Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1990, Appellant was convicted of three counts of rape in the second degree. Prior to his release in 2004, Appellant was adjudicated a risk level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Appellant subsequently violated parole. In 2010, while under civil confinement, Appellant filed a petition for a downward modification of his risk level. After a hearing, County Court denied Appellant’s modification request, concluding that Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to a downward modification. The Appellate Division affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was deprived of due process when County Court failed to grant an adjournment so as to give him access to copies of all the records that the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders reviewed in making an updated recommendation that Appellant’s risk level classification should not be reduced. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant was not prejudiced by the court’s denial of an adjournment to obtain the documents. View "People v. Lashway" on Justia Law

The two defendants in this case were eighteen years old when they pleaded guilty to armed felonies. Both defendants were “youths” within the meaning of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 720.10(1), had never been convicted of a crime, and would be eligible to be granted youthful offender status but for the fact that their convictions to be replaced by youthful offender adjudications were armed felonies. At issue on appeal was whether the court in the case of each defendant was required to determine on the record if he was an eligible youth due to the existence of one or more factors set forth in section 720.10(3). The Court of Appeals reversed in each case, holding that, when a defendant who would otherwise be an eligible youth has been convicted of an armed felony, the court is required to make a determination on the record as to whether one or more of the section 720.10(3) factors exists and the defendant is therefore an eligible youth, even if the defendant does not request it or has agreed to forgo youthful offender treatment as part of a plea bargain. View "People v. Middlebrooks" on Justia Law

Defendant and Oman Gutierrez were charged with the first degree murder of Edward Contreras. It was alleged that Defendant murdered Contreras at Gutierrez’s request. New York City Police Detective Rolando Rivera testified for the prosecution as an expert respecting uncoded portions of recorded conversations of phone calls made by Gutierrez while in prison. Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, arguing that Rivera should not have been permitted to testify as an expert regarding the conversations because he invaded the fact-finding province of the jury and impermissibly bolstered the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although considerable portions of Rivera’s testimony were admitted in error, the error was harmless. View "People v. Inoa" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree and gang assault in the first degree. After a plea colloquy, the court accepted the plea, and Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the County Court erred in denying in part his motion to suppress statements he made to police. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s valid waiver of the right to appeal barred his challenge to the court court’s suppression ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal, and therefore, he was precluded from challenging the County Court’s adverse suppression ruling. View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant pleaded guilty in a Westchester County court to criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree. In 2010, a Suffolk County Grand Jury charged Defendant with criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. Defendant moved to dismiss the Suffolk County charges on statutory double jeopardy grounds, arguing that his second prosecution was based on the same criminal transaction as the previous prosecution. The court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the crimes for which Defendant was prosecuted in Suffolk County were not based upon the same criminal transaction as the crime for which he was prosecuted in Westchester County. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the successive prosecutions here involved two different criminal transactions. View "People v. Lynch" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted robbery in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he had the specific intent to steal. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that there was legally sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction on the robbery counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that while the evidence may establish attempted criminal behavior, it did not support a valid inference that Defendant intended to steal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances provided legally sufficient evidence to support the inference that Defendant intended to steal. View "People v. Lamont" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance. While on parole for the instant offense, Defendant moved for resentencing pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.46. The People opposed the motion, arguing that Defendant was ineligible for resentencing under that provision because he was not currently incarcerated. Supreme Court granted Defendant’s motion for resentencing, concluding that Defendant was eligible for relief under the 2011 amendments to section 440.46 because the revised statute did “not distinguish between defendants who are incarcerated and those who are on parole but are not incarcerated.” The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the amendments to section 440.46 expanded the class of defendants eligible for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act to include those who are on parole at the time resentencing is sought. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2004, Respondent pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree. Respondent was previously convicted in three separate cases to sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the first degree, and sodomy in the second degree. As Respondent’s release date approached, the Attorney General commenced this N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 proceeding seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. After a dispositional hearing, Supreme Court issued an order finding that Respondent was a dangerous sex offender and ordering his confinement. Defendant appealed, arguing that Supreme Court improperly permitted an expert witness to testify via electronic video conferencing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Supreme Court erred by permitting the expert witness to testify via electronic appearance on rebuttal without a showing of exceptional circumstances; but (2) the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence presented by the State. View "State v. Robert F." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and robbery in the second degree. The sentencing court directed that the assault sentence run consecutively to the attempted murder sentence and that the remaining sentences run concurrently. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by directing that the sentences for Defendant’s assault and attempted murder convictions be served concurrently. The Appellate Division then remanded the matter for resentencing for consideration of whether one of Defendant’s robbery sentences should be modified to run consecutively in light of the correction. Defendant argued that N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 430.10 prohibited the court from realigning his sentences and that N.Y. Penal Law 70.25(2) required the imposition of concurrent sentences for each count. The sentencing court rejected Defendant’s arguments and modified Defendant’s sentences by running his sentence for first-degree assault consecutively to his sentence for first-degree robbery. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing court’s realignment of Defendant’s sentences did not violate N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 430.10; and (2) the imposition of consecutive sentences on Defendant's assault and robbery convictions was lawful because the robbery and assault were committed by separate and distinct acts. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

While seeking treatment from a psychiatrist, Defendant admitted to sexually abusing an eleven-year-old relative. Defendant was later arrested and charged with predatory sexual assault against a child. During Defendant’s criminal trial, over Defendant’s objection, the trial court permitted the psychiatrist to testify that Defendant had made the admission on the grounds that the psychiatrist had disclosed the reported abuse to the Administration for Children’s Services. Defendant was convicted as charged. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Supreme Court erred in permitting the psychiatrist to testify concerning Defendant’s admissions and that the error was not harmless. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the testimony by Defendant’s psychiatrist that Defendant admitted to the abuse ran afoul of the physician-patient privilege, and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Rivera" on Justia Law