Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, rape in the second degree, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to seek the dismissal of time-barred charges against him and by failing to object to certain statements by the prosecutor during her summation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) given the presence of a plausible and reasonable strategy that could explain counsel’s action, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek dismissal of the time-barred charges; and (2) Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to certain statements made during the prosecutor’s summation. View "People v. Ambers" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for burglary in the second degree and petit larceny. The burglary charge was timely interposed but the petit larceny charge was not, as the applicable statutory period ran approximately one and one-half years before the filing of the accusatory instrument. Defendant’s counsel never obtained the time-barred count’s dismissal, and Defendant was convicted of both indicted offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his for-cause challenge to a prospective juror and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by vacating Defendant’s conviction on the charge of petit larceny and dismissing that charge in the indictment, holding that the failure of Defendant’s counsel to have the time-barred petit larceny count dismissed constituted ineffective assistance. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a second child sexual assault felony offender to a determinate term of fifteen years with five years of post-release supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to a fair trial was violated because of alleged critical mistakes by his trial counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish that defense counsel made the type of missteps that establish a performance so lacking in competence and strategic purpose that it failed to meet the constitutional minimum standard of professionalism recognized by the Court. View "People v. Wragg" on Justia Law

Petitioners, including individual residents of the Village of Painted Post, commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against the Village and others (collectively, Respondents), asserting that the Village failed to comply with the strict procedural mandates of the State Environmental Quality Review Act by entering into a bulk water sale agreement with a subsidiary of Shell Oil Co. providing for the sale of 314 million gallons of water from the village water system and by approving a lease agreement with a railroad for the construction of a water transloading facility. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that Petitioners lacked standing and failed to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing after finding that one of the individual petitions had standing. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the petition on the ground that the individual petitioner lacked standing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division, in concluding that the individual petitioner at issue lacked standing, applied an overly restrictive analysis of the requirement to show harm “different from that of the public at large.” View "Sierra Club v. Village of Painted Post" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four counts of grand larceny in the first degree and one count of petit larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) properly declined to give a circumstantial evidence charge, and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s requests for a mistrial after the jurors indicated during deliberations that they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in refusing to grant Defendant’s request for a circumstantial evidence charge; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Defendant’s requests for a mistrial, and the court’s procedure did not coerce the jury into delivering a verdict. View "People v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, was charged in a misbehavior report for violating prison disciplinary rules. At the disciplinary hearing, Petitioner pleaded not guilty and requested another inmate be called as a witness. When the inmate reversed to testify, Petitioner asked the hearing officer to re-contact the witness. When the hearing reconvened, the hearing officer did not state whether the inmate had been re-contacted. The hearing officer subsequently found Petitioner guilty of all charges. Thereafter, Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding asserting that the hearing officer violated his constitutional right to call witnesses for failing to make reasonable efforts to contact the witness. Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the determination, and remitted the matter for a new hearing. Petitioner appealed, arguing that expungement was the proper remedy for violation of an inmate’s right to call a witness at a prison disciplinary hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, a rehearing was properly ordered. View "Texeira v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested in the lobby of an apartment building that was enrolled in the trespass affidavit program. Upon his arrest, officers frisked Defendant and found a razor blade in one of his pants pockets. Defendant pleaded guilty to, inter alia, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the razor blade. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the combination of Defendant’s presence in the building with the private and protected nature of that location supported the lower courts’ determination that the police officers had an objective credible reason to approach and request information from Defendant and thus to begin the encounter that culminated in Defendant’s arrest and the seizure of the razor blade. View "People v. Barksdale" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Attorney General (AG) filed a complaint resulting in a civil enforcement action by the AG, alleging that Sprint knowingly violated the New York Tax Law, engaged in fraudulent or illegal acts, and submitted false documents to the State pursuant to the New York False Claims Act (FCA). Sprint moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the New York Tax Law imposes sales tax on interstate voice service sold by a mobile provider along with other services for a fixed monthly charge; (2) the statute is unambiguous; (3) the statute is not preempted by federal law; (4) the AG’s complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action under the FCA; and (5) the damages recoverable under the FCA are not barred by the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. View "People v. Sprint Nextel Corp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the three-and-a-half year retroactive application of the 2010 amendments to N.Y. Tax Law 632(a)(2) were unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs under the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Plaintiffs, Florida residents, brought this action claiming that the 2010 amendments retroactively imposed a tax on the 2007 sale of the stock of their subchapter S corporation in a deemed asset sale, for which they utilized the installment method of accounting for federal tax purposes, and seeking a declaration that the application of the amendments was unconstitutional as applied to them. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Defendants, determining that the amendments were curative and, because Plaintiffs failed to show reasonable reliance on any relevant pre-amendment law, retroactive application of the statute was justified. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that retroactive application of the 2010 amendments did not violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights. View "Caprio v. New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several nonresident former owners and shareholders in an S corporation, filed the instant declaratory judgment action against the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, challenging a tax imposed on their pro rata share of gains from the sale of the corporation’s stock. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that N.Y. Const. art. XVI, 3 absolutely precluded taxation of gains from the sale of a nonresident’s intangible personal property - in this case, the corporation’s stock. Supreme Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and declared that the statute is constitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there is no constitutional bar to taxation of a nonresident’s New York-source income earned from a stock sale. View "Burton v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law