Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ronald and Margaret Marchard owned property in the Village of Bayville through which runs a dirt road called the Travelled Way. The Marchands asserted that the road was private property, while the Village maintained that it was a Village Street. Supreme Court, after a non-jury trial, entered judgment in favor of the Village, declaring that the Travelled Way was a Village street. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a road is not public unless the public takes responsibility for maintaining and repairing it; and (2) because the Village had not maintained or repaired the road, the Travelled Way was a private road and not a Village street. View "Marchand v. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a rezoning proposal for Sunset Park, a predominantly residential neighborhood in Brooklyn. Following public hearings, the Department of City Planning (DCP), the lead agency here, prepared an environmental assessment statement (EAS) and issued a negative declaration, concluding that the proposed rezoning would not have an adverse impact on the environment. Petitioners sought to annul the negative declaration on the ground that DCP's environmental review of the proposed rezoning was not in compliance with the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act and the City Environmental Quality Review rules. Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that DCP neither abused its discretion nor was arbitrary or capricious when it issued its negative declaration because in its EAS the DCP identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a hard look at them, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination. View "Chinese Staff & Workers' Ass'n v. Burden" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a justice of the town court, commenced a proceeding to review a determination of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct that sustained six charges of misconduct against him and determined that he should be removed from office. The charges stemmed from numerous cases Petitioner presided over involving his paramour's relatives in which Petitioner failed to disqualify himself, failed to disclose the relationship, and engaged in ex parte communications. Upon reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals concluded that removal was the appropriate sanction and accepted the determined sanction, as Petitioner's conduct demonstrated a misuse of his judicial office and damaged public confidence in his integrity and impartiality. View "In re Young" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder upon evidence that he killed his fiancee by inflicting numerous knife wounds. Although Defendant had sought to interpose the affirmative defense that his homicidal acts had been committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, and upon that theory to afford the jury the option of returning a verdict of manslaughter in the first degree instead of murder, the trial court refused to charge the defense, deeming the charge unwarranted absent proof that Defendant suffered from an underlying "mental infirmity." The appellate division affirmed, concluding that Defendant's conduct before, during and after the offense was inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with the defense. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the charge should have been given, as the evidence would have permitted Defendant's jury reasonably to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the homicide, he was affected by an extreme emotional disturbance, and that the disturbance was supported by a reasonable explanation or excuse rooted in the situation as he perceived it. View "People v. McKenzie" on Justia Law

In Soundview Park in the Bronx, a New York City police officer observed a knife on Defendant's person and seized it while issuing Defendant a summons for trespass and questioning him about his presence in the park after hours. The knife turned out to be a gravity knife, and Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Defendant moved to suppress the knife as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The Supreme Court granted the motion on the ground that, at the time the officer took the knife, he lacked probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed a crime. The appellate court reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer to retrieve the knife and make an arrest when the knife turned out to be unlawful. View "People v. Miranda" on Justia Law

At issue here was national assets stolen by President Ferdinand Marcos. Victims of Marcos' human rights abuses ("Pimentel class") obtained a judgment against Marcos' estate and, in enforcing the judgment, sought to obtain assets also sought by the Republic of the Philippines and its commission organized to retrieve the assets (collectively, Republic). In dispute was the assets of Arelma, a Panamanian corporation, which were held in a brokerage account. The brokerage firm commenced an interpleader action in federal court. The district court awarded ownership of the Arelma assets to the Pimentel claimants. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the Republic required dismissal for lack of a required party. Petitioner then commenced this turnover proceeding seeking to execute the Pimental judgment against the Arelma account. Meanwhile, a Philippine court determined the assets had been forfeited to the Republic. PNB and Arelma moved to intervene, requesting dismissal. Supreme Court denied the motion. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that dismissal was required under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1001, as the Republic was a necessary party but could not be subject to joinder in light of the assertion of sovereign immunity. View "Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that the City of New York was contractually obligated to pay rent subsidies to their landlords under the Advantage New York program until expiration of their leases. State and Federal reimbursement for two-thirds of the Advantage program's costs ended on April 1, 2011, causing the City to discontinue it as of that date. Both lower courts found that the City did not intend to enter into enforceable contracts with Plaintiffs or their landlords under the Advantage program. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit, holding that the courts below did not err in finding that the City made no contractual commitment to continue the Advantage program through expiration of Plaintiffs' leases. View "Zheng v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of third degree robbery, a felony. Defendant was sentenced as a second degree felony offender, on the basis of a previous conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to distribute heroin, and to possess it with intent to distribute. The court held that, under New York's "strict equivalency" standard for convictions rendered in other jurisdictions, a federal conviction for conspiracy to commit a drug crime could not serve as a predicate felony for sentencing purposes. View "People v Ramos" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a criminal homicide prosecution against defendant. The primary issue presented on appeal was whether an Administrative Judge exceeded his authority pursuant to 22 NYCRR 127.2(b) by considering the order of a trial court assigning an attorney, under article 18-B of the County Law, to a criminal proceeding. The court held that section 127.2(b), which only provided for an Administrative Judge's review of orders awarding legal fees to attorneys, did not authorize the Administrative Judge to review the assignment of counsel. View "Matter of Smith v Tormey" on Justia Law

Public school students filed complaints with the SDHR, claiming that their respective school districts engaged in an "unlawful discriminatory practice" under Article 15 of the Executive Law, Executive Law 290, et seq. At issue on these appeals was whether a public school district was an "education corporation or association" as contemplated by Executive Law 296(4). The court concluded that it was not, and therefore, SDHR lacked jurisdiction to investigate complaints made against public school districts under that provision. View "Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v New York State Div. of Human Rights" on Justia Law