Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against 96 Rockaway, LLC, Novalex Contracting Corp., and T-Construction Co., Inc., alleging among other things, violations of Labor Law 240(a) and 241(6). Discovery and a third-party action ensued. T-Construction moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint, and all cross-claims against it. 96 Rockaway and Novalex cross-moved for identical relief. Supreme Court granted defendants' motions, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. The Appellate Division reversed so much of Supreme Court's order as granted defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims, denied the motions, and reinstated those claims. The court held that, given that Labor Law 240(1) should be construed with a common sense approach to the realities of the workplace at issue, defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing that claim. Plaintiff's Labor Law 241(6) cause of action, predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1)(i), failed for similar reasons. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "Salazar v Novalex Contr. Corp." on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to establish that defendant acted "[w]ith intent to prevent" an emergency medical technician (EMT) "from performing a lawful duty" when he caused an EMT to suffer physical injury. As the uniformed EMT was climbing into the driver's side of an ambulance, defendant blindsided him with a blow to the head, threw him to the ground and pummeled him repeatedly about the face and head. The EMT and his partner on a two-person ambulance crew were about to drive away from the premises where they had just treated an injured woman. The court concluded that the People made out a prima facie case of intent by presenting evidence that defendant attacked someone he had reason to know was an EMT on duty at the time. View "People v Bueno" on Justia Law

Defendants were accused of robbing a store and using a stun gun to incapacitate the store manager temporarily. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the People failed to prove that the stun gun was a "dangerous instrument" as defined in the Penal Law, and that therefore, defendants' convictions for first degree robbery and fourth degree weapon possession could not stand. However, the court sustained defendants' convictions for second degree robbery. View "People v Hall" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery but acquitted of first degree burglary. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the statutory definitions of the terms "deprive" and "appropriate" as they related to the meaning of larcenous intent. The court held that defendant's challenge to the jury charge was preserved. At trial, defendant's counsel expressed concern that the jury might not understand the meaning of the phrase "[a]ppropriated for himself and requested a particular charge as to intent with regard to that phrase, which the trial court rejected. The court found this to be sufficient to preserve the issue for review because the definition of the term went directly to the question of the permanency of the taking and the requisite intent. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and a new trial ordered. View "People v Medina" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery, third-degree weapon possession, and second-degree menacing. On appeal, defendant contended that the People's proof was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under People v. Ledwon. The court held that the limited rule of Ledwon did not govern on these facts and the proof at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction despite the evidentiary discrepancies. Nevertheless, an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure entitled defendant to a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing. View "People v Delamota" on Justia Law

Petitioners brought these Article 78 proceedings to challenge, among other things, their placement on involuntary leave without having been provided a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law 72. At issue was whether Civil Service Law 72, which provided certain procedural safeguards to a public employee when placed on an involuntary leave of absence, applied to employees who were prevented from returning to work following a voluntary absence. The court held that it did and the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the judgment of Supreme Court reinstated. View "Matter of Sheeran v New York State Dept. of Transp.; Matter of Michelle Birnbaum v New York State Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over the arbitration of a collective bargaining agreement that contained a no-layoff clause. The court held that because the clause was not explicit, unambiguous and comprehensive, there was nothing for the Union to grieve or for an arbitrator to decide. Having concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable for reasons of public policy, the court need not reach the issue of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the Village's application to stay the arbitration was granted. View "Matter of Johnson City Professional Firefighters Local 921" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the County alleging that the County was negligent for failing to exercise due care to prevent an unsafe condition, to wit, improperly stacked and stored bales at the recycling center. Plaintiff also claimed that the County was negligent in allowing a defective baler to be used at the recycling center, resulting in improperly wound bales that contributed to the accident. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that, like an out-of-possession landlord, it had relinquished all control over the maintenance and operations of the recycling center to Metro Waste pursuant to an agreement and was not contractually obligated to repair unsafe conditions on the premises. At issue was whether the courts erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the County relinquished control over the recycling center. The court held that an issue of fact existed as to whether and to what extent the County exercised control over the subject property. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the County's motion for summary judgment denied. View "Gronski v County of Monroe" on Justia Law

Respondent, a 36-year-old tenured high school teacher, was the subject of disciplinary charges pursuant to Education Law 3020-a as a result of her improper conduct with respect to a 15-year-old male student. Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7511 to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the penalty imposed was irrational and contrary to the public policy of protecting children. The court held that the arbitration award did not violate public policy where the award, on it's face, was neither prohibited by statute nor common law. The court also held that the award was not arbitrary, capricious, or irrational where the hearing officer engaged in thorough analysis of the facts and circumstances, evaluated respondent's credibility, and arrived at a reasoned conclusion that a 90-day suspension and reassignment was the appropriate penalty. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "City School Dist. of the City of New York v McGraham" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought to vacate a unanimous arbitration award in favor of Sirius arising out of a breach of contract dispute. Petitioner, which had a non-exclusive agreement with Sirius to distribute radio receivers, claimed that the chairman of the arbitration panel failed to disclose relationships of interest that affected the impartiality and propriety of the arbitration process. The court adopted the Second Circuit's reasonable person standard and held that the Appellate Division erred by imposing upon petitioner a "burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that any impropriety or misconduct of the arbitrator prejudiced its rights." The court held, however, that the Appellate Division correctly determined that there was no basis to vacate the arbitration award. Accordingly, the order was affirmed. View "U.S. Electronics, Inc. v Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc." on Justia Law