Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a parolee, Eugene L. Lively, who was searched by parole officers during a home visit in February 2021. The officers were looking for a parole absconder they believed might be at Lively's residence. During the search, an officer found a small case used for headphones in Lively's pocket, which contained heroin. Lively was subsequently charged with one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.Lively moved to suppress the physical evidence obtained from him. The suppression court denied his motion, ruling that the search was lawful as the parole officers were performing their duties. Lively was convicted of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance after a bench trial. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in a split decision. The majority held that the search was substantially related to the parole officers' duties. Two dissenting justices argued that the search was unlawful as there was no evidence that it was related to Lively's status as a parolee or that he had violated his parole conditions.The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the People failed to establish at the suppression hearing that the search of Lively's pocket was substantially related to the parole officers' duties. The court found that the People did not provide evidence that Lively was aware of the absconder's parole status, that he was harboring an absconder, or that he was violating his parole conditions. The court concluded that the search of Lively's pocket was not substantially related to the parole officers' duties under the circumstances, and thus, the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. The court ordered the reversal of the Appellate Division's order and the dismissal of the indictment. View "People v Lively" on Justia Law

In May 2017, police officers stopped a vehicle driven by the defendant, Jason Brown. The officers claimed they stopped the vehicle because they observed the passenger side door open and close quickly while the car was in motion, leading them to believe someone inside might need assistance. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers smelled marijuana and subsequently discovered ecstasy in the defendant's possession. The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree.The defendant moved to suppress his statement and the physical evidence recovered, arguing that the stop was unlawful. The suppression court disagreed, concluding that the officers' concern for the safety of the passenger justified the stop, despite the absence of a traffic infraction or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Appellate Term affirmed the judgment, holding that the stop was justified based on considerations of public safety.The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court recognized a "community caretaking" function, which allows police to stop a moving vehicle under certain circumstances. However, the court held that the police may only stop a vehicle under this function if they can point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that an occupant of the vehicle is in need of assistance, and the police intrusion must be narrowly tailored to address the perceived need for assistance. In this case, the court found that the officers' observation of the car door opening and closing once while the vehicle was in motion did not meet this standard. Therefore, the stop of the defendant's vehicle was unlawful, and the order of the Appellate Term was reversed. View "People v Brown" on Justia Law

The defendant, Samual Nektalov, was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by NYPD Detective Gregory Fortunato due to "excessively tinted windows." Upon approaching the vehicle, the detective observed marijuana in plain view and subsequently arrested and searched Nektalov, finding two bags of cocaine. Nektalov moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause to stop the vehicle based on a traffic violation.The Criminal Court denied Nektalov's motion to suppress the drugs, ruling that the vehicle was properly stopped due to a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law for having excessively tinted windows. Nektalov pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. The Appellate Term affirmed the decision, with one Justice dissenting, holding that the detective's testimony sufficiently established probable cause to lawfully stop the vehicle due to an apparent violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.The Court of Appeals disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court noted that the Vehicle and Traffic Law generally prohibits operating a vehicle with windows that have a light transmittance of less than 70%. The court found that the detective's testimony that the windows were "excessively tinted" was effectively a legal conclusion that the tint violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. However, the prosecution failed to elicit any factual basis for this conclusion. The detective did not testify that the windows were so dark that he could not see into the vehicle, that he had training and experience in identifying illegally tinted windows, or that he measured the tint after stopping the vehicle and the results confirmed that the tint level violated the law. As a result, the court concluded that the Criminal Court should have granted Nektalov's motion to suppress. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Term and dismissed the accusatory instrument. View "People v Nektalov" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Cid Franklin, who was arrested following a road rage incident that involved a firearm. The police searched the basement of Franklin's home, which he shared with his son and stepmother, and found a gun in a closet containing items belonging to both Franklin and his stepmother. Franklin was interviewed by an employee of the Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) while in Queens central booking prior to arraignment. The CJA employee recorded Franklin's address as the basement of his home. This information was central to the prosecution's case at trial, as no DNA or fingerprints were discernable on the gun, and no other direct proof was provided that Franklin lived in the basement.The trial court admitted the CJA form as either "a public document" or "a business record," rejecting the defense's objections that it was hearsay and violated Franklin's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Franklin was convicted of one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the introduction of the report violated Franklin's Confrontation Clause rights.The Court of Appeals of New York, however, reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the primary purpose of the CJA interview report was administrative, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and thus it was not testimonial. The court noted that the CJA report was introduced as a business or public record, and the pedigree information collected, including the defendant's address, was pertinent to establishing community ties; it was only incidentally relevant in this case. Therefore, the introduction of the CJA interview report did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that Court. View "People v Franklin" on Justia Law

The defendant, Melvin Baez, was convicted of possessing a quantity of cocaine after a nonjury trial. The conviction was based on evidence obtained during a traffic stop when NYPD officers observed Baez using his cell phone while driving. Upon stopping Baez, the officers noticed his bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of marijuana in his car. During a search, a clear plastic bag containing a white substance fell from Baez's jacket pocket. The bag was retrieved, placed in a latex glove for safekeeping, and later stored in a narcotics envelope at the police station.The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the cocaine was inadmissible because the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of custody and there were no reasonable assurances that the substance examined at trial was authentic. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion and found him guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the decision, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the chain of custody of the cocaine and provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the prosecution had laid a legally sufficient foundation for the admission of the drugs into evidence. The court noted that the prosecution had established a legally adequate chain of custody and provided reasonable assurances of the identity and unchanged condition of the evidence. The court also noted that the discrepancies in the record regarding the condition, appearance, or handling of the cocaine were not significant enough to render the drugs inadmissible. The court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted and the defendant's conviction was upheld. View "People v Baez" on Justia Law

The case involves Harvey Weinstein, a well-known figure in the entertainment industry, who was convicted by a jury for various sexual crimes against three complainants. Weinstein appealed, arguing that he was judged based on irrelevant, prejudicial, and untested allegations of prior bad acts, rather than the conduct for which he was indicted.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the third-degree rape prosecution was timely commenced and that the trial court properly admitted testimonies of uncharged, alleged prior sexual acts against persons other than the complainants of the underlying crimes. The court also concluded that the trial court properly allowed the prosecution to cross-examine Weinstein on a broad range of uncharged bad acts should he testify.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division, holding that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of uncharged, alleged prior sexual acts against persons other than the complainants of the underlying crimes because that testimony served no material non-propensity purpose. The court also held that the trial court erred when it ruled that Weinstein, who had no criminal history, could be cross-examined about those allegations as well as numerous allegations of misconduct that portrayed Weinstein in a highly prejudicial light. The court concluded that these errors were not harmless and ordered a new trial. However, the court rejected Weinstein's claim that the third-degree rape prosecution was untimely, holding that the trial court properly discounted the days Weinstein was continuously outside the state and correctly held that the prosecution was not time-barred. View "People v Weinstein" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of when a non-eyewitness can testify to a jury that the defendant is the person depicted in a photo or video. The incident in question occurred on June 10, 2015, when a man was captured on police cameras in Syracuse firing three shots into a van. The defendant, Farod Mosley, was indicted for the shooting in September 2015, but the indictment was dismissed as legally insufficient. In July 2016, an assistant district attorney showed the video of the shooting to Detective Steven Kilburn, who identified Mosley as the shooter in the video. This identification led to a new indictment against Mosley.The trial took place in February 2018, with the key issue being the identification of the shooter in the video. The prosecution relied on Kilburn to provide lay, non-eyewitness identification testimony that he believed Mosley was the shooter in the video. The jury ultimately convicted Mosley of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree. Mosley argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Kilburn's testimony.The Appellate Division rejected Mosley's contention, holding that the People demonstrated Kilburn was more likely than the jury to correctly identify Mosley in the video. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the People failed to establish that Kilburn's testimony would aid the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the person in the video was Mosley. The court ruled that such testimony may be admitted where the witness is sufficiently familiar with the defendant that their testimony would be reliable, and there is reason to believe the jury might require such assistance in making its independent assessment. In this case, there was no showing that the proffered witness was sufficiently familiar with the defendant to render his testimony helpful, or that the jury faced an obstacle to making the identification that the witness's testimony would have overcome. View "People v Mosley" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Kenneth Fisher, who was convicted of three counts of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, based on two controlled buy operations. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. During the trial, one of the jurors believed that Fisher had followed her home after the first day of jury selection. She did not immediately inform the court of her concern but waited until the case was submitted to the jury, and then expressed her safety concern to the other jurors during deliberations.The trial court deemed the juror's belief likely unfounded and, despite some assurances that the juror could put aside her concerns, the court decided to retain her. Fisher's attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis that he did not have a fair and impartial jury, but the court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, and a Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The Court of Appeals found that the juror's belief that she had been followed home by Fisher was a prejudicial belief about the defendant that was not based on the evidence at trial. The court noted that the juror's fear was not about witnesses or collateral matters, but about the defendant's character. The court also noted that the juror had violated the court's instructions by failing to inform the court promptly about her beliefs about the defendant and instead introduced those beliefs into jury deliberations. The court concluded that the juror was "grossly unqualified" and should have been dismissed, and a mistrial granted. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial. View "People v Fisher" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Corey Dunton, who was convicted of attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and reckless endangerment after he opened fire at a skating rink, injuring two individuals. Dunton had a history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior, both in and out of the courtroom. During the announcement of the verdict, Dunton, who was handcuffed for security reasons, disrupted the proceedings with verbal outbursts directed at the jury. As a result, the court ordered his removal from the courtroom.The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Dunton's conviction. However, following a similar case (People v Antoine), Dunton's appellate counsel contacted the Office of the Appellate Defender (OAD) regarding filing a writ of error coram nobis on Dunton's behalf. The OAD filed the writ, arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain claims, including that the trial court violated Dunton's constitutional and statutory right to be present during the rendering of the verdict when it removed him from the courtroom without prior warning. The Appellate Division granted the writ, reversed the judgment, and ordered a new trial.The case was then brought before the Court of Appeals. The court held that the trial court's removal of Dunton from the courtroom was appropriate given his history of violent outbursts and disruptive behavior. The court rejected the argument that any error was de minimis based on the timing of Dunton's removal from the courtroom. The court also held that the Appellate Division erroneously concluded that the trial court violated Dunton's right to be present, and therefore incorrectly granted Dunton's writ of error coram nobis on the sole ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim on direct appeal. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of issues raised but not determined by that Court. View "People v. Dunton" on Justia Law

In December 2016, an undercover police officer purchased heroin through an intermediary during a buy-and-bust operation in Manhattan. The officer did not meet the seller face-to-face but followed several feet behind the intermediary and the seller. The officer was far enough away that he could not hear their conversation. After the transaction, the officer reported to his team that the dealer was wearing specific clothing. Minutes later, the police arrested the defendant nearby, and the undercover officer identified him as the seller. The defendant filed a motion arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and that the court should suppress the undercover officer's identification, the prerecorded buy money, and the defendant's cell phone.The Supreme Court ordered a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The undercover officer testified about his observations during the operation and his subsequent identification of the defendant. After the hearing, the court ruled that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant and suppressed the undercover officer's identification and the physical evidence recovered from the defendant. The defendant then moved for an independent source hearing to determine whether the undercover officer would be allowed to identify him at trial. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the undercover's testimony at the probable cause hearing provided clear and convincing evidence for an in-court identification of the defendant at trial. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the court had exercised its discretion appropriately in denying the defendant's request for a separate independent source hearing. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial to be preceded by an independent source hearing. The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the undercover officer's in-court identification without a hearing record sufficient to support an independent source determination for the identification. The court found that the testimony at the probable cause hearing did not provide enough evidence to support an independent source determination. The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to an independent source hearing, as requested. View "People v Williams" on Justia Law