Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of murder and eventually released on lifetime parole supervision. Petitioner was subsequently charged with misdemeanor assault. Petitioner was found to be unfit to stand trial and was committed to the custody of the Office of Mental Health. While committed, Petitioner was charged with assault and harassment stemming from his attack on a fellow patient. The charges were eventually dismissed. Meanwhile, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision commenced parole revocation proceedings against Petitioner on the incident based on the patient attack. An administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended parole revocation. The Division of Parole adopted the ALJ’s recommendation, and Petitioner was incarcerated. While incarcerated, Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 contending that due process prohibits the Division from proceeding with a revocation hearing against a person who has been deemed mentally unfit to proceed to trial. Supreme Court denied the petition, determining that an assertion of incompetency does not bar parole revocation proceedings. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a parolee lacks mental competency to stand trial, it is a violation of his or her due process rights to conduct a parole revocation hearing. View "Lopez v. Evans" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer stopped Defendant’s vehicle based on the officer’s mistaken belief that Defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Defendant was subsequently charged with failing to stop at a stop sign and driving while intoxicated. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause for the initial stop. The county court suppressed the evidence, concluding that the traffic stop was improper. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that that traffic stop was justified based on the officer’s reasonable belief that Defendant failed to stop at a valid stop sign. View "People v. Guthrie" on Justia Law

At issue in this criminal case was the prosecution’s references in its case-in-chief to Defendant’s selective silence during custodial interrogation, after Defendant had waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak to the police. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the third degree, and criminal impersonation in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified, holding that the comments by the prosecutor during opening and closing statements concerning Defendant’s post-arrest silence were improper, and the county court erred in admitting into evidence a portion of a law enforcement officer’s testimony concerning Defendant’s selective silence, but any errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) as a matter of state evidentiary law, evidence of a defendant’s selective silence generally may not be used by the People as part of their case-in-chief either to allow the jury to infer the defendant’s admission of guilt or to impeach the credibility of the defendant’s version of events when the defendant has not testified; and (2) the error in this case was not harmless. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder, intentional murder on a transferred intent theory, attempted murder in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The convictions arose from a single homicide where Defendant killed one victim in the course of attempting to kill someone else. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his due process rights when it submitted to the jury depraved indifference murder and intentional murder on a “transferred intent” theory in the conjunctive with respect to the same victim. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial on the intentional murder, depraved indifference murder, and attempted murder counts, holding (1) a defendant cannot be convicted of depraved indifference murder and intentional murder on a transferred intent theory in a case involving the death of the same person, and therefore, the trial court erred in submitting to the jury both charged in the conjunctive rather than in the alternative; and (2) the trial court violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by admitting into evidence certain grand jury statements of a non-testifying witness. View "People v. Dubarry" on Justia Law

Two codefendants (Defendants) were convicted of second-degree murder for acting in concert with three others to kill Matharr Cham. When the People’s main witness failed to appear twice during trial, the court held an in camera, off-the-record discussion with the witness to ascertain the witness's mental and physical ability to testify. The proceeding was held without counsel present. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendants’ right to counsel was not violated. The Court of Appeals reversed the orders in each case and remitted for new trials, holding that the trial court violated Defendants’ right to counsel by denying defense counsel access to the proceeding because, under the facts of this case, the witness's mental and physical health were inextricably tied to his credibility, a nonministerial issue for trial. View "People v. Carr" on Justia Law

After two separate jury trials in two unrelated cases, Defendants were convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and murder in the second degree, respectively. Defendants appealed, arguing that the introduction of purported “background and narrative” evidence through the testimony of police detectives violated their right to confrontation. The Appellate Division in both cases affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in one case and reversed in the other, holding (1) the trial court in the first case erred in admitting the testimony because it exceeded the permissible bounds of providing background information, and the error was not harmless where there was no proper curative or limiting charge given to temper the testimonial evidence; and (2) the statement made in the second case was not testimonial, and therefore, there was no merit to Defendant’s contention that his confrontation rights were violated. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other claims, that his right to counsel was violated when the trial court replaced a sick juror with an alternate juror and failed to object to the replacement of the juror. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant failed to preserve his right to counsel claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s right to counsel claim was not preserved for appellate review; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims lacked merit. View "People v. Garay" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. The People sought to have Defendant adjudicated a persistent felony offender pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 70.10. After two days of hearings, County Court issued an order finding that Defendant was a persistent felony offender and concluding that a recidivist sentence was warranted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 70.10 was rational as applied to Defendant in this case. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of a sex crime and, upon his release from custody, was classified a level one sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act. Defendant was later charged with a violation of Nassau County Local Law 4, codified in Nassau County Administrative Code 8-130.6. That provision establishes residency restrictions on a “registered sex offender.” The code defines “registered sex offender” as a person who has been classified as a level one, level two, or level three sex offender and is required to register pursuant to the Act, regardless of whether the sex offender has actually registered. The district court dismissed the charge, determining that Local Law 4 is preempted by New York’s comprehensive statutory scheme for sex offenders. The Appellate Term reversed, concluding that the Legislature did not intend to occupy the entire field so as to prohibit the enactment of local laws imposing residency restrictions for sex offenders who are no longer on probation, parole supervision, or subject to a conditional discharge. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unmistakable intent of the State to preempt the field prohibits the enactment of local residency restriction laws. View "People v. Diack" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted assault in the third degree and second degree harassment. The convictions arose from Defendant’s act of “banging into” the complainant with his shoulder. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that because the attempted assault and harassment counts were based on the same conduct, harassment must be treated as a lesser included offense of attempted assault. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that harassment is not a lesser included offense of attempted assault because the two counts do not share the same elements. View "People v. Repanti" on Justia Law