Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree. Defendant did not appeal. Defendant was later placed in removal proceedings. Citing Padilla v. Kentucky, Defendant moved to vacate his conviction, arguing that his counsel failed inform him that his guilty plea carried a risk of deportation. Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that Padilla should not be applied retroactively to judgments such as Defendant’s that became final before Padilla was decided. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States. At issue before the Appellate Division was whether Defendant’s 2009 judgment of conviction and sentence became final before or after Padilla was decided on March 31, 2010. Defendant argued that the judgment did not become final until one year and thirty days after he was sentenced, or the last day that he could have sought an extension from the Appellate Division to file a late notice of appeal. The Appellate Division concluded that the judgment did not become final until after Padilla was decided, and therefore, Defendant could raise a Padilla claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where a defendant does not take a timely direct appeal from the judgment and does not move for leave to file a late notice of appeal, the judgment becomes final thirty days after sentencing. View "People v. Varenga" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree. The plea included treating Defendant as a second felony offender. The second felony information was based on a prior conviction in Washington D.C.for attempt to commit robbery. Supreme Court adjudicated Defendant a second felony offender and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Defendant subsequently filed a motion pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.20 to set aside his sentence, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the prison term from twenty-five years to fifteen years but disagreed with Defendant that his predicate felony was not equivalent to a New York felony. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant’s prior conviction for attempt to commit robbery was not equivalent to any New York felony and, therefore, did not provide a proper basis for Defendant’s second felony offender adjudication. Remitted for further proceedings. View "People v. Jurgins" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of burglary in the second degree but was acquitted of charges involving the use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument. The Appellate Division reversed. Before the second trial on the second-degree burglary charge began, defense counsel moved to preclude the prosecution from presenting evidence at trial evidence that Defendant threatened the victim of the burglary with a razor blade, arguing that the jury in the first trial necessarily decided that Defendant did not use a razor blade by acquitting him of first-degree burglary. The trial court denied the motion. During trial, the People sought to introduce a statement made by Defendant’s counsel at arraignment that was damaging to Defendant. The trial court allowed the statement and denied counsel’s request to withdraw. The jury convicted Defendant of burglary in the second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) even if the jury necessarily decided that Defendant did not use or threaten to use the razor blade, the Appellate Division correctly determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply; but (2) pursuant to the advocate-witness rule, the trial court should have granted defense counsel’s request to withdraw or declared a mistrial. View "People v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The two defendants in these cases accepted pleas to criminal offenses. Defendants later petitioned for writs of error coram nobis, each alleging that counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to advise Defendants of their right to appeal. Defendants also alleged had they known about their right to appeal, they would have requested one. In each case, the Appellate Division denied the defendant’s writ of error coram nobis. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of these two cases, Defendants failed to meet their burden on their coram nobis applications, as the records as a whole revealed that Defendants knew about their right to appeal. View "People v. Rosario" on Justia Law

The primary issue in these three consolidated appeals was whether Defendants entered knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty pleas when the trial courts failed to mention the constitutional rights Defendants were waiving, including the right to a trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront one’s accusers. The Court of Appeals concluded that two of the three defendants intelligently and understandingly waived their constitutional rights, holding (1) a court’s failure to recite the Boykin rights does not automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary and intelligent plea, and where the record affirmatively shows that the defendant intentionally relinquished those rights, the plea will be upheld; (2) the records in two of the three cases contained such a showing, and therefore, Defendants’ pleas were valid; and (3) the third defendant’s plea must be vacated because the record failed to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. View "People v. Conceicao" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Later that year, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts each of robbery in the first degree and of endangering the welfare of a child. In 2009, Defendant was released to parole supervision, but his parole was revoked both in 2010 and in 2011. Defendant pleaded guilty to a parole violation and was sentenced to an eighteen-month parole hold. In 2012, Defendant moved to be resentenced on his 2004 conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to Supreme Court, holding that the courts below erred in deciding Defendant’s resentencing motion without giving him an opportunity to be heard. View "People v. Golo" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to vacate his judgment of conviction under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law ("CPL") 440.10, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the People failed to disclose evidence that would have supported a third-party culpability defense. Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granted Defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion and ordered a new trial, holding that there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different if the information supporting the third-party culpability defense had been disclosed, and therefore, Defendant was denied his right to a fair trial. View "People v. Negron" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed legal error by failing to issue an adverse inference instruction based on the police’s failure to generate an electronic recording of his interrogation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion or commit legal error by declining to issue an adverse inference instruction against the People at trial based solely on the police’s failure to electronically record the custodial interrogation of a defendant; and (2) the Appellate Division properly determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law or commit legal error by declining to deliver the adverse inference instruction requested by Defendant. View "People v. Durant" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, rape in the second degree, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to seek the dismissal of time-barred charges against him and by failing to object to certain statements by the prosecutor during her summation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) given the presence of a plausible and reasonable strategy that could explain counsel’s action, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek dismissal of the time-barred charges; and (2) Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to certain statements made during the prosecutor’s summation. View "People v. Ambers" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for burglary in the second degree and petit larceny. The burglary charge was timely interposed but the petit larceny charge was not, as the applicable statutory period ran approximately one and one-half years before the filing of the accusatory instrument. Defendant’s counsel never obtained the time-barred count’s dismissal, and Defendant was convicted of both indicted offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his for-cause challenge to a prospective juror and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by vacating Defendant’s conviction on the charge of petit larceny and dismissing that charge in the indictment, holding that the failure of Defendant’s counsel to have the time-barred petit larceny count dismissed constituted ineffective assistance. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law