Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was thirty-four weeks pregnant when she struck the vehicle of Robert and Mary Kelly, killing them both. Defendant’s baby was born after an emergency cesarean section but died six days later from injuries sustained in the accident. Defendant was indicted on three counts of manslaughter in the second degree, one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, and one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the combined influence of alcohol or drugs. After a second trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant not guilty on all counts except manslaughter in the second degree for the death of her child. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a woman cannot be convicted of manslaughter for conduct with respect to themselves and their unborn fetuses unless such conduct is done intentionally. View "People v. Jorgensen" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested in the lobby of an apartment building that was enrolled in the trespass affidavit program. Upon his arrest, officers frisked Defendant and found a razor blade in one of his pants pockets. Defendant pleaded guilty to, inter alia, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the razor blade. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the combination of Defendant’s presence in the building with the private and protected nature of that location supported the lower courts’ determination that the police officers had an objective credible reason to approach and request information from Defendant and thus to begin the encounter that culminated in Defendant’s arrest and the seizure of the razor blade. View "People v. Barksdale" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of sodomy. In contemplation of Defendant’s release from incarceration, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders prepared a case summary and a risk assessment instrument. At the ensuing court appearance, Supreme Court assessed Defendant eighty-five points and adjudicated him a level two sexually violent offender, finding sufficient evidence, consisting in part of the grand jury minutes, to support the imposition of points for course of sexual misconduct. The grand jury minutes were not disclosed to the defense in reaching Defendant’s Sex Offender Registration Act risk level determination. The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that there was no due process violation in Supreme Court’s reliance on the grand jury minutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s due process rights were violated when the hearing court relied on the grand jury minutes, but given the overwhelming evidence that was disclosed to Defendant in support of the same risk factor, the error was harmless. View "People v. Baxin" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Defendant waived prosecution by information. Defendant appealed, arguing that the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective. The Appellate Term affirmed, concluding that the accusatory instrument was facially sufficient. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the language used in the accusatory instrument gave Defendant sufficient notice of the crime charged to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy. View "People v. Sans" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of witness tampering and bribery for cultivating a relationship with and giving money to three girls, witnesses to the murder of Dennis Brown. Defendant’s half-brother, Wesley Sykes, was charged with the murder. As the trial of Sykes was about to begin, Bobby Gibson, an eyewitness to the shooting, was shot and killed outside the apartment of one of the three girls. An unrelated individual later confessed to the murder of Gibson. During Defendant’s trial, the trial court ruled that evidence of Gibson’s murder was necessary for the jury to consider the reliability and truthfulness of the three girls. The jury acquitted Defendant of all three tampering counts but convicted him of the bribery counts. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court allowed evidence of the Gibson murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court’s decision to admit the evidence of Gibson’s murder was not an abuse of discretion. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree intentional murder. Defendant was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the evidence was legally sufficient, that Defendant was not denied meaningful representation, and that Defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct committed during summation was unpreserved. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor misrepresented to the jury critical DNA evidence as proof of Defendant’s guilt in contradiction of the People’s expert testimony; and (2) Defendant was denied a fair trial as a result. View "People v. Wright" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing the People to to introduce identification testimony of a police officer who had previously identified him during a pretrial procedure without notifying him, within fifteen days of his arraignment, of the officer’s prospective testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the officer’s identification of Defendant was confirmatory in nature and thus did not require notice under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 710.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the People were required to serve their notice concerning the officer’s observations, but the error was harmless. View "People v. Pacquette" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, first-degree manslaughter, first-degree burglary, two counts of second-degree burglary, and second-degree assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for felony murder because the predicate burglary was based upon his conceded intent to commit an assault. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the felony murder conviction “may properly be based on a burglary as the predicate felony where the intent at the time of entry is to commit an assault.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Defendant unlawfully entered the victim’s apartment with the singular intent to assault him, but caused his death, Defendant’s felony murder conviction was supported by legally sufficient evidence. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In 1990, Appellant was convicted of three counts of rape in the second degree. Prior to his release in 2004, Appellant was adjudicated a risk level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Appellant subsequently violated parole. In 2010, while under civil confinement, Appellant filed a petition for a downward modification of his risk level. After a hearing, County Court denied Appellant’s modification request, concluding that Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to a downward modification. The Appellate Division affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was deprived of due process when County Court failed to grant an adjournment so as to give him access to copies of all the records that the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders reviewed in making an updated recommendation that Appellant’s risk level classification should not be reduced. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant was not prejudiced by the court’s denial of an adjournment to obtain the documents. View "People v. Lashway" on Justia Law

The two defendants in this case were eighteen years old when they pleaded guilty to armed felonies. Both defendants were “youths” within the meaning of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 720.10(1), had never been convicted of a crime, and would be eligible to be granted youthful offender status but for the fact that their convictions to be replaced by youthful offender adjudications were armed felonies. At issue on appeal was whether the court in the case of each defendant was required to determine on the record if he was an eligible youth due to the existence of one or more factors set forth in section 720.10(3). The Court of Appeals reversed in each case, holding that, when a defendant who would otherwise be an eligible youth has been convicted of an armed felony, the court is required to make a determination on the record as to whether one or more of the section 720.10(3) factors exists and the defendant is therefore an eligible youth, even if the defendant does not request it or has agreed to forgo youthful offender treatment as part of a plea bargain. View "People v. Middlebrooks" on Justia Law