Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of burglary in the second degree. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the use of leg irons (shackles) on his ankles violated his constitutional rights. The court held that the use of leg irons was a violation of defendant's constitutional rights under Deck v Missouri where the court could not conclude that the shackles were not visible to the jury, or that the jury, seeing the bunting around the defense table and not the prosecutor's, would not have inferred that it was there to hide shackles on defendant's legs. The court also held that the People could not meet their burden of showing that any constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the People conceded that the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and a new trial ordered. View "People v Cruz" on Justia Law

Defendant violated several terms of the youthful offender agreement and, at the subsequent sentencing proceeding, Supreme Court imposed a determinate prison sentence of three and one-half years plus five years of post-release supervision. On appeal, defendant contended that reversal was required under People v Catu. The court held that, having elected to advise defendant of the consequences that might flow from the violation of the youthful offender agreement, Supreme Court referenced only a prison term, omitting any mention of the possibility of post-release supervision, thereby giving defendant an inaccurate impression concerning the sentencing options. Accordingly, the court concluded that reversal and vacatur of the plea was appropriate. View "People v McAlpin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of arson in the first degree, one count relating to a fire set on May 25, 2004 (expectation of pecuniary profit), and the other two counts relating to a fire set on May 30, 2004 (expectation of pecuniary profit and use of an incendiary device). On appeal, defendant argued that the prosecutor repeatedly violated the trial court's Molineux rulings by eliciting evidence of an uncharged arson attempt and of his prior bad acts and associations. Defendant further argued that the elicited expert testimony concerning the origins of the fires was inadmissible under People v. Grutz. The court held that, although the People conceded that certain questions asked by the prosecutor at trial clearly violated the trial court's Molineux rulings, the contested testimony elicited, on the whole, was not significant; the trial court also took steps to minimize the impact of arguably improper testimony or prosecutorial statements during the trial; and in any event, to the extent any evidence subject to the trial court's Molineux rulings was improperly admitted, such error was harmless. The court also held that because the evidence adduced at trial conclusively established, apart from the expert testimony, that the subject fires were intentionally set, it could be argued that the admission of expert testimony was largely unnecessary. In any event, any error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "People v Rivers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of 50 taxpayers of the State of New York, commenced this declaratory judgment action against the State and other defendants, challenging numerous loans and grants issued by public defendants to private entity defendants and other private companies in order to stimulate economic development. At issue was plaintiffs' challenge to appropriations in the New York State 2008-2009 budget. The court held that it could find no constitutional infirmity to the challenged appropriations. Although some could question the wisdom of the policy choices, "the legislature has made a valid legislative judgment." Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "Bordeleau v State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree and appealed the judgment of the conviction, arguing, among other things, that the evidence of the show-up identification of a co-defendant was inadmissible. The Appellate Division ruled that any error was harmless and affirmed Supreme Court's judgment. The court concluded that the victim's testimony concerning his identification of the co-defendant was probative of whether defendant had attacked the victim. This was because the victim's accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing of a certain address were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial. Thus, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the material testimony or grant a mistrial. View "People v Thomas" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to establish that defendant acted "[w]ith intent to prevent" an emergency medical technician (EMT) "from performing a lawful duty" when he caused an EMT to suffer physical injury. As the uniformed EMT was climbing into the driver's side of an ambulance, defendant blindsided him with a blow to the head, threw him to the ground and pummeled him repeatedly about the face and head. The EMT and his partner on a two-person ambulance crew were about to drive away from the premises where they had just treated an injured woman. The court concluded that the People made out a prima facie case of intent by presenting evidence that defendant attacked someone he had reason to know was an EMT on duty at the time. View "People v Bueno" on Justia Law

Defendants were accused of robbing a store and using a stun gun to incapacitate the store manager temporarily. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that the People failed to prove that the stun gun was a "dangerous instrument" as defined in the Penal Law, and that therefore, defendants' convictions for first degree robbery and fourth degree weapon possession could not stand. However, the court sustained defendants' convictions for second degree robbery. View "People v Hall" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery but acquitted of first degree burglary. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the statutory definitions of the terms "deprive" and "appropriate" as they related to the meaning of larcenous intent. The court held that defendant's challenge to the jury charge was preserved. At trial, defendant's counsel expressed concern that the jury might not understand the meaning of the phrase "[a]ppropriated for himself and requested a particular charge as to intent with regard to that phrase, which the trial court rejected. The court found this to be sufficient to preserve the issue for review because the definition of the term went directly to the question of the permanency of the taking and the requisite intent. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and a new trial ordered. View "People v Medina" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery, third-degree weapon possession, and second-degree menacing. On appeal, defendant contended that the People's proof was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under People v. Ledwon. The court held that the limited rule of Ledwon did not govern on these facts and the proof at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction despite the evidentiary discrepancies. Nevertheless, an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure entitled defendant to a new trial preceded by an independent source hearing. View "People v Delamota" on Justia Law

Petitioners brought these Article 78 proceedings to challenge, among other things, their placement on involuntary leave without having been provided a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law 72. At issue was whether Civil Service Law 72, which provided certain procedural safeguards to a public employee when placed on an involuntary leave of absence, applied to employees who were prevented from returning to work following a voluntary absence. The court held that it did and the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the judgment of Supreme Court reinstated. View "Matter of Sheeran v New York State Dept. of Transp.; Matter of Michelle Birnbaum v New York State Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law