Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in November, 2011
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This case involved a dispute over property that was sold by the City to the sponsor of an urban renewal project. The agreement between the City and the sponsor, called a Land Distribution Agreement, contained provisions designed to assure that, for at least 25 years, the land would be used for a Pathmark supermarket. At issue was whether Pathmark breached the Lease Assignment Contract, thus, giving plaintiff a right to terminate it. The court interpreted the contract to assign a lease of real property, and held that the risk that the City might not permit the assignment was one that the buyer agreed to take. That risk did not give the buyer an excuse for terminating the contract. View "CPS Operating Co. LLC v Pathmark Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this dispute between an employee and his employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, the court was asked to interpret Workers' Compensation Law 27(2) and 15(3)(w) amended by the Laws of 2007, as they related to an award for a non-scheduled permanent partial disability made after the effective date for an injury sustained years earlier. The court concluded that the Workers' Compensation Board and the Appellate Division properly construed the amended statute by requiring the carrier to deposit a lump-sum amount into the Aggregate Trust Fund representing the present value of the award. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Matter of Raynor v Landmark Chrysler" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether Supreme Court abused its discretion when it dismissed a hearing-impaired prospective juror for cause. The court held that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by granting the cause challenge to venire member 1405 because the record supported the determination that his hearing impairment would have unduly interfered with his ability to be a trial juror. Defendant's remaining contentions did not require reversal. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Guay" on Justia Law

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Defendant was indicted on one count of first-degree robbery and on one count of grand larceny in the fourth degree. At issue was whether defendant's written statement threatening to shoot a robbery victim with a gun constituted legally sufficient evidence that he was in actual possession of a dangerous instrument at the time of the crime to support the charge of robbery in the first degree. The court held that a defendant's statement that he was in possession of a dangerous instrument, standing alone, did not supply sufficient proof to establish actual possession of a dangerous instrument at the time of the crime to support the charge of first-degree robbery. The court held that this type of statement - whether in the form of a verbal threat or a handwritten note - not only established the threat of physical force necessary to support the charge of third-degree robbery. Accordingly, the People must furnish additional proof, separate and apart from a defendant's statement, that would permit a rational fact finder to infer that a defendant was in actual possession of a dangerous instrument. View "People v Grant" on Justia Law

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Five days after Charmaine D. was admitted to the hospital, petitioner, the director of the psychiatry department at that hospital, applied to Supreme Court for an order that she be retained for 30 days. Charmaine moved to dismiss the retention proceeding, arguing, among other things, that her original commitment was defective because the emergency room psychiatrist at issue was not a proper applicant under Mental Hygiene Law 9.27. The court held that an emergency room psychiatrist was "supervising the treatment of or treating" a patient within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law 9.27(b)(11), and so had standing to seek an involuntary commitment of the patient pursuant to section 9.27. The psychiatrist was not required to resort to the emergency procedure contained in Mental Hygiene Law 9.39. View "Matter of Rueda v Charmaine D." on Justia Law