Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law (VTL) 397, which provides that a person - not a police officer but someone acting pursuant to his special duties - who equips or operates a motor vehicle with a radio capable of receiving signals on the frequencies allocated for police use does not require that the prohibited device be physically attached to the motor vehicle.The prosecution filed an accusatory instrument alleging that Defendant operated a pick-up truck bearing the name of a tow truck company while having inside his jacket pocket a police scanner. Criminal Court dismissed the accusatory instrument on the ground that there were no allegations that the scanner was specifically prepared to be used with a vehicle. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the information was facially sufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe Defendant violated VTL 397. View "People v. Andujar" on Justia Law

A due process violation occurs when the sole judge deciding a criminal defendant’s appeal as of right is the same judge who also presided over the defendant’s pretrial motions and bench trial. In this case, due process required the judge’s recusal.Defendant was charged with driving while ability impaired. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him. The judge presiding in city court denied Defendant’s motion. The same judge subsequently found Defendant guilty as charged at a bench trial. During the pendency of Defendant’s appeal, the same judge who had presided over Defendant’s bench trial was elected to county court. That same judge then upheld Defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence on appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the county court, holding that this matter must be remitted to county court for Defendant’s appeal to be heard by a different judge. View "People v. Novak" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals in this care reaffirmed its longstanding rule that a warrantless arrest of a suspect in the threshold of a residence is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, provided that the suspect has voluntarily answered the door and the police have not crossed the threshold.Defendant was arrested without a warrant inside the doorway of his home. Defendant was later convicted of four counts of third-degree robbery and one count of attempted third-degree robbery. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the police violated Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573 (1980), by entering his home without consent or a warrant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the police never entered Defendant’s home, and therefore, the intrusion prohibited by Payton did not occur; (2) despite the urging of Defendant and two dissenting colleagues, this court refuses to adopt a new rule that warrantless “threshold/doorway arrests” violate Payton when the only reason the arrestee is in the doorway is that he or she was summoned there by police; and (3) there is no compelling justification to overrule prior precedent to recognize a new category of Payton violations based on subjective police intent. View "People v. Garvin" on Justia Law

The trial court’s introduction of DNA evidence through the testimony of a witness who had not performed, witness or supervised the generation of DNA profiles to prove an essential fact for a finding of guilt violated Defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him.Defendant was charged with three burglaries and several related offenses in connection with two separate incidents in June 2009 and September 2009. During trial, a criminalist was permitted to testify, over Defendant’s hearsay objections, and without having conducted, witnessed or supervised the generation of the DNA profiles, that the DNA profile generated from Defendant’s buccal swab was a match to the DNA profile generated from evidence found at the crime scenes. The jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of burglary in the third degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree relating to the June 2009 burglaries and acquitted Defendant of the counts relating to the September 2009 burglary. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the introduction of the hearsay DNA evidence through surrogate testimony to prove that Defendant was the perpetrator of the burglaries at issue violated Defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. View "People v. Austin" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of New York’s discretionary persistent felony offender sentencing scheme, holding that, in light of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __ (2013), this sentencing scheme does not violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), nor does it violate Defendant’s due process and Sixth Amendment rights.Defendant argued New York’s persistent felony offender statute, N.Y. Penal Law 70.10(1)(a), increased the sentencing floor for persistent felony offenders. The Court of Appeals held that even if Defendant was correct in his characterization, the increase to the sentencing floor would not be the result of impermissible judicial fact-finding. The court further held that the statute falls squarely within the exception afforded by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), because it exposes defendants to an enhanced sentencing range based only on the existence of two prior felony convictions. View "People v. Prindle" on Justia Law

An entity engaged in the bail bond business may not retain the premium paid on a criminal defendant’s behalf when bail is denied and the defendant is never released from custody.Arthur Bogoraz was indicted on state law fraud charges. Plaintiffs, Bogoraz’s wife and family friends, entered into an indemnity agreement with Ira Judelson, a licensed bail bond agent affiliated with the International Fidelity Insurance Agency, to secure Bogoraz’s release from custody in exchange for a premium of $120,560. The district court denied the bail bond after a hearing, however, and Bogoraz was never released from custody. Judelson refused to return the $120,560 to Plaintiffs. The district court found that the indemnity agreement permitted Judelson to retain the premium. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified a question of law regarding the issue to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that, under the Insurance Law, an entity engaged in the bail bond business does not earn a premium for a bail bond if a court refuses to accept the bond following a bail source hearing and the principal is not released on bail. View "Gevorkyan v. Judelson" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the People did not proffer a sufficient foundation at trial to authenticate a photograph that was obtained from an internet profile page allegedly belonging to Defendant to render the photograph admissible in evidence.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery. Over Defendant’s objection to the sufficiency of the proffered authentication, the trial court ruled that a photograph purportedly depicting Defendant holding a firearm and money would be admissible into evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial, holding (1) the People failed to demonstrate that the photograph was a fair and accurate representation of that which it purported to depict and presented insufficient evidence to establish that the website belonged to, and was controlled by, Defendant; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "People v. Price" on Justia Law

Under the circumstances of this case, where a sworn juror repeatedly and unambiguously stated that she was unable to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence and the law, the trial court erred in failing to discharge the juror as “grossly unqualified to serve” pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 270.35(1).After a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of murder in the second degree and convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered that Defendant receive a new trial, holding that the sworn juror at issue in this case, a juror who purportedly stated that she could not “do what the law require[d] [her] to do,” was incapable of rendering an impartial verdict as required by her oath as a sworn juror. Therefore, section 270.35(1) mandated her discharge. View "People v. Spencer" on Justia Law

The sentencing court violated N.Y. Crim. Proc. Laws 390.50 and Defendant’s due process rights by failing adequately to set forth on the record the basis for its refusal to disclose to the defense certain statements that were considered by the court for sentencing purposes.Defendant pleaded guilty to charges of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and assault in the second degree. At sentencing, county court denied counsel’s request to turn over to counsel the victim impact letters that accompanied the presentence investigation report (PSI). The Appellate Division concluded that the sentencing court had not erred by denying disclosure of “confidential information.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sentencing court failed to comply with its statutory obligation under section 390.50, thus implicating Defendant’s due process rights. View "People v. Minemier" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree course of sexual conduct against a child. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to object to the admission of evidence that the victim disclosed the abuse three years after it ceased and then again four years after her initial disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or legitimate explanations for counsel’s failure to object to the evidence at issue. View "People v. Honghirun" on Justia Law