Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prior to Defendant’s criminal trial, he moved to suppress a spontaneous postdetention statement to the police. The trial court denied the motion. After Defendant’s direct testimony, the court granted the prosecutor’s application to impeach Defendant on cross-examination with the omissions from his initial statement to the police. The jury ultimately convicted Defendant of robbery in the first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, it was not error to allow the People to use Defendant’s selective silence, while making his spontaneous postdetention statement, to impeach his trial testimony. View "People v. Chery" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one course of sexual conduct in the first degree for acts committed when he sexually assaulted AM, the seven-year-old daughter of his former lover. Defendant was charged after AM disclosed the abuse to police when she was twenty-one years old. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment as time-barred. Supreme Court denied the motion. After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the indictment was not time-barred because N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 30.10(3)(f) tolled the statute of limitations for Defendant’s crime until the victim reached the age of eighteen. Defendant appealed, arguing that the applicable five-year limitations period set forth under former CPL 30.10(3)(e) expired before the filing of the felony complaint and that the statute of limitations was not subject to tolling under CPL 30.10(3)(f). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s prosecution is not time-barred because application of CPL 30.10(3)(f) to crimes described in CPL 30.10(3)(e) conforms with the statutory text and furthers the legislative goal of the statutes by tolling the limitations period. View "People v. Pabon" on Justia Law

In People v. Catu, the Court of Appeals held that a court accepting a guilty plea from a defendant must ensure that a defendant is aware of the postrelease supervision (PRS) component of his sentence. In these two consolidated appeals, neither defendant was apprised by the trial court of the PRS component relative to the sentence imposed on their guilty pleas. Defendants brought postconviction motions to challenge their pleas and convictions, which were later utilized to enhance sentences for subsequent crimes. In essence, Defendants sought retroactive application of Catu to disqualify their predicate offenses. The Court of Appeals reversed the orders of the Appellate Division in each appeal, holding that Catu does not apply retroactively in enhanced sentence proceedings. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of criminal possession of a weapon in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 265.01(1). Defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument, which alleged that a police officer observed Defendant with a “rubber gripped, metal, extendable baton (billy club)” in his rear pants pocket, as facially insufficient. Criminal Court granted the motion, concluding that the allegations describing the object possessed by Defendant was insufficient to charge him with possessing a billy within the meaning of N.Y. Penal Law 265.01(1). The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the accusatory instrument was sufficient to charge Defendant with possessing a “billy” under N.Y. Penal Law 265.01(1) so as to provide sufficient notice for Defendant to prepare a defense and to protect him from multiple prosecutions. View "People v. Ocasio" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating N.Y. Penal Law 265.01(1), which lists a number of per se weapons, the mere possession of which renders a defendant guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Metal knuckles is included in the list. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the accusatory instrument, which stated that the police officer who stopped Defendant “recovered one set of brass metal knuckles” from Defendant’s pocket, was facially insufficient because it asserted an ultimate conclusion without any supporting evidence for it. Criminal Court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant then agreed to plead guilty to disorderly conduct, waiving prosecution by information and formal allocution. Defendant appealed, arguing again that the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the accusatory instrument was facially sufficient. View "People v. Aragon" on Justia Law

This personal injury action resulted from a physical altercation between Plaintiff and Defendant. The jury rendered a verdict that Defendant battered Plaintiff by striking him with a bat but that Defendant acted in self-defense. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court judgment and ordered a new trial, concluding that Defendant was the initial aggressor in the physical altercation between the parties. During the retrial ordered by the Appellate Division, Supreme Court indicated that it was constrained by the Appellate Division’s conclusion that Defendant was the initial aggressor and denied Defendant’s request to charge the jury on self-defense. The jury subsequently found that Defendant battered Plaintiff and that Plaintiff did not provoke the battery. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that it was not utterly irrational for the jury to find that Defendant was not the initial aggressor and that he acted in self-defense. Remitted to Supreme Court for a new trial. View "Killon v. Parrotta" on Justia Law

Respondent was riding his bicycle against the flow of traffic on a one-way street when officers stopped him. Respondent told the officers he was sixteen years old. The police arrested Respondent and transported him to the precinct, where Respondent told law enforcement that he was only fifteen years old. Thereafter, the officers placed Respondent in a juvenile room and instructed him to remove his belt, shoelaces, and shoes as a protective measure. A revolver was recovered from one of the shoes. The presentment agency filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Respondent with various weapon possession counts. Respondent filed a motion to suppress. Family Court denied the motion, concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest Respondent for disorderly conduct and that the seizure of the gun was legal because the officers were justified in having Respondent remove his shoes as part of protocol to ensure a detainee’s safety. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the search that uncovered the weapon from Respondent’s shoe was unreasonable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the officers’ initial arrest of Respondent was lawful where the officers believed he was sixteen years old at the time; and (2) the subsequent search of Respondent’s shoes was reasonable. View "In re Jamal S." on Justia Law

In 2005, a grand jury charged the perpetrator of a 1998 crime by “DNA indictment.” In 2011, while questioning Defendant concerning an unrelated crime, investigators recovered Defendant’s DNA from a cigarette butt. The People subsequently moved to amend the 2005 indictment to add Defendant’s name to the caption. Defendant was arraigned on the DNA indictment. Defendant filed an omnibus motion seeking an order denying the People’s motion to amend the indictment and dismissing the DNA indictment on the grounds that its prosecution was untimely and violated his speedy trial rights. Supreme Court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and upheld the indictment's amendment. Defendant then pleaded guilty to each count in the amended indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial and that his arguments regarding the DNA indictment, amended indictment and statute of limitations were forfeited by his guilty plea and foreclosed by his waiver of the right to appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by pleading guilty, Defendant forfeited his right to challenge the underlying DNA indictment and the amended indictment that named him; and (2) while Defendant’s speedy trial argument survived his guilty plea and appeal waiver, there was no constitutional violation. View "People v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, attempted murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed the part of the judgment convicting Defendant of attempted murder in the second degree, dismissed one burglary count, revised the sentences, and otherwise affirmed, concluding that County Court did not err in determining that Defendant’s statements he made to the police during a brief exchange after he refused to waive his Miranda rights were voluntary and thus admissible for impeachment purposes. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Court of Appeals should adopt a bright-line rule that would preclude the People from utilizing on cross-examination or rebuttal any statement made by the defendant to the police after the defendant refuses to waive his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed after declining Defendant’s invitation to adopt such a rule, holding that County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to preclude the People from utilizing the statements Defendant made to police after he had invoked his Miranda rights on cross-examination or rebuttal. View "People v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Almost nine months after Defendant’s indictment, the People began a DNA analysis of an object three of their witnesses claimed Defendant possessed. Defendant later moved to dismiss the indictment under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 30.30, arguing that a period in excess of six months had elapsed in violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial and that the period of delay attributable to the DNA testing was without justification. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that a relevant portion of the period at issue was excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(g). Thereafter, Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed, granted Defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion, and dismissed the indictment, concluding that the period of delay between when Defendant consented to the DNA swab and when the People produced the DNA results was chargeable to the People for failing to exercise due diligence in obtaining Defendant’s DNA sample. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the 161-day period of delay to test the DNA and to produce the DNA report was not excludable from speedy trial computation as an exceptional circumstance. View "People v. Clarke" on Justia Law