Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of burglary in the second degree but was acquitted of charges involving the use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument. The Appellate Division reversed. Before the second trial on the second-degree burglary charge began, defense counsel moved to preclude the prosecution from presenting evidence at trial evidence that Defendant threatened the victim of the burglary with a razor blade, arguing that the jury in the first trial necessarily decided that Defendant did not use a razor blade by acquitting him of first-degree burglary. The trial court denied the motion. During trial, the People sought to introduce a statement made by Defendant’s counsel at arraignment that was damaging to Defendant. The trial court allowed the statement and denied counsel’s request to withdraw. The jury convicted Defendant of burglary in the second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) even if the jury necessarily decided that Defendant did not use or threaten to use the razor blade, the Appellate Division correctly determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply; but (2) pursuant to the advocate-witness rule, the trial court should have granted defense counsel’s request to withdraw or declared a mistrial. View "People v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The two defendants in these cases accepted pleas to criminal offenses. Defendants later petitioned for writs of error coram nobis, each alleging that counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to advise Defendants of their right to appeal. Defendants also alleged had they known about their right to appeal, they would have requested one. In each case, the Appellate Division denied the defendant’s writ of error coram nobis. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of these two cases, Defendants failed to meet their burden on their coram nobis applications, as the records as a whole revealed that Defendants knew about their right to appeal. View "People v. Rosario" on Justia Law

The primary issue in these three consolidated appeals was whether Defendants entered knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty pleas when the trial courts failed to mention the constitutional rights Defendants were waiving, including the right to a trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront one’s accusers. The Court of Appeals concluded that two of the three defendants intelligently and understandingly waived their constitutional rights, holding (1) a court’s failure to recite the Boykin rights does not automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary and intelligent plea, and where the record affirmatively shows that the defendant intentionally relinquished those rights, the plea will be upheld; (2) the records in two of the three cases contained such a showing, and therefore, Defendants’ pleas were valid; and (3) the third defendant’s plea must be vacated because the record failed to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. View "People v. Conceicao" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Later that year, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts each of robbery in the first degree and of endangering the welfare of a child. In 2009, Defendant was released to parole supervision, but his parole was revoked both in 2010 and in 2011. Defendant pleaded guilty to a parole violation and was sentenced to an eighteen-month parole hold. In 2012, Defendant moved to be resentenced on his 2004 conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to Supreme Court, holding that the courts below erred in deciding Defendant’s resentencing motion without giving him an opportunity to be heard. View "People v. Golo" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to vacate his judgment of conviction under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law ("CPL") 440.10, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the People failed to disclose evidence that would have supported a third-party culpability defense. Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granted Defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion and ordered a new trial, holding that there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different if the information supporting the third-party culpability defense had been disclosed, and therefore, Defendant was denied his right to a fair trial. View "People v. Negron" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed legal error by failing to issue an adverse inference instruction based on the police’s failure to generate an electronic recording of his interrogation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion or commit legal error by declining to issue an adverse inference instruction against the People at trial based solely on the police’s failure to electronically record the custodial interrogation of a defendant; and (2) the Appellate Division properly determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law or commit legal error by declining to deliver the adverse inference instruction requested by Defendant. View "People v. Durant" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, rape in the second degree, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to seek the dismissal of time-barred charges against him and by failing to object to certain statements by the prosecutor during her summation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) given the presence of a plausible and reasonable strategy that could explain counsel’s action, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek dismissal of the time-barred charges; and (2) Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to certain statements made during the prosecutor’s summation. View "People v. Ambers" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for burglary in the second degree and petit larceny. The burglary charge was timely interposed but the petit larceny charge was not, as the applicable statutory period ran approximately one and one-half years before the filing of the accusatory instrument. Defendant’s counsel never obtained the time-barred count’s dismissal, and Defendant was convicted of both indicted offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his for-cause challenge to a prospective juror and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by vacating Defendant’s conviction on the charge of petit larceny and dismissing that charge in the indictment, holding that the failure of Defendant’s counsel to have the time-barred petit larceny count dismissed constituted ineffective assistance. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant was arraigned on three accusatory instruments, each charging him with two counts of forcible touching, sexual abuse in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree. Upon motion, Criminal Court consolidated the three accusatory instruments. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to one count of forcible touching. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and dismissed the accusatory instrument based on factual insufficiency grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Appellate Term and reinstated Defendant’s conviction, holding that the accusatory instrument set forth sufficient factual allegations to establish the elements of the offense. View "People v. Hatton" on Justia Law

On March 30, 2006, Defendant was indicted for various charges arising from a burglary that occurred in January 2005. Defendant was arrested on April 4, 2006 for a different burglary that occurred that day. On April 7, 2006, the People filed a felony complaint against Defendant for a burglary that occurred on February 23, 2006. Defendant was charged with two counts of burglary in the second degree for both the April 4 and February 23 incidents. After a trial on the consolidated indictments, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree relative to both the 2005 and February 23, 2006 burglaries. The sentencing court adjudicated Defendant a second violent felony offender based on a 1985 conviction for robbery in the second degree and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division by remitting the case for resentencing, holding (1) the courts below properly denied Defendant’s motions to dismiss the grand jury indictment for the February 23 burglary; but (2) Defendant should not have been sentenced as a second violent felony offender for the 2005 burglary because his 1985 conviction occurred more than ten years earlier, and the intervening periods of incarceration did not close the gap. View "People v. Small" on Justia Law