Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with multiple counts of first and second degree robbery, as well as various weapon possession offenses where the charges stemmed from a robbery that occurred outside a Manhattan nightclub. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a five-minute limitation on counsel for the questioning of jurors during each round of voir dire. The court held that the trial court erred in adhering to the unusually short time restriction after defense counsel objected based on the seriousness and number of charges, the identity of the victim, and certain characteristics of prospective jurors that were revealed during examination by the court. View "The People v. Steward" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree where defendant, an experienced archery hunter, shot an arrow from his compound bow towards his neighbor's yard, fatally striking the victim. On appeal, defendant principally contended that he was entitled to an intoxication charge. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support an inference that defendant was so intoxicated as to be unable to form the requisite intent. The court held, however, that the uncontradicted record evidence, including defendant's own account, supported the conclusion that his overall behavior on the day of the incident was purposeful. Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to an intoxication charge. View "The People v. Sirico" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession and sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and promptly appealed his conviction arguing that the supreme court erred in its suppression ruling. At issue was whether the People must timely object to defendant's failure to prove standing in order to preserve that issue for appellate review. The court held that the People were required to alert the suppression court if they believed that defendant had failed to meet his burden to establish standing where the preservation requirement served the added purpose of alerting the adverse party of the need to develop a record for appeal. Accordingly, because the People failed to preserve the issue, the appellate division erred in entertaining it and the matter was reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against defendant after she slipped and fell on ice in a parking lot owned and maintained by defendant. The appellate court held that defendant met its burden of demonstrating that it had not received written notice and that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing either exception to the written notice requirement. The appellate court also certified to the court the question of whether its decision and order was properly made. The court agreed with the appellate court and held that defendant was entitled to notice and an opportunity to correct any defect before being required to respond to any claim of negligence with respect thereto where the parking lot owned and maintained by defendant was accessible to the general public for vehicular travel. Accordingly, the order of the appellate division was affirmed, with costs, and the certified question was not answered upon the ground that it was unnecessary.

Petitioners, two tenured teachers in the New York City School system, commenced Article 78 proceedings against the Board of Education for orders compelling respondent to expunge "letters of reprimand" from their personnel files for failure to follow Education Law 3020-a procedures. Respondent contended that the letters were properly placed in petitioners' files because, pursuant to the 2007-2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), petitioners' union waived the section 3020-1 procedures with respect to the placement of letters of reprimand in tenured teacher's files and agreed to replace them with a different procedure described in Article 21A. The court found that there was ample basis to conclude that the union knowingly waived the procedural rights granted in section 3020-a and held that, because the letters at issue were not subject to section 3020-a procedures, petitioners were not entitled to have them expunged.

Plaintiff sued defendants over whether plaintiff had been fully paid for construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance work performed for defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that plaintiff was not licensed to do home improvement business in his individual name. At issue was whether plaintiff, by doing business in his own name and not the name on his license, violated Westchester County Administrative Code 863.319(1)(b). The court held that a licensed home improvement contractor who entered into a contract using a name other than the one on his license was not barred from enforcing the contract unless the other party was deceived or otherwise prejudiced by the misnomer. The court also held that the forfeiture of the right to be paid for work done was an excessive penalty in this case for what seemed to have been an inadvertent and harmless violation of the County Code. Accordingly, the order of the appellate division should be reversed with costs and defendants' motion for summary judgment denied.

Respondent, a resident of Southold, but not a resident of Fishers Island, filed with the Suffolk County Board of Elections a petition designating himself a candidate in the September 2009 primary election. Petitioners filed objections to the designated petition, alleging that it was invalid because respondent did not meet a residency requirement. At issue was the constitutionality of the residency requirement for the elected position of town justice/town board member, Fishers Island, Town of Southold, Suffolk County. The court held that the residency requirement did not violate the equal protection clause and that the residency requirement passed the rational basis test where the residency requirement imposed only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the right to vote; where any Southold resident who would otherwise be eligible to run for political office could run for the Fishers Island seat; where the residency requirement affected the right to vote, but only in an incidental way; and where the legislative history of the residency requirement articulated several rational bases for the residency requirement and retaining the dual town justice/town board member seat.