Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of rape in the third degree, criminal sexual act in the third degree, sexual abuse in the third degree, and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial or to strike the complainant’s prompt outcry testimony elicited by the People in disregard of the prosecutor’s pre-trial representation that no such testimony would be offered. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that Supreme Court erred by denying Defendant a remedy for the unfair and prejudicial surprise. View "People v. Shaulov" on Justia Law

Phillip Khalil was employed with Front, Inc. for approximately seven years. Khalil later informed Front that he intended to resign to take a position with Eckersley O’Callaghan Structural Design (EOC), one of Front’s competitors. Front, however, terminated Khalil’s employment upon discovering that he worked on several side projects for Front’s competitors, including EOC, in violation of the terms of his employment contract. Front retained Meister Seelig & Fein LLP (MSF), whose attorney sent a letter to Khalil making certain demands. The attorey then sent a letter to EOC making demands nearly identical to those made in the letter to Khalil. Khalil and EOC failed to comply with Front’s demands. Front subsequently commenced an action against Khalil and EOC alleging, inter alia, civil conspiracy and misappropriation of trade secrets. Khalil commenced a third-party action against MSF and its attorney (collectively, MSF), asserting a cause of action for libel per se based upon statements made by MSF in its letter to Khalil. Supreme Court determined that the letter to Khalil was absolutely privileged and dismissed the third-party action against MSF. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the letters were written in the preliminary stages of an anticipated action, they were properly subject to a qualified privilege. View "Front, Inc. v. Khalil" on Justia Law

In 2005, Barclays Bank PLC, a major global bank based in the United Kingdom, and BDC Finance LLC, a Connecticut-based hedge fund, entered into a series of transactions that were memorialized in several forms, including a Master Agreement. In 2008, Barclays sent BDC a letter terminating the Agreement due to BDC’s alleged default. BDC filed this action for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Barclays counterclaimed alleging corresponding causes of action. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Appellate Division granted BDC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Barclays breached the agreements and was not entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaims. The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the Appellate Division, holding that material issues of fact existed as to whether Barclays defaulted under the parties’ contract and, thus, neither party was entitled to summary judgment. View "BDC Finance LLC v. Barclays Bank PLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a property owner, and Defendant, a tenant, entered into a one-year commercial rental lease agreement. Prior to the end of the one-year term, the parties extended the lease for a nine-year term. Several months after executing the lease extestion, Defendant vacated the premises and ceased paying rent. Plaintiff commenced this action for rent arrears and an amount equal to the future remaining rent owed on the lease. Supreme Court entered judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $1,488,604, consisting of the rent remaining due under the lease, reduced by the amount of rent Plaintiff was able to collect by reletting the premises. Defendants appealed, arguing that Plaintiff was barred from collecting unpaid future rents pursuant to an acceleration clause in the leasehold agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the court below erred by limiting the damages hearing to whether Plaintiff relet the premises without allowing Defendants the opportunity to present evidence that the undiscounted accelerated rent amount was disproportionate to Plaintiff’s actual losses, notwithstanding that Plaintiff had possession and no obligation to mitigate. View "172 Van Duzer Realty Corp. v Globe Alumni Student Assistance Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

Beginning in 1983, Defendant law firm represented Alice Lawrence and her three children in litigation arising from the death of her husband and their father, a real estate developer. For over three decades, Lawrence and Seymour Cohn, the decedent’s brother and business partner, litigated issues surrounding the sale of the decedent’s properties and the distribution of the proceeds. After Cohn and Lawrence settled the matter, this dispute followed between Lawrence and Defendant with respect to the law firm’s fee and the validity of gifts made by Lawrence to three law firm partners. Lawrence died in 2008. Thereafter, the Lawrence estate argued that a revised retainer agreement between the parties was void procedurally and substantively and made claims for refund of the gifts. The Court of Appeals held (1) the revised retainer agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable and was therefore enforceable; and (2) the Lawrence estate’s claim for return of the gifts was time-barred. View "Matter of Lawrence" on Justia Law

At issue in this lawsuit was whether workers engaged in testing and inspection of fire protection equipment are covered by New York’s prevailing wage statute. The New York State Department of Labor issued an opinion letter stating that the workers were covered but that the opinion shall be applied prospectively. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified to the Court of Appeals a question regarding what deference a court should pay to an agency’s decision, made for its own enforcement purposes, to construe a statute prospectively only. In its amicus brief in the Court of Appeals, the Department asserted that no deference was due to it by the courts deciding the litigation. The Court of Appeals answered (1) courts should give an agency no more deference than it claims for itself; and (2) a party’s commitment to pay prevailing wages pursuant to the prevailing wage statute binds the party to comply with the statute as correctly interpreted, whether or not the correct interpretation was known to the parties at the time of contracting. View "Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Paul Ellington, an heir and grandson of Duke Ellington, filed this breach of contract action to recover royalties allegedly due under a royalty provision contained in a 1961 United States copyright renewal Agreement between Duke Ellington and Mills Music, Inc., now EMI Music, Inc. The Agreement assigned to a “Second Party” - defined as consisting of a group of music publishers including Mills Music - the right to renew the copyright to certain music compositions written by Duke Ellington, subject to the payment of royalties. The royalty provision of the Agreement required the Second Party to pay Duke Ellington and named members of his family a percentage of the net revenue received from a foreign publication of the musical publication. Plaintiff claimed that by using affiliated foreign subpublishers, EMI breached the Agreement by diluting Plaintiff’s share of the royalties. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the disputed terms of the Agreement were clear and unambiguous and that the Appellate Division correctly held that Plaintiff did not state a cause of action for breach of the Agreement. View "Ellington v. EMI Music, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants retained Mary Dorman to represent them in a lawsuit. During the litigation, Dorman and Appellants entered into three separate retainer agreements pertaining to Dorman’s work on the trial, on the appeal to the Appellate Division, and on the appeal to the Court of Appeals. A jury ruled in Appellants’ favor, awarding them $986,671 in damages. Dorman was awarded $296,826 for her trial work. The verdict and trial fee awards were upheld on appeal. Dorman subsequently requested fees for her appellate work, and Supreme Court awarded Dorman $233,966. After a monetary dispute arose between Dorman and Appellants, Dorman sought a declaratory judgment to enforce the three retainer agreements. Supreme Court granted Dorman’s motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Dorman correctly interpreted the fee calculation. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order with regard to the trial agreement and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the trial agreement entitled Dorman to one third of the jury award; and (2) because the trial agreement did not address the treatment of statutory counsel fees, Dorman was entitled to the more generous alternative of either one third of the jury verdict or the statutory award for her trial work.View "Albunio v. City of New York" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(a)(4), which allows a party to obtain discovery from a nonparty. John Kapon was the CEO of Acker, Merrall & Condit Company (AMC), a retailer and auctioneer of fine and rare wines, and the employer of Justin Christoph. In 2008, William Koch commenced an action against AMC in Supreme Court concerning alleged counterfeit wine that Rudy Kurniawan had consigned to AMC and that AMC had sold to Koch. In 2009, Koch commenced a fraud action in California against Kurniawan, alleging that Kurniawan had sold Respondent counterfeit wine through AMC’s auctions and sales. In 2012, Koch, seeking disclosure in the California action, served subpoenas on Kapon and Christoph (together, Petitioners). Petitioners filed motions to quash the subpoena, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners failed to show that the requested deposition testimony was irrelevant to the prosecution of the California action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the subpoenas satisfied the notice requirement of section 3101(a)(4); and (2) in moving to quash the subpoena, Petitioners failed to meet their burden of establishing that their deposition testimonies were irrelevant to the California action.View "Kapon v. Koch" on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiff, a manufacturer and distributor of medical devices, and Defendant, the developer and manufacturer of CoStar, a coronary stent, entered into an agreement designating Plaintiff as the exclusive distributor of CoStar for a worldwide market territory. In 2007, Defendant notified Plaintiff that it was recalling CoStar and removing it from the worldwide market. Plaintiff subsequently sued Defendant for breach of contract, seeking damages for lost profits related to its resale of the stents. Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the issue of damages, concluding that the lost profits sought by Plaintiff were consequential damages and subject to the agreement’s damages limitation provision. The court subsequently dismissed the complaint because, by denying Plaintiff lost profits as a remedy, the court effectively ended the lawsuit. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the agreement’s limitation on consequential damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the parties’ exclusive distribution agreement, the lost profits constituted general damages, which fell outside the scope of the agreement’s limitation on recovery.View "Biotronik A.G. v. Conor Medsystems Ireland, Ltd." on Justia Law