Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent pleaded guilty to sex offenses, including sexual abuse in the first decree. When Respondent’s term of imprisonment neared its end, the State commenced a civil commitment proceeding against him pursuant to N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10. After a bench trial, Supreme Court imposed strict and intensive supervision (SIST) rather than confinement. Respondent was required to attend a sex offender treatment program, but due to his failure to cooperate, Respondent was discharged and later arrested. Supreme Court subsequently revoked Respondent’s release on SIST and committed him to a secure treatment facility, determining that the State had proven that Respondent was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement. The Appellate Division affirmed on the merits. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Mental Hygiene Law envisages a distinction between sex offenders who have difficulty controlling their sexual conduct and those who are unable to control it; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Respondent had such an inability to control his behavior that he was likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility. View "State v. Michael M." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for burglary and, in an attempt to obtain leniency, told the police that a friend of his admitted that he stabbed a man at the supermarket. Defendant was represented by his lawyer at the meeting. After Defendant was released from jail, he discussed the supermarket stabbing with the police outside of the presence of his lawyer. Defendant was later charged with and convicted of attempted murder and assault. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the police officers were not barred from questioning Defendant about the stabbing despite the fact that he was represented by counsel on the pending burglary charge, as the two charges were unrelated. The Court of Appeals reversed, suppressed Defendant’s statements, and ordered a new trial, holding (1) Defendant’s right to counsel encompassed his conversations with the police about the stabbing, as long as those conversations were part of an effort to obtain leniency in the burglary case in which his lawyer represented him; and (2) Defendant did not waive his right to be represented by counsel at the second meeting with law enforcement officers. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1981, Defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and attempted robbery in the first degree. During trial, Defendant pursued a mistaken identity defense. Defendant later moved to vacate his conviction and for a new trial pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10(1) on the ground that newly discovered evidence in the form of mitochondrial DNA testing excluded him as the perpetrator of the crimes. Defendant sought an evidentiary hearing as part of his postjudgment motion. Supreme Court summarily denied Defendant’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of a hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) because the rule announced in People v. Crimmins that the power to review a discretionary order denying a motion to vacate judgment on the ground of newly discovered evidence cease at the Appellate Division needlessly restricts the Court of Appeals’ power of review concerning section 440.10(1)(g) motions, that part of the decision is overruled; and (2) in this case, the Appellate Division abused its discretion in summarily denying Defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. Remanded. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped the car Defendant was driving due to traffic violations. After observing that Defendant appeared to be intoxicated, the officer asked Defendant to step out of the car and then patted him down. The officer found a switchblade knife in Defendant’s pocket and arrested him. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the knife. The motion was denied on the ground that the pat-down was justified as a search incident to arrest. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the police officer’s search of Defendant was not incident to Defendant’s arrest because, although there was probable cause to arrest Defendant before the search, Defendant would not have been arrested if the search had not produced evidence of a crime. View "People v. Reid" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, among other charges. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the count of the indictment charging him with attempted murder was rendered duplicitous due to events that unfolded during the course of the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, concluding that the duplicity argument was unpreserved. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a duplicity argument based on trial evidence must be preserved for appeal where the count is not duplicitous on the face of the indictment; and (2) none of the other issues raised by Defendant warranted reversal. View "People v. Allen" on Justia Law

The defendants in these two separate criminal cases were convicted of criminal offenses by a jury. The two juries each sent notes to the court requesting specific information for use in deliberations. The transcripts did not show in either case that the courts were aware of the juries’ submission of some of the notes. Defendants appealed, contending that the trial courts committed mode of proceedings errors under People v. O’Rama and its progeny by accepting the verdicts without acknowledging or responding to the jury notes at issue. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding that because the substantive jury notes, marked as court exhibits, were neither revealed to the attorneys nor addressed by the courts, a mode of proceedings error occurred under O’Rama in both cases, and the defendants were entitled to new trials. View "People v. Silva" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for second-degree murder as a hate crime and second-degree murder. A jury convicted Defendant of the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and acquitted him of the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter. Defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the verdict was repugnant because the crimes of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime and ordinary first-degree manslaughter share the same basic elements. The sentencing judge denied Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict on repugnancy grounds without elaborating on his reasoning. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing Defendant’s conviction for first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime, concluding that the verdict was repugnant because the jury necessarily found that one of the essential elements of ordinary manslaughter in the first degree was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals held that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent, and thus repugnant, and modified the order of the Appellate Division by granting the People leave to submit the charge of manslaughter in the first degree as a hate crime to another grand jury. View "People v. DeLee" on Justia Law

In 2008, Defendant pleaded guilty pro se in Town Court to a misdemeanor charge of driving while intoxicated. Defendant took no appeal. In 2010, Defendant was charged with a felony under N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1193(1)(c)(k), which is applicable to persons who drive while intoxicated after having been convicted of such a crime within the preceding ten years. Defendant moved to withdraw his 2008 guilty plea, arguing that he was deprived of his right to counsel in the 2008 proceedings. The Town Court granted the motion. The Appellate Term reversed, concluding that Defendant was barred from raising his right to counsel claim in a motion under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10 by failing to raise it on direct appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant was not barred from raising his right to counsel claim. View "People v. Grubstein" on Justia Law

In these two matters, the State commenced civil commitment proceedings against Kenneth T. and Donald DD under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10. After trials were held in both cases, it was found that the men had a condition, disease or disorder that prdisposed them to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and resulted in their having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct. Following dispositional hearings, both men were ordered to be confined. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conclusion that Kenneth T.’s mental conditions resulted in his having serious difficulty in controlling conduct constituting a sex offense; and (2) in Donald DD’s case, Supreme Court erred in using a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, together with testimony concerning Donald DD’s sex crimes, but without evidence of some independent mental abnormality diagnosis, to ground a finding of mental abnormality within the meaning of article 10. View "Matter of State of New York v. Donald DD" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Queens County District Attorney implemented a central booking pre-arraignment interview program consisting of a structured, videotaped interview conducted by members of the District Attorney’s staff with a suspect immediately prior to arraignment. During these interviews, a detective investigator delivered a scripted “preamble” to the Miranda warnings informing suspects that “this is your opportunity to tell us your story” and “your only opportunity” to speak with the District Attorney staff before going to court. Defendants here made statements in their respective videotaped interviews that they unsuccessfully sought to suppress. The Appellate Divisions reversed and ordered suppression of the statements, concluding that the preamble prevented the Miranda warnings from effectively conveying to suspects their rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the preamble undercut the subsequently-communicated Miranda warnings to the extent that Defendants were not adequately and effectively advised of their rights safeguarded by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before they agreed to speak with law enforcement authorities. View "People v. Dunbar" on Justia Law