Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim's sexual conduct around the time of the incident pursuant to New York's rape shield law and in disqualifying one juror and failing to discharge another. The court held that the county court appropriately accepted defendant's argument that evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct would be relevant to his defense if the prosecution introduced evidence of her bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed such evidence to him. The court concluded that such evidence would have been relevant to both charges of rape but the prosecutor decided not to offer evidence of bruising. The court also held that although the county court failed to make a probing inquiry regarding a sworn juror's ability to render an impartial verdict, its discharge was not error as such action was authorized by CPL 270.15(4) and that there was no error in refusing to disqualify a prospective juror due to a former professional relationship with the prosecutor where the relationship was distant in time and limited in nature.

Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated while his conditional license was in effect. At issue was whether the offense in section 1196(7)(f), regarding traffic infractions for conditional license-holders, and section 511, regarding the aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, of the Vehicle and Traffic Law may be prosecuted at the same time. The court held that a driver whose license had been revoked, but who had not received a conditional license and failed to comply with its conditions, may be prosecuted only for the traffic infraction of driving for a use not authorized by his license, not for the crime of driving while his license was revoked.

Petitioner, a New York City police officer, retired in 2004 and was awarded disability benefits. In the following years, the police department received information indicating that petitioner was not disabled; that he made false representations to the Police Pension Fund ("Fund"); and that he had ingested cocaine, thus becoming ineligible to return to duty. At issue was whether the city should continue to pay petitioner a pension. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's order annulling the termination of petitioner's pension benefits and held that the benefits can only be terminated by the trustee of the Fund, who has not taken necessary action.

Defendants, six individuals, sought relief upon resentencing from their statutory obligation to serve postrelease supervision ("PRS"). At issue was whether Double Jeopardy barred their resentencing to PRS; whether substantive due process barred their resentencing to PRS; whether a resentencing court may reconsider a defendant's sentence at a resentencing to correct a People v. Sparber error; and whether the appellate division may reduce a defendant's sentence on appeal from a resentencing to correct a Sparber error. The court rejected defendants' Double Jeopardy argument and held that after it handed down People v. Sparber, the legislature promptly adopted legislation to allow resentencing as many defendants as possible to sentences that include PRS. The court also rejected defendants' substantive due process argument where defendants did not give reason for the court to interpret substantive due process more broadly in these circumstances as a matter of state constitutional law. The court also held that resentencing to set right the flawed imposition of PRS at the original sentencing was not a plenary proceeding. The court further held that the Appellate Division could not reduce the prison sentence on appeal in the interest of justice when a trial court lacked discretion to reconsider the incarceratory component of a defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Appellate Division's order except People v. Sharlow, where the the order should be reversed and the resentence imposed by the Supreme Court reinstated.