Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division concluding on direct appeal that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that Defendant, on this record, did not sustain his burden to establish that counsel was constitutionally ineffective.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial counsel's failure to challenge a prospective juror constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the record was inadequate to review Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (2) the appropriate procedure for the litigation of Defendant's challenge to his counsel's performance was a N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10 motion. View "People v. Maffei" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and affirmed the denial of Defendant's pro se motion pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 440.10 to vacate his conviction of attempted burglary in the second degree, holding that Defendant did not preserve his due process claim that the trial court failed to inform him of potential immigration consequences as a result of his conviction and that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in summarily rejecting Defendant's CPL 440.10 motion.Defendant was served, in open court and months before the plea proceedings leading up to his plea of guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree, with a "Notice of Immigration Consequences" form. In affirming both Defendant's conviction on his direct appeal and Supreme Court's denial of Defendant's CPL 440.10 motion the Appellate Division concluded that provision of the notice to Defendant meant that his direct appeal did not fit within "the narrow exception to the preservation requirement." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claim on appeal was unpreserved as a matter of law, and no exception to the preservation rule applied; and (2) Supreme Court acted within its discretion in denying Defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without a hearing. View "People v. Delorbe" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder, holding that the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law in admitting certain DNA evidence without holding a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013 (DC Cir. 1923), but the error was harmless.At issue in this case was whether the trial court erred in admitting low copy number (LCN) DNA evidence and the results of a statistical analysis conducted using the proprietary forensic statistical tool (FST) developed and controlled by the New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner without holding a Frye hearing. The Appellate Division refused to disturb the trial court's determination denying Defendant's motion for an order directing that a Frye hearing be held with respect to the reliability of any proposed evidence generated through LCN and FST review. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law in denying a Frye hearing, but the error was harmless; and (2) none of Defendant's remaining arguments on appeal had merit. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division, holding that Defendant's prior New Jersey conviction was within the scope endangering the welfare of a child under New York law, and therefore, the courts below did not err in assessing Defendant thirty points under risk factor nine of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk assessment when determining Defendant's presumptive risk level.In 1999, Defendant was convicted in New Jersey for lewdness in the fourth degree. At issue in this appeal was whether Defendant was properly assessed thirty points under risk factor nine for the New Jersey conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the assessment was warranted and that Defendant's adjudication as a level two Sex Offender was correct because Defendant's prior New Jersey conviction was tantamount to endangering the welfare of a child under New York law. View "People v. Perez" on Justia Law

In this criminal proceeding, the Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the sentencing court erred in unsealing the court record of the proceeding in which Defendant was acquitted but erred in concluding that Defendant was not entitled to a remedy for the trial court's violation of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 160.50, holding that the sentence should be vacated.Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance. Before sentencing, Defendant was prosecuted for a crime he allegedly committed after entering his plea. The jury acquitted Defendant of the new charge, and the official record was sealed. In sentencing Defendant for his possession charge, the court unsealed the records in the prior criminal action. Based in part on Defendant's trial testimony in the sealed proceeding, the court deviated upward from the court's promised sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in unsealing the records of the proceeding terminated by acquittal and improperly considered Defendant's trial testimony in deciding not to adhere to the promised sentence; and (2) because the court's sentence was based on that testimony, the proper remedy was to remit for resentencing without reference to the contents of the sealed records. View "People v. Anonymous" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court denying Defendant's motion to set aside his sentence of six months of incarceration, imposed upon his guilty plea to third-degree criminal possession of a weapon, on the ground that the sentence was illegally lenient, holding that the denial of Defendant's motion was not reviewable.Over a fifteen-year period, Defendant committed numerous felonies, some of them violent, yet avoided enhanced sentences. In 1997, Defendant was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender based upon his criminal convictions in 1988 and 1991. In 2015, Defendant collaterally moved to set aside his 1988 sentence of six months of incarceration under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.20 on the ground that the sentence was illegally lenient. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that because Defendant was not adversely affected by the error in sentencing on the 1988 conviction, his motion must be rejected without consideration of its merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a defendant moves to vacate a sentence on the ground that it is illegally lenient, denial of the motion is not reviewable because any purported error in the proceedings has not adversely affected the defendant. View "People v. Francis" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence following the court's granting permission to the People to reopen the hearing and present additional testimony after the People had rested but before the court rendered a decision, holding that Supreme Court had, and did not abuse, the discretion to reopen the suppression hearing.Defendant was charged with attempted robbery and assault. Defendant moved to suppress the identification made by the victim on the night of the assault, arguing that the identification procedures had been unduly suggestive and that his initial detention had been without reasonable suspicion. A hearing was held. After the People rested but before the court rendered a decision the People were granted permission to reopen the hearing and present additional testimony. Supreme Court subsequently denied Defendant's suppression motion, and Defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the hearing court's reopening was a permissible exercise of its discretion. View "People v. Cook" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Appellate Division affirming Defendant's conviction of first-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument and seventh-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, holding that there was legally sufficient evidence of Defendant's "intent to defraud, deceive or injury another" within the meaning of N.Y. Penal Law 170.30.On appeal, the Appellate Division held that the jury could reasonably have inferred from the evidence that Defendant knowingly possessed counterfeit money with fraudulent intent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant intended to pass the counterfeit bills in his possession and thereby defraud others; (2) Defendant's objections to the admission of certain testimony were unpreserved; and (3) the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the original stop of Defendant. View "People v. Britt" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments of the trial court in both of these cases, holding that both courts erred by reversing, after summations, their prior rulings on Defendants' requests to charge the jury, but these errors did not mandate reversal.The appellate courts affirmed Defendants' convictions on both cases at issue on appeal, ruling that both lower courts erred by failing to charge the jury in accordance with the courts' pre-summation rulings on Defendants' charging requests but that the error was harmless. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a trial court's error in reversing a prior charging decision after summations have been completed is subject to harmless error analysis; and (2) where the evidence of guilt in both cases was overwhelming, the error in each case was harmless. View "People v. Mairena" on Justia Law

In these three consolidated appeals the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of imprecise language in Defendants' written waivers of the right to appeal that mischaracterized the scope of the appellate rights waived as a condition of the plea bargains, adhering to well-established precedent in affirming in one case and reversing in other two cases.At issue was whether, under the circumstance of each of the three cases, the mischaracterizations impacted the knowing and voluntary nature of the three appeal waivers before the Court. The Court of Appeals (1) affirmed in one case, holding that the appeal waiver was knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (2) reversed in the other two cases, holding that the appeal waivers were involuntarily made and thus not enforceable. View "People v. Thomas" on Justia Law