Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were two limited liability companies that made loans to Goldan, LLC. Goldan failed to repay the loans. Plaintiffs later discovered that their mortgages had not been recorded as agreed upon. Plaintiffs sued Goldan and its two principals, Mark Goldman and Jeffrey Daniels, alleging a number of claims. One claim was asserted against Daniels, a lawyer, for legal malpractice for failing to record the mortgages. Daniels' malpractice carrier, American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (American) refused to provide defense or indemnity coverage. Daniels defaulted in Plaintiffs' action against him. Daniels assigned to Plaintiffs his rights against American. Plaintiffs subsequently brought an action against American for breach of contract and bad faith failure to settle the underlying lawsuit. Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs' motions as to the breach of contract claims and dismissed the bad faith claims. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by breaching its duty to defend Daniels, American lost its right to rely on policy exclusions to escape its duty to indemnify; and (2) the lower courts properly dismissed Plaintiffs' bad faith claims. View "K2 Inv. Group, LLC v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) notified Bear Stearns & Co. and Bear Stearns Securities Corp. of its intention to charge Bear Stearns with violations of federal securities laws. Bear Stearns agreed to pay $160 million as a disgorgement and $90 million as a civil penalty. Bear Stearns then sought indemnification from its insurers (Insurers), requesting indemnity for the $160 million SEC disgorgement payment. Insurers denied coverage. Bear Stearns subsequently brought this breach of contract and declaratory judgment action against Insurers. Insurers unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that, as a matter of public policy, Bear Stearns could not seek coverage under its policies for any of the SEC disgorgement payment. Bear Stearns appealed, arguing that, while it was reasonable to preclude an insured from obtaining indemnity for the disgorgement of its own illegal gains, Bear Stearns was not unjustly enriched by at least $140 million of the disgorgement payment, the sum attributable to the profits of its customers. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Insurers did not meet their burden of establishing, as a matter of law, that Bear Stearns was barred from pursuing insurance coverage under its policies. View "J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Wicks Law requires public entities seeking bids on construction contracts to obtain separate specifications for three subdivisions of the work to be performed. Until 2008 when the law was amended to raise the threshold, the Wicks Law applied to contracts whose cost exceeded $50,000. The new, higher thresholds, unlike the old one, were not uniform throughout the State. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the amendments violated the Home Rule section of the State Constitution by unjustifiably favoring the eight counties with higher thresholds. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the Home Rule cause of action and that, in any event, the challenged amendments did not violate the Home Rule section because they "were enacted in furtherance of and bear a reasonable relationship to a substantial State-wide concern." The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) at least one plaintiff had standing to assert the Home Rule claim, but that claim failed on the merits; and (2) most of Plaintiffs' other claims failed, but four causes of action challenging the apprenticeship requirements as applied to out-of-state contracts should be reinstated. View "Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased furniture from the Fortunoff Department Store. Along with the furniture, Plaintiffs purchased a protection plan. The plan was a contract in which Valspar Corporation agreed to provide service for damages to the furniture during the contract period. The plan contained a store closure provision providing that if the store location where customers purchased furniture closed, the purchase price of the plan would be refunded. Fortunoff subsequently closed, and Valspar tendered Plaintiffs a refund of their payment made to the plan. Plaintiffs brought a diversity action against Valspar for breach of contract under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 395, which forbids the termination before expiration of any "maintenance agreement covering parts and/or service" and for damages under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, claiming that section 395 rendered the store closure provision ineffective and that, by denying claims based on this provision, Valspar breached its contracts with Plaintiffs. The district court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals accepted certification to answer questions of law and held (1) section 395(a) does not make contract clauses that contradict its terms null and void; and (2) a violation of section 395(a) alone does not give rise to a cause of action under section 349. View "Schlessinger v. Valspar Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a number of corporations and an individual, Ariq Vanunu, alleging that he had provided telephone service to Defendants pursuant to a written agreement and had not been paid. The complaint alleged that Vanunu was a "principal officer in all the corporate defendant entities." A default judgment was later entered against all Defendants. Vanunu moved to vacate the judgment, asserting that his default was excusable and that he had meritorious defenses to the action. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that Vanunu was personally liable for the stated claims, the default judgment was a nullity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defect in this case was not jurisdictional. View "Manhattan Telecomms. Corp. v. H & A Locksmith, Inc." on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were married in 1997. A week before the wedding, they each separately signed a prenuptial agreement. Neither party was present when the other executed the document, and the signatures were witnessed by different notaries public. In the acknowledgment relating to Husband's signature, a key phrase was omitted. As a result, the certificate failed to indicate that the notary public confirmed the identity of the person executing the document. In 2010, Husband filed for divorce. Wife commenced a separate action seeking a divorce and a declaration that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable. Supreme Court denied Wife's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding (1) the certificate of acknowledgment was defective, but (2) the deficiency could be cured after the fact, and the notary public affidavit raised a triable question of fact as to whether the prenuptial agreement had been properly acknowledged when it was signed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prenuptial agreement was invalid where, even assuming a defect in a certificate of acknowledgment could be cured, the notary public's affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable question of fact as to the propriety of the original acknowledgment procedure. View "Galetta v. Galetta" on Justia Law

A minor plaintiff commenced a civil action against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and one of its priests alleging sexual molestation by the priest. The Diocese settled the action for $2 million and additional consideration. At issue on appeal was a dispute between the Diocese and one of its insurance carriers (National Union) regarding the Diocese's demand for reimbursement for the settlement. The Diocese sought a declaratory judgment that National Union was required to indemnify the Diocese for the settlement and certain defense costs and fees. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the Diocese. At issue on appeal was whether the incidents of sexual abuse constituted a single occurrence or multiple occurrences that spanned several years and several policy periods. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the alleged acts of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences and that the settlement amount should be allocated on a pro rata basis over the seven policy periods. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the incidents of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences and that any potential liability should be apportioned among the several insurance policies, pro rata. View "Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

This case arose from efforts of Verizon New England to collect a judgment awarded in 2009 by the U.S. district court against Global NAPs (GNAPs). Verizon served a restraining notice on GNAPs and companies with which it did business, one of which was Transcom Enhanced Services. Verizon subsequently commenced this special proceeding seeking a turnover of property and debts of the judgment debtor held by Transcom. Supreme Court denied turnover and dismissed the petition with prejudice, concluding that Transcom did not owe any debt to GNAPs and it did not hold property in which GNAPs had any interest. At issue on appeal was whether the at-will, prepayment service agreement between the parties, which lacked any obligation to continue services or a commitment to engage in future dealings, constituted a property interest or debt subject to a N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222(b) restraining notice. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, based on the nature of the agreement, the restraining notice was unenforceable. View "Verizon New England, Inc. v Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant formed a partnership by oral agreement. Defendant later withdrew from the venture after Plaintiff refused his demand for majority ownership of the partnership. Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, claiming that Defendant could not unilaterally terminate his obligations under the agreement. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the complaint failed to allege that the partnership agreement provided for a definite term or a defined objective, and therefore, dissolution was permissible under N.Y. P'ship Law 62(1)(b). The Appellate Division modified by reinstating the breach of contract cause of action, reasoning that the complaint adequately described a definite term and alleged a particular undertaking. The Court of Appeals reversed with directions that the breach of contract cause of action of the complaint be dismissed, holding (1) the complaint did not satisfy the "definite term" element of section 62(1)(b) because it did not set forth a specific or a reasonably certain termination date; and (2) the alleged scheme of anticipated partnership events detailed in the complaint were too amorphous to meet the statutory "particular undertaking" standard for precluding unilateral dissolution of a partnership. View "Gelman v. Buehler" on Justia Law

The Whites signed a contract to buy the Farrells' property and tendered a $25,000 deposit. The Whites later terminated the contract due to a faulty "drainage situation." The Whites subsequently sued the Farrells to recover their down payment, alleging, inter alia, fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation. The Farrells counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court concluded (1) the Whites had breached the contract and were not entitled to a return of their down payment; and (2) the measure of the Farrells' actual damages was the difference between the contract price and the market value of the property at the time of the breach, and thus, the Farrells did not suffer damages on account of the Whites' breach. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the measure of damages for the Whites' breach was the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach; and (2) there was conflicting evidence as to the property's fair market value when the Whites default, which precluded summary judgment. Remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings. View "White v. Farrell" on Justia Law