Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that the regulations of the Office of Victim Services (OVS), as amended, that limit attorneys' fee awards for crime victim claimants to the costs incurred on applications for administrative reconsideration or appeal and on judicial review did not conflict with the authorizing statute, N.Y. Exec. Law 22, and were rational.The individual petitioners were crime victims who were represented by petitioner Gordon, Jackson & Simon in their applications for awards from OVS. Petitioners commenced this combined N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action arguing that the amended regulations and the denials of certain petitioners' attorneys' fee requests were arbitrary and capricious. Supreme Court granted OVS's motion for summary judgment, declaring the amendments lawful. The Appellate Division modified and annulled the amendments, holding that the provisions limiting counsel fee awards for crime victims were inconsistent with the language and purposes of article 22. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division, holding that the regulations are consistent with the statutory language and that the OVS's rational construction was entitled to deference. View "Juarez v. New York State Office of Victim Services" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division upholding the denial of Defendant's suppression motion, holding that the search warrant in this case was facially valid and that Defendant's challenge to the execution of the search warrant was unpreserved for appellate review.Police officers searched Defendant's residence pursuant to a search warrant and recovered, among other things, a handgun and ammunition. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the warrant was invalid because it did not meet the constitutional requirements of particularity. The motion court denied Defendant's suppression motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying suppression without holding an evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Duval" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the definition of credit card in N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 511(1), as supplemented by N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 511-a, is the controlling definition as designated by N.Y. Penal Law 155.00(7) and, as a result, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of grand larceny for stealing an intangible credit card account number.Defendant's conviction of grand larceny in the fourth degree was based on Defendant's theft of the victim's credit card account number to purchase goods. During trial, there was no evidence that Defendant possessed the physical card itself. At issue was whether the People needed to prove that Defendant physically possessed the tangible credit card in order to support his conviction of grand larceny based upon credit card theft. The issue turned on the definition of credit card for purposes of N.Y. Penal Law 155.00(7) and whether that definition includes the credit card account number. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that, under the Penal Law, theft of a tangible card is not a necessary element of fourth-degree grand larceny. View "People v. Badji" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawfully possessing a firearm, holding that the lower courts properly concluded that Defendant was not entitled to a jury charge regarding temporary and lawful possession.On Defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that there was no reasonable view of the evidence under which Defendant was entitled to a temporary and lawful possession charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because there was no reasonable view of the evidence upon which a jury could find that Defendant's initial possession of the firearm was temporary and lawful, Defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on that defense; and (2) Defendant's challenge to the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict was unavailing. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division insofar as appealed from and ordered a new trial on the count of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, holding that the jury should have been instructed regarding the definition of voluntary possession, and the failure to so charge was not harmless.Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and unlawful possession of marihuana. Based on the trial evidence, Defendant requested that the jury be charged on voluntary possession of the gun. The court denied the requested charge. The jury convicted Defendant of third-degree possession of the gun and unlawful possession of marihuana. The Appellate Division modified and affirmed, summarily rejecting Defendant's challenge to the jury instructions. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of third-degree possession of a weapon, holding that a reasonable juror could have concluded that Defendant had constructive, knowing, but not voluntary, possession of the gun in question for a brief moment, and therefore, the failure to instruct the jury regarding the definition of voluntary possession was not harmless. View "People v J.L." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court vacating Defendant's convictions of two counts of attempted murder in the first degree and two counts of attempted murder in the second degree, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.At issue was whether the People proved that Defendant and his purported coconspirator took any actual step toward accomplishing Defendant's plan to kill his wife and mother-in-law beyond mere conversations and planning. The Appellate Division concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that Defendant engaged in conduct that came "dangerously near commission of the completed crime." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the intended crimes were dangerously close to completion. View "People v. Lendof-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the condition restricting entry upon school grounds on certain offenders is mandatory only for parolees who have been designated a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and are serving a sentence for an offense enumerated in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).Although Petitioner's conviction did not qualify as an enumerated offense under the statute, the Board of Parole determined that, because of his level three sex offender designation, Petitioner was nevertheless subject to the mandatory condition restricting entry upon school grounds. The Appellate Division granted Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus to the extent of annulling that part of the Board's determination that found Petitioner subject to the mandatory school grounds restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding than an offender must be serving a sentence for an enumerated offense and be a level three sex offender in order for the mandatory condition to apply. View "People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, in these two criminal cases, there was no constitutional violation in the practice of temporarily confining level three sex offenders in correctional facilities, after the time they would otherwise be released to parole or postrelease supervision (PRS), while they remain on a waiting list for accommodation at a shelter compliant with N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified. At issue was whether the Federal Constitution allows DOCCS to place a SARA-restricted sex offender in an RTF or other correctional facility while awaiting SARA-compliant housing. The Court of Appeals held that the practice is constitutional. View "People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified.Under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45(3), the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from an underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of an residential treatment facility (RTF). N.Y. Correct. Law 73(10) authorizes the DOCCS to use any RTF as a residence for persons who are on community supervision, which includes those on PRS. The Court of Appeals held that Correction Law 73(10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the SARA, N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), after the six-month period specified in Penal Law 70.45(3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. View "People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming County Court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a stop of the vehicle in which Defendant was a front seat passenger, holding that the People failed to meet their burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient to establish that the stop was lawful.A police officer stopped a vehicle when his patrol car's mobile data terminal notified him that something was similar about the registered owner of the vehicle and a person with an outstanding warrant, known as a "similarity hit." The officer arrested Defendant after observing a handgun on the floor of the front passenger seat where Defendant was sitting. Defendant was neither the registered owner of the vehicle nor the person with the warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. County Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where the People presented no evidence about the content of the similarity hit, the suppression court could not independently evaluate whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. View "People v. Balkman" on Justia Law