In December 2016, an undercover police officer purchased heroin through an intermediary during a buy-and-bust operation in Manhattan. The officer did not meet the seller face-to-face but followed several feet behind the intermediary and the seller. The officer was far enough away that he could not hear their conversation. After the transaction, the officer reported to his team that the dealer was wearing specific clothing. Minutes later, the police arrested the defendant nearby, and the undercover officer identified him as the seller. The defendant filed a motion arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the court should suppress the undercover officer's identification, the prerecorded buy money, and the defendant's cell phone.The Supreme Court ordered a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The undercover officer testified about his observations during the operation and his subsequent identification of the defendant. After the hearing, the court ruled that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant and suppressed the undercover officer's identification and the physical evidence recovered from the defendant. The defendant then moved for an independent source hearing to determine whether the undercover officer would be allowed to identify him at trial. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the undercover's testimony at the probable cause hearing provided clear and convincing evidence for an in-court identification of the defendant at trial. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the court had exercised its discretion appropriately in denying the defendant's request for a separate independent source hearing. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial to be preceded by an independent source hearing. The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the undercover officer's in-court identification without a hearing record sufficient to support an independent source determination for the identification. The court found that the testimony at the probable cause hearing did not provide enough evidence to support an independent source determination. The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to an independent source hearing, as requested. View "People v Williams" on Justia Law

The case involves the Walt Disney Company and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), both multinational corporations, and their dispute with the Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York. The corporations challenged the state's taxation scheme that was in effect from 2003 to 2013. The scheme allowed corporations that paid franchise taxes in New York to deduct income received as royalty payments from members of the same corporate group in calculating their taxable income. The deduction was only allowed if the royalty payment came from a related entity that had already paid a New York tax on the same income. The state Department of Taxation and Finance determined that both corporations improperly deducted royalty payments they received from affiliates in foreign countries that were not subject to New York franchise taxes. The corporations argued that the denial of the deduction was contrary to the statute and violated the Commerce Clause's prohibition on discrimination against foreign commerce.The corporations challenged the denial of their royalty tax deductions and the notices of deficiency with the New York State Division of Tax Appeals. The Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) determined that the deduction authorized under the law only applied where the royalty came from a subsidiary that had been subjected to the add back requirement contained in the law. The ALJs denied the petitions and sustained the notices of deficiency. The Tax Appeals Tribunal subsequently affirmed both decisions. The corporations then commenced proceedings in the Appellate Division, which affirmed the determinations and dismissed the petitions. The corporations appealed to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Appellate Division correctly interpreted the statutes as permitting a tax deduction only where a related subsidiary was subject to the add back requirement. The court also found that any burden on interstate or foreign commerce created by this tax scheme was incidental and did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court rejected the corporations' argument that the tax scheme was facially discriminatory against out-of-state commerce and failed the internal consistency test. The court concluded that the tax scheme treated groups with related members who did not pay taxes in New York the same as those with related members who did, and that the scheme did not result in duplicative taxation in all situations. View "In re Walt Disney Company and Consolidated Subsidiaries v Tax Appeals Tribunal" on Justia Law

The case involves 21 U.S. citizens and the family of a deceased U.S. citizen who were victims of rocket attacks by the Hizbollah terrorist organization in Israel in 2006. The plaintiffs allege that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) provided financial services to Hizbollah, including facilitating millions of dollars in wire transfers through a New York-based correspondent bank. In 2011, LCB and Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (SGBL), a private company incorporated in Lebanon, executed a purchase agreement where SGBL acquired all of LCB's assets and liabilities. In 2019, the plaintiffs brought similar claims against SGBL, as LCB's successor, in the Eastern District of New York for damages stemming from the 2006 attacks.The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over SGBL. The court interpreted several Appellate Division and federal decisions to allow imputation of jurisdictional status only in the event of a merger, not an acquisition of all assets and liabilities. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals, asking whether an entity that acquires all of another entity's liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherits the acquired entity's status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, and under what circumstances the acquiring entity would be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York.The New York Court of Appeals answered the first question affirmatively, stating that where an entity acquires all of another entity's liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, it inherits the acquired entity's status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The court declined to answer the second question as unnecessary. The court reasoned that allowing a successor to acquire all assets and liabilities, but escape jurisdiction in a forum where its predecessor would have been answerable for those liabilities, would allow those assets to be shielded from direct claims for those liabilities in that forum. View "Lelchook v Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law

The case pertains to a dispute between the Department of Finance of the City of New York and Brookdale Physicians' Dialysis Associates, Inc. over the revocation of a real property tax exemption. The property in question was owned by Samuel and Bertha Schulman Institute for Nursing and Rehabilitation Fund, Inc., a not-for-profit entity, and was leased to Brookdale Dialysis, a for-profit corporation. The Department of Finance retroactively revoked the property's tax-exempt status in 2013, citing the fact that the property had been leased to a for-profit entity.The Supreme Court initially annulled the Department's determination, arguing that it failed to consider whether Brookdale Dialysis' services were reasonably incidental to the exemption purpose. The Department of Finance reassessed the property for the 2014-2015 tax year and again revoked the exemption after finding that the income from the lease exceeded the expenses for the property. The decision to revoke the exemption was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Division.However, the Court of Appeals reversed these decisions, holding that the property was not exempt under New York Real Property Tax Law § 420-a. The court noted that the law mandatorily exempts from taxation any real property owned by certain not-for-profit entities and used exclusively for beneficial purposes without financial gain. The law does not apply to property leased by a for-profit corporation. Therefore, the court concluded that the property in this case was not exempt under this law, and the Department of Finance's decision to revoke the exemption was justified. View "Matter of Brookdale Physicians' Dialysis Assoc., Inc. v Department of Fin. of the City of N.Y." on Justia Law

Patrick Labate was charged with a class A misdemeanor, for which he was legally entitled to a trial within 90 days of his indictment. The court's record, however, showed that Labate had not been tried 420 days after his indictment. This delay was primarily due to multiple instances where the prosecution declared they were not ready for trial, without providing an explanation, causing the trial to be adjourned.In the case in question, the main issue was the 43-day period between September 5, 2018, and October 18, 2018. The Court of Appeals ruled that this entire period must be charged to the prosecution. The court found that when the prosecution declares readiness for trial, any subsequent delay caused by their own inaction is charged to them. In this case, the prosecution had declared readiness, yet were not ready to proceed on the first scheduled trial date and provided no explanation for their unreadiness. This meant that the delay was attributable to the prosecution's inaction and affected their ability to proceed to trial.The court emphasized that the prosecution has an obligation to maintain readiness and must provide an explanation for any changes in their readiness status. In this case, the prosecution had failed to do so, leading to the court's decision to dismiss the indictment against Labate. The court affirmed the Appellate Term's order to dismiss the indictment but provided different reasoning for its decision.This decision serves as a reminder of the importance of providing an explanation for any changes in trial readiness status and maintaining trial readiness to ensure the prompt administration of justice. View "People v Labate" on Justia Law

The case involved two separate lawsuits against the City of New York, where the plaintiffs, Luis Jaime and Adan Orozco, were seeking permission to serve late notices of claim for alleged intentional torts committed by City employees. The claims were based on the General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), which allows for late notices if the court believes the City has actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claims.In Orozco's case, he claimed that officials of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the District Attorney's Office obtained a warrant for his arrest without probable cause and used false evidence. Jaime, who was detained at Riker's Island, alleged that he was attacked by correction officers and/or inmates on multiple occasions. Both plaintiffs argued that the City had actual knowledge of their claims due to the involvement of its employees and its possession of related records.The Court of Appeals disagreed with the lower courts' decision to grant the plaintiffs leave to serve late notices of claim. It held that mere participation of City's employees in an intentional tort and the City's possession of related records do not necessarily provide the City with actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claims. The court found that both plaintiffs failed to provide substantive evidence to establish the City's actual knowledge. It also found that their reasons for late filing, such as defending against criminal charges and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, did not constitute a reasonable excuse. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the orders of the Appellate Division, denying the plaintiffs' petitions to file late notices of claim. View "Matter of Jaime v City of New York" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jason Bohn, was convicted of first-degree murder for the death of a woman with whom he had an abusive relationship. He appealed, contending that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he relished or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain, which is a requirement under the first-degree murder statute. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the conviction.The court applied the standard that a verdict is legally sufficient when "there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The court found sufficient proof for a rational jury to conclude that the defendant derived pleasure from inflicting extreme pain.In reaching this conclusion, the court considered evidence of the defendant's threats and abusive conduct towards the victim before the murder, a voicemail that inadvertently recorded the crime, and the testimony of the medical examiner about the nature and extent of the victim's injuries. The court found that this evidence, particularly the recording of the attack and the medical testimony, was sufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant relished or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme pain.The court rejected the defendant's argument that his actions were driven by anger or a desire to extract information from the victim. The court clarified that having mixed motives does not preclude a finding that the defendant took pleasure in inflicting extreme pain, as long as this was a substantial motivation. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that taking pleasure in inflicting extreme pain was a substantial motivation for the defendant's actions. View "People v Bohn" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Tax Equity Now NY LLC (TENNY), challenged the property-tax system of New York City, arguing that it imposes substantially unequal tax bills on similarly valued properties that bear little relationship to the properties' fair market value. TENNY further alleged that multi-million-dollar properties are taxed at similar or lower rates than less valuable properties and that real property in majority-people-of-color districts are overassessed and subjected to higher taxes compared to properties in majority-white districts. The plaintiff sought relief against City and State defendants for alleged constitutional and statutory violations caused by the City's tax scheme.The Court of Appeals of New York concluded that although TENNY's complaint failed to state claims against the State defendants, the complaint sufficiently alleges causes of action against the City defendants under section 305 (2) of Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) and the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) on the basis that the system is unfair, inequitable and has a discriminatory disparate impact on certain protected classes of New York City property owners. The court therefore modified the Appellate Division's order with respect to these causes of action. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the remaining causes of action against the City and all claims against the State for failure to state a claim. View "Tax Equity Now NY LLC v City of New York" on Justia Law

In 2005, Marta Urias and her incapacitated husband, Manuel Urias, were represented by Daniel P. Buttafuoco and his law firm in a medical malpractice suit. The suit, against four defendants, resulted in a $3.7 million settlement. Buttafuoco calculated his legal fees separately for each defendant, as per his interpretation of Judiciary Law § 474-a. His fee totaled $864,552, which he later reduced to $710,000. Marta Urias later sued Buttafuoco, claiming that he deceived her and the court about the legal fees they were entitled to by offering a false interpretation of the law. Buttafuoco moved for summary judgment, arguing that Urias's sole remedy was to move under CPLR 5015 to vacate the underlying judgment. Both the Supreme Court and Appellate Division dismissed Urias's claims.The Court of Appeals held that Judiciary Law § 487 allows a plenary action for attorney deceit, even if the claim could undermine a separate final judgment. However, the Court also found that Buttafuoco was entitled to summary judgment on Urias's claim. It found no material issue of fact as to whether Buttafuoco made false statements regarding his fee calculations. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division order, holding that Urias had failed to establish a material, triable issue of fact as to whether Buttafuoco's interpretations of the fee calculations or litigation expenses amounted to false statements. Therefore, while Judiciary Law § 487 permits a plenary action, Buttafuoco was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. View "Urias v Daniel P. Buttafuoco & Assoc., PLLC" on Justia Law

This case involved an appeal from the Appellate Division by the prosecution, contesting the vacation of a defendant's conviction of first-degree murder on the grounds that two elements of the crime were not proven by legally sufficient evidence. The defendant was a member of a gang who, along with his accomplices, mistook a 15-year-old boy (Junior) for a member of a rival gang and murdered him. The murder was captured on surveillance video.The Appellate Division had vacated the defendant's first-degree murder conviction on the grounds that two necessary elements were not satisfied by legally sufficient evidence. The first element was a "course of conduct" involving the intentional infliction of extreme physical pain, and the second was that the defendant "relished" or took pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain.The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the second element was not proven but disagreed with them on the first. It held that the evidence, including testimony from the medical examiner and surveillance video, provided a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant and his accomplices' actions prior to and during the murder caused extreme physical pain to Junior before his death.However, with regard to the second element, the court concurred with the Appellate Division that the evidence did not establish that the defendant took pleasure in causing Junior extreme physical pain before his death. It stated that the evidence demonstrated, at most, that the defendant took pride in having killed Junior, not that he took pleasure in causing Junior extreme physical pain before his death. The court stated that the statute requires that the defendant inflicted extreme physical pain and took pleasure in doing so before killing the victim.In conclusion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division that vacated the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder. View "People v Estrella" on Justia Law