bad acts, rather than the conduct for which he was indicted.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the third-degree rape prosecution was timely commenced and that the trial court properly admitted testimonies of uncharged, alleged prior sexual acts against persons other than the complainants of the underlying crimes. The court also concluded that the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to cross-examine Weinstein on a broad range of uncharged bad acts should he testify.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division, holding that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of uncharged, alleged prior sexual acts against persons other than the complainants of the underlying crimes because that testimony served no material non-propensity purpose. The court also held that the trial court erred when it ruled that Weinstein, who had no criminal history, could be cross-examined about those allegations as well as numerous allegations of misconduct that portrayed Weinstein in a highly prejudicial light. The court concluded that these errors were not harmless and ordered a new trial. However, the court rejected Weinstein's claim that the third-degree rape prosecution was untimely, holding that the trial court properly discounted the days Weinstein was continuously outside the state and correctly held that the prosecution was not time-barred. View "People v Weinstein" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of when a non-eyewitness can testify to a jury that the defendant is the person depicted in a photo or video. The incident in question occurred on June 10, 2015, when a man was captured on police cameras in Syracuse firing three shots into a van. The defendant, Farod Mosley, was indicted for the shooting in September 2015, but the indictment was dismissed as legally insufficient. In July 2016, an assistant district attorney showed the video of the shooting to Detective Steven Kilburn, who identified Mosley as the shooter in the video. This identification led to a new indictment against Mosley.The trial took place in February 2018, with the key issue being the identification of the shooter in the video. The prosecution relied on Kilburn to provide lay, non-eyewitness identification testimony that he believed Mosley was the shooter in the video. The jury ultimately convicted Mosley of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree. Mosley argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Kilburn's testimony.The Appellate Division rejected Mosley's contention, holding that the People demonstrated Kilburn was more likely than the jury to correctly identify Mosley in the video. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the People failed to establish that Kilburn's testimony would aid the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the person in the video was Mosley. The court ruled that such testimony may be admitted where the witness is sufficiently familiar with the defendant that their testimony would be reliable, and there is reason to believe the jury might require such assistance in making its independent assessment. In this case, there was no showing that the proffered witness was sufficiently familiar with the defendant to render his testimony helpful, or that the jury faced an obstacle to making the identification that the witness's testimony would have overcome. View "People v Mosley" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the adjusted Medicaid reimbursement rates for for-profit residential health care facilities in New York. The New York State Department of Health and its Commissioner, in response to a legislative mandate, eliminated a component known as the "residual equity reimbursement factor" from the computation formula used to set these rates. This change was part of a broader effort to reduce Medicaid costs in the state. The petitioners, 116 for-profit nursing homes, challenged this adjustment, arguing that it was retroactively applied and violated their rights under the Public Health Law and the Equal Protection Clause.The Supreme Court partially granted the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the clause pending a final determination of the proceeding. It also partially granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the petitioners' claims that the adjusted rates were not "reasonable and adequate to meet costs" under the Public Health Law and violated their equal protection rights. However, the court found that the adjusted rates were improperly applied retroactively. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision.The New York Court of Appeals, in its review, held that the Department of Health did not violate the legislature's intent when it announced the recalculated rates for services provided on or after April 2, 2020. The court found that the legislature clearly expressed its intent for the elimination clause to be applied without delay, and that the initial implementing ratemaking was not subject to the usual 60-day advance notice requirement. The court also rejected the petitioners' claims that the adjusted rates were not "reasonable and adequate to meet costs" and violated their equal protection rights. The court modified the order of the Appellate Division in accordance with its opinion and, as so modified, affirmed it. View "In re Aaron Manor Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., LLC v Zucker" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Corey Dunton, who was convicted of attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and reckless endangerment after he opened fire at a skating rink, injuring two individuals. Dunton had a history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior, both in and out of the courtroom. During the announcement of the verdict, Dunton, who was handcuffed for security reasons, disrupted the proceedings with verbal outbursts directed at the jury. As a result, the court ordered his removal from the courtroom.The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Dunton's conviction. However, following a similar case (People v Antoine), Dunton's appellate counsel contacted the Office of the Appellate Defender (OAD) regarding filing a writ of error coram nobis on Dunton's behalf. The OAD filed the writ, arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain claims, including that the trial court violated Dunton's constitutional and statutory right to be present during the rendering of the verdict when it removed him from the courtroom without prior warning. The Appellate Division granted the writ, reversed the judgment, and ordered a new trial.The case was then brought before the Court of Appeals. The court held that the trial court's removal of Dunton from the courtroom was appropriate given his history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior. The court rejected the argument that any error was de minimis based on the timing of Dunton's removal from the courtroom. The court also held that the Appellate Division erroneously concluded that the trial court violated Dunton's right to be present, and therefore incorrectly granted Dunton's writ of error coram nobis on the sole ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim on direct appeal. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of issues raised but not determined by that Court. View "People v. Dunton" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Kenneth Fisher, who was convicted of three counts of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, based on two controlled buy operations. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. During the trial, one of the jurors believed that Fisher had followed her home after the first day of jury selection. She did not immediately inform the court of her concern but waited until the case was submitted to the jury, and then expressed her safety concern to the other jurors during deliberations.The trial court deemed the juror's belief likely unfounded and, despite some assurances that the juror could put aside her concerns, the court decided to retain her. Fisher's attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis that he did not have a fair and impartial jury, but the court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The Court of Appeals found that the juror's belief that she had been followed home by Fisher was a prejudicial belief about the defendant that was not based on the evidence at trial. The court noted that the juror's fear was not about witnesses or collateral matters, but about the defendant's character. The court also noted that the juror had violated the court's instructions by failing to inform the court promptly about her beliefs about the defendant and instead introduced those beliefs into jury deliberations. The court concluded that the juror was "grossly unqualified" and should have been dismissed, and a mistrial granted. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial. View "People v Fisher" on Justia Law