Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The primary question in this commercial dispute involving, among other things, the right to a leasehold to certain commercial property, was whether, pursuant to the "necessary affects" requirement under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(a)(1), Defendants' appeal to the appellate division from a judgment declaring Plaintiff the lawful tenant of the subject property brought up for review two non-final supreme court orders: one dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint and the other denying Defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the appellate division, concluding that the appellate division improperly held that Defendants' appeal from the judgment did not bring up for review the order dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint. In other words, the appellate division erred in ruling that this order did not necessarily affect the final judgment. View "Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v. E. 149th Realty Corp." on Justia Law

At Defendant's trial for second-degree murder, the trial judge agreed with the defense attorney that a reasonable view of the evidence supported his request to submit the lesser-included offenses of first- and second-degree manslaughter to the jury. But contrary to defense counsel's request and repeated statements that, in his professional judgment, the lesser-included offenses should be given to the jury, the judge did not do so because Defendant objected. The jury found Defendant guilty of murder. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge denied Defendant the expert judgment of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, as the decision regarding whether to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses is for the defense attorney, not the accused, to make; and (2) the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Colville" on Justia Law

Defendant's paramour, Maria, obtained an order of protection requiring Defendant to refrain from contacting her in any manner and to stay away from her. Defendant violated the order and was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree. Another order of protection was issued, which Defendant violated by trying to open the door of Maria's apartment. Based on this incident, Defendant was indicted for attempted burglary in the second degree and several counts of criminal contempt in the first degree. Defendant was convicted on all counts. At issue on appeal was whether the intent to do something inside the residence that would be legal in the absence of the order of protection establishes the requisite criminal state of mind to elevate the trespass to a burglary. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even an act that would otherwise be legal but for the issuance of the order of protection can be viewed as a crime, and the intent to commit this act inside a building may be used to prove a burglary charge. View "People v. Cajigas" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the New York City School Construction Authority (Authority) violated the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) during a construction project by failing to discuss in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) the methods it adopted for long-term maintenance and monitoring of the controls it used to prevent or mitigate environmental harm. Petitioners brought this action challenging that Authority's SEQRA compliance. Supreme court ordered the Authority to prepare a supplemental EIS based on any changes to the final EIS as a result of the Authority's completed, detailed long-term maintenance and monitoring plan. The Authority did not file a supplemental EIS but, instead, moved for reargument and renewal, asserting that its submission of a site management plan removed the need for any further SEQRA filing. Supreme court adhered to its previous ruling on reargument, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) where important decisions about mitigation can only be made after the initial remedial measures are complete, a supplemental EIS may be called for, as it is here; and (2) nor does the submission of a site management plan justify short-circuiting SEQRA review. View "Bronx Comm. for Toxic Free Schs. v. N.Y. City Sch. Constr. Auth." on Justia Law

Appellants were indicted for enterprise corruption based in essential part on their commission of numerous predicate offenses. There was proof before the grand jury that three of them repeatedly purchased stolen credit card data which they then used for fraudulent purposes, and that the remaining appellant, through the company he controlled, Western Express International, Inc., facilitated transactions by which the purloined credit card data was transferred. Supreme court granted Appellants' respective motions to dismiss the indictment's enterprise corruption count upon the ground that the proof before the grand jury did not make out the existence of a "criminal enterprise." The appellate division reversed and reinstated the enterprise corruption count, concluding that the evidence permitted the inference that Appellants knowingly played roles in the enterprise even though, for the most part, they had no personal interaction. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the orders of supreme court, holding that although there was evidence of many arms' length transactions, there was no proof of concerted activity from which a petit jury might reasonably have gathered that Appellants were knowing participants in the affairs of a "criminal enterprise" within the meaning of N.Y. Penal Law 460.10(3). View "People v. W. Express Int'l Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the high profile disappearance of Michele Harris, the mother of four young children and Defendant's estranged wife. After a lengthy retrial, a jury convicted Defendant of murder in the second degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for a new trial, holding, (1) the appellate division properly held that the guilty verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence; but (2) a critical error occurred during voir dire when supreme court failed to elicit from a prospective juror an unequivocal assurance of her ability to be impartial after she apprised defense counsel that she had a preexisting opinion as to Defendant's guilt or innocence. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendants owned land on the shore of a pond. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants claimed to be the owners of the land under the pond that was adjacent to Defendants' waterfront land. The parties' claims depended on the interpretation of two 1973 deeds from Anthony and Marilyn Furlano to Defendants' predecessors in title. According to Defendants, the deeds conveyed both waterfront land and land under the water. Plaintiffs claimed that only the waterfront land was conveyed. Plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin Defendants from interfering with or using the underwater property "and the water thereon." The supreme court granted summary judgment for defendants, but the appellate division modified and ruled in Plaintiffs' favor. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that since the deeds did not expressly exclude underwater lands, they must be read as conveying such land, to the center of the pond, to Defendants' predecessors. View "Knapp v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a credit union, commenced this declaratory judgment action against Defendants, the state department of taxation and finance, its commissioner, and the state. The credit union asserted it was not required to pay the mortgage recording tax (MRT) on mortgage obligations issued to members because (1) the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) exempts federal credit unions and their property from state taxation, and (2) as instrumentalities of the United States, federal credit unions are immune from state taxation under the Supremacy Clause. Supreme court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, based on principles of statutory interpretation and the legislative history of the FCUA, federal credit unions are not exempt from the state's MRT. View "Hudson Valley Fed. Credit Union v. Dep't of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Court of Appeals considered whether a written letter from the assistant commissioner of the fire department of the city of New York to Petitioner firefighter advising him that he violated the department's code of conduct and equal employment (EEO) policy may be made part of Petitioner's permanent EEO file without affording him an opportunity for a hearing. The supreme court annulled the department's determination that Petitioner made racially offensive remarks and expunged the letter from Petitioner's EEO file. The appellate division affirmed, concluding that the department did not comport with the requirements of due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the department denied Petitioner his right to due process by placing the letter in his file without conducting a hearing, and thus the letter was properly expunged from Petitioner's permanent EEO file. View "D'Angelo v. Scoppetta" on Justia Law