Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in February, 2013
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Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts. At the time of the guilty plea, Defendant had a prior undischarged state sentence stemming from a felony drug conviction and also faced a federal violation of supervised release in connection with two prior federal felonies. Defendant was later sentenced to a determinate prison term of twelve years. The sentencing court stated that the sentence would be concurrent to the federal sentence. In addition, as a second felony drug offender, N.Y. Penal Law 70.25(2-a) required Defendant's twelve-year prison term to run consecutively to his prior undischarged state sentence. Defendant appealed, asserting that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court did not advise him of the consequence of his plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the failure of the trial court to address the impact of section 70.25(2-a) during the plea colloquy did not require vacatur of the plea. View "People v. Belliard" on Justia Law

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An insurance company (USF&G), having settled asbestos claims for nearly a billion dollars, sought to recover a share of its settlement payment from its reinsurers. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to USF&G. The Appellate Division affirmed, with one justice dissenting on the ground that there was a genuine triable issue of fact as to whether a portion of the settlement was for bad faith claims. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division's order to deny summary judgment on two issues and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) there was an issue of fact as to whether USF&G, in allocating the settlement amount, reasonably attributed nothing to the so-called "bad faith" claims made against it; and (2) there was a genuine issue of triable fact as to whether certain claims were given unreasonable values for settlement purposes. View "U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. Re-Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Following a verbal exchange between Defendant and a police officer in which Defendant swore at the officer and accused the officer of harassing him, Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct. In a search incident to arrest, the police discovered Defendant was in possession of twenty-five bags of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs found on his person, contending that the arrest for disorderly conduct was illegal, rendering the contraband fruit of the poisonous tree. After the motion was denied, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance third degree and assault second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed, vacated Defendant's guilty plea, and granted Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) Defendant's arrest for disorderly conduct was not supported by probable cause due to insufficient proof on the public harm element; and (2) because the arrest was unlawful, the cocaine seized during the search incident to that arrest should have been suppressed. View "People v. Baker" on Justia Law

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In 2007, Plaintiff's father (Decedent) collapsed and at a health club owned and operated by Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc. (Bally). Ambulance personnel administered shocks to Decedent with an automatic external defibrillator (AED), but he never revived. Plaintiff, as executor of Decedent's estate, brought a wrongful death suit against Bally, alleging that Bally employees negligently failed to use an available AED, or failed to use it within sufficient time, to save Decedent's life. Bally primarily argued that it was immune from liability under the State's Good Samaritan Law. Supreme Court denied Bally's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding (1) N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 627-a imposes an affirmative duty of care upon health clubs so as to give rise to a cognizable cause of action in negligence for failure to operate an available AED; and (2) the complaint stated a cause of action based upon common law negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 627-a does not create an affirmative duty for health clubs to use the AEDs they are required to have available; but (2) Plaintiff pleaded a viable cause of action at common law. View "Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc." on Justia Law

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After falling on the street and injuring her leg, Plaintiff commenced this negligence action against Communications Specialists, Inc. (CSI) for creating a hazardous condition in the road by failing to properly pave over a trench CSI cut to install high-speed fiber-optic cable underneath the street. To rebut Plaintiff's testimony that a dip in the trench caused her to fall, CSI subpoenaed a physician who treated Plaintiff shortly after the accident and declared that Plaintiff "tripped over a dog." CSI paid the doctor $10,000 for appearing at trial. Plaintiff's counsel asked the court to charge the jury that, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8001, the doctor was entitled to a witness fee of $15 per day. The court gave the jury a general bias charge but made no specific reference to the payment the doctor received for appearing at trial. The jury found that CSI was negligent but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court should have issued a bias charge specifically tailored to address the payment CSI made to the doctor; but (2) the court's failure to issue such an instruction in this case was harmless. View "Caldwell v. Cablevision Sys. Corp." on Justia Law