Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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Petitioner Maryanne McCabe lived with her long-time romantic partner, David Burrows, in a New York City cooperative building. Upon Burrows' death, he bequeathed his unit to McCabe. She sought to acquire his lease and shares under a lease provision allowing automatic transfer to a shareholder's "spouse." The cooperative board did not recognize McCabe as a spouse but offered to consider her under a clause for family members. McCabe argued that the board's refusal violated the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) prohibition against marital status discrimination.The Supreme Court denied McCabe's petition, stating that the denial was not due to her being unmarried but because she was not married to Burrows, which did not constitute marital status discrimination. The court also found that McCabe had not proven she was a family member or financially responsible. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision on the same grounds.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the term "marital status" under the NYCHRL refers to the legal condition of being single, married, legally separated, divorced, or widowed, and does not extend to individuals in long-term romantic relationships who are not legally married or in a registered domestic partnership. The Court concluded that the cooperative board's actions did not constitute marital status discrimination under the NYCHRL, the New York State Human Rights Law, or federal law. The Court also deferred to the board's decision to reject McCabe's application based on her financial representations. View "Matter of McCabe v. 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp." on Justia Law

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In 2001, Alphonse Fletcher, Jr. acquired property associated with two apartment units in a residential cooperative corporation controlled by The Dakota, Inc. In 2008, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. approved a loan to Fletcher, secured by his rights in the property. Fletcher, Chase, and The Dakota entered into an agreement recognizing The Dakota's priority to proceeds from any sale or subletting of Fletcher's apartments. In 2011, Fletcher sued The Dakota for racial discrimination, and The Dakota counterclaimed for legal fees and costs based on Fletcher's proprietary lease.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota in the Fletcher action and awarded attorneys' fees and costs. While this action was pending, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP initiated a CPLR 5225 proceeding against Chase, The Dakota, and Fletcher to seize and sell Fletcher's apartments to satisfy a judgment for unpaid legal fees. The Dakota claimed a superior interest in Fletcher's property based on the fee judgment, while Chase argued that The Dakota's lien was not superior and that the lease provision authorizing attorneys' fees was either inapplicable or unconscionable.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that Chase's contentions were an impermissible collateral attack on The Dakota's judgment. Chase moved for leave to appeal and to intervene and vacate the judgment in the Fletcher action. The Supreme Court denied Chase's motion, but the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals held that Chase, as a nonparty to the original action, was not barred from challenging the fee award in a separate proceeding. The court concluded that Chase was not required to intervene in the Fletcher action to protect its interests and that doing so would violate Chase's due process rights. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the matter was remitted for further proceedings. View "Matter of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Victor Ibhawa, a Black, Nigerian Catholic priest, was hired by the Diocese of Buffalo in 2016 as the Parish Administrator of the Blessed Trinity Church. He was reappointed in January 2019 for another three-year term but was terminated on September 28, 2020. Ibhawa filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) in November 2020, alleging racial discrimination, including incidents involving racial slurs and xenophobic remarks. He claimed that Diocesan officials failed to investigate these incidents and made offensive remarks about foreign priests. Ibhawa's employment was terminated, and his priestly faculties were removed, preventing him from applying for another priest position in the Diocese. He alleged hostile work environment and unlawful termination based on race and national origin.The DHR dismissed Ibhawa's complaint, citing the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment, which it interpreted as a jurisdictional bar. The New York Supreme Court partially reversed this decision, finding that while the unlawful termination claim was properly dismissed, the hostile work environment claim required further consideration. The Appellate Division, however, reinstated the DHR's dismissal, emphasizing deference to the agency's expertise and noting the lack of controlling precedent on the ministerial exception's applicability to hostile work environment claims.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the DHR erred in treating the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar rather than an affirmative defense. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and remitted the case to the DHR for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Ibhawa v New York State Div. of Human Rights" on Justia Law

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In 2006, an individual was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and later subjected to civil management under New York's Mental Hygiene Law due to a "mental abnormality." Initially confined, he was released to a strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST) program in 2016. In 2019, he violated SIST conditions by tampering with an alcohol monitoring bracelet, leading to his temporary confinement based on a psychologist's evaluation and a probable cause finding by the court.The Supreme Court initially found probable cause to believe he was a "dangerous sex offender requiring confinement" and ordered his detention pending a final hearing. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the statutory scheme violated procedural due process by not providing an opportunity to be heard at the probable cause stage. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division converted the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action, ultimately declaring the statute constitutional.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and upheld the lower court's decision. The court held that the statutory scheme under Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 (d) (4) appropriately balances individual and state interests. It concluded that the statute provides sufficient procedural safeguards, including a prompt judicial probable cause determination and a full hearing within 30 days, to mitigate the risk of erroneous confinement. The court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to him. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed without costs. View "People ex rel. Neville v Toulon" on Justia Law

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In this case, the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting three minors between 2007 and 2009. The police obtained a search warrant and found child pornography on the defendant's computers, including an encrypted file they could not access. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including sexual conduct against a child and possession of child pornography. He posted bail and was released but was later remanded to jail for allegedly posting a blog that intimidated a witness.The trial court assigned counsel and experts to assist the defendant, who later chose to represent himself. During the trial, the defendant's daughter testified about a recorded conversation in which one of the victims allegedly recanted her accusations. The prosecution used recorded jail phone calls to challenge the daughter's testimony, revealing that the defendant had discussed trial strategies with her. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of sexual conduct against a child and all child pornography counts but deadlocked on other charges. The defendant entered an Alford plea to the deadlocked counts.The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The primary issue was whether the defendant's right to present a defense was violated by the prosecution's monitoring of his jail phone calls. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's right to present a defense was not violated. The court noted that the defendant had ample time to prepare his defense while out on bail and had other means to communicate with witnesses. The court also found that the defendant's request to proceed pro se was unequivocal and that the trial court had conducted a proper inquiry into the risks of self-representation. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Dixon" on Justia Law

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The defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing a defaced firearm and unlawfully possessing a loaded firearm outside of his home or place of business. Before the trial, the prosecution filed a Sandoval application to cross-examine the defendant about his prior convictions and pending cases. The trial court held an in-camera conference on this motion without the defendant present. Later, in the defendant's presence, the court announced its decision on the Sandoval application without hearing arguments on the merits or confirming the defendant's understanding.The case proceeded to a bench trial where the prosecution presented evidence, including testimony from an arresting officer and surveillance footage. The trial court found the defendant guilty on both counts and sentenced him to imprisonment and post-release supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with one Justice dissenting on the grounds that the defendant was denied his right to be present during the Sandoval application consideration. The dissenting Justice granted the defendant leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant's right to be present during a material stage of his prosecution was violated. The court found that the defendant had a right to be present at the initial in-chambers conference on the Sandoval application and that the subsequent in-court proceeding did not cure this violation. The court emphasized that the defendant's presence is crucial for meaningful participation in such hearings. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and granted the defendant a new trial. View "People v Sharp" on Justia Law

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On March 26, 2017, two men robbed a restaurant in Queens. One of the robbers, a Black man wearing a red hoodie, black jacket, and a bandana over his face, approached the Assistant Manager, Sumintra Ramsahoye, and demanded she open the safe. When she couldn't, she handed over the contents of the cash register drawers. Meanwhile, the other perpetrator stood next to another employee, Jordan Guzman. After the robbers fled, Guzman called the police. Police Officer Bryce Blake and his partner arrived at the restaurant within minutes and observed the defendant, Freddie T. Wright, standing in the parking lot dressed in a black jacket and red hoodie. Wright fled upon seeing the patrol car, but was eventually arrested. Guzman and Ramsahoye were brought to the house where Wright was arrested to identify him.Wright moved to suppress the identification testimony, arguing that the identification procedures were unduly suggestive. The court denied the motion, finding that the identifications were not "overly suggestive and improper" because they were made in a "very short spatial and temporal time between the incident and arrest." During jury selection, Wright raised a Batson challenge to the People's use of peremptory strikes on two prospective jurors—C.C. and K.C. The court found that the reasons proffered by the People for their strike of C.C. and K.C. were not pretextual. Wright was ultimately convicted of second-degree robbery and second-degree criminal trespass.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that Wright had "failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating, under the third prong of the Batson test, that the facially race-neutral explanation given by the prosecutor was a pretext for racial discrimination." The Court of Appeals granted Wright leave to appeal.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that there was record support for the determinations that the People had valid, race-neutral reasons for striking the two prospective jurors. The court also found record support for the conclusions of the courts below that the show-up procedure used by police was not unduly suggestive. The court concluded that the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. View "People v Wright" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Dwane Estwick, was convicted of first-degree and second-degree robbery following a jury trial and was sentenced to 12 years in prison, followed by five years of post-release supervision. The defendant claimed that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike of a prospective juror, K.S., an African-American female. The defendant argued that this failure constituted a violation of the Batson framework, which prohibits racial discrimination in jury selection, and thus, he was entitled to a new trial.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction (208 AD3d 799 [2d Dept 2022]). A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal (39 NY3d 1078 [2023]). The defendant reiterated his claim that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike of K.S., thus violating the Batson framework.The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with the defendant. It found that the defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination regarding the prosecution's peremptory challenge against K.S. The burden then shifted to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral basis for its peremptory strike, which it failed to do. Instead, the trial court stepped in to provide an explanation, speculating that the prosecution had gotten a "bad vibe" from K.S. The court ruled that the prosecution had "given a legitimate race-neutral reason" for the strike. The Court of Appeals held that this was a serious departure from the Batson framework and constituted an error of the highest order. The court's speculation as to the prosecution's basis for the strike was irrelevant and deprived the defendant of any meaningful way to demonstrate pretext in the face of the prosecution's silence. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and ordered a new trial. View "People v Estwick" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany and other entities, who provide medical insurance plans to their employees. They challenged a regulation by the Department of Financial Services, which requires New York employer health insurance policies that provide hospital, surgical, or medical expense coverage to include coverage for medically necessary abortion services. The plaintiffs argued that the exemption for "religious employers" was too narrow, violating the First Amendment rights of certain types of religiously affiliated employers who do not meet the terms of the exemption.The case began in 2016, raising a federal Free Exercise Claim that was similar to a previous case, Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v Serio. The lower courts dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints based on the principle of stare decisis, and the Appellate Division affirmed on the same ground. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which remanded the case to the Appellate Division to reconsider in light of a recent decision, Fulton v Philadelphia.On remand, the Appellate Division held that Serio was still good law and affirmed its previous decision that neither the medically necessary abortion regulation nor the "religious employer" exemption as defined violated the Free Exercise Clause. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that under Fulton, both the regulation itself and the criteria delineating a "religious employer" for the purposes of the exemption are generally applicable and do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The court concluded that the "religious employer" exemption survives the general applicability tests delineated in Fulton, and therefore, the Appellate Division order should be affirmed. View "Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v Vullo" on Justia Law

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The case involves a group of convicted sex offenders who were confined in the Fishkill Residential Treatment Facility (RTF) while on post-release supervision (PRS). The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) used the Fishkill RTF to confine these offenders past their maximum sentence expiration dates because they were unable to find housing that complied with the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA). The plaintiffs initiated a proceeding in 2016, seeking injunctions, declaratory relief, and class certification, arguing that DOCCS's operation of the Fishkill RTF failed to comply with the statutes governing RTFs because it did not offer adequate programming or employment opportunities.The Supreme Court dismissed part of the proceeding and converted the remaining into an action seeking a declaration that DOCCS's operation of the Fishkill RTF was non-compliant with the statutes governing RTFs. The court denied class certification, reasoning that the converted declaratory judgment action would adequately protect the interests of similarly situated offenders. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment and a declaration in their favor. The Supreme Court granted defendants' motion in part, concluding that the internal programming was minimally adequate to satisfy DOCCS's statutory obligations. However, the court agreed with plaintiffs that DOCCS failed to provide adequate community-based opportunities.The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the part that granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs and granted defendants' motion in its entirety. The Court concluded that while the statute requires DOCCS to locate RTFs near a community with employment, training, and educational opportunities, there was no mandate that DOCCS offer such opportunities outside the facility.The Court of Appeals held that DOCCS's wholesale refusal to secure community-based opportunities for Fishkill RTF residents constitutes a violation of the statute. The Court concluded that DOCCS, at a minimum, must undertake reasonable efforts to secure community-based opportunities for those persons subject to its RTF programming. However, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the internal programming at the Fishkill RTF was at least minimally adequate. View "Alcantara v Annucci" on Justia Law