Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted on two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The jury returned a verdict convicting Defendant of both counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it may infer that Defendant possessed the weapon with the intent to use it unlawfully against another. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence that Defendant possessed a loaded firearm, together with the statutory presumption of intent arising from the possession, was legally sufficient to support his conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. View "People v. Galindo" on Justia Law

In the first case involved in this appeal, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marihuana. Defendant appealed, asserting that his plea was invalid because the record did not affirmatively demonstrate the waiver of his Boykin rights. The Appellate Term affirmed. In the second case, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sale of marihuana. Defendant appealed, arguing, as in the first case, that the waiver of his Boykin rights was nonexistent. The Appellate Term affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding that because the records in both cases were silent as to Defendant's waiver of his Boykin rights, the pleas must be vacated.View "People v. Tyrell" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the first degree. The trial court orally sentenced Defendant to a fifteen-year determinate sentence of incarceration without pronouncing the term of postrelease supervision (PRS) required under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45. In 2008, the Legislature enacted N.Y. Penal Law 70.85, which makes an exception to section 70.45 by allowing a determinate sentence without a term of PRS to stand as a legal sentence. In 2010, the People moved to resentence Defendant under N.Y. Penal Law 70.85, and Supreme Court resentenced Defendant under section 70.85 to a determinate term of fifteen years without PRS. Defendant appealed, claiming that section 70.85 was unconstitutional because he denied him the right to vacate his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 70.85 is a constitutionally permissible legislative remedy for the defectiveness of a plea. View "People v. Pignataro" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree for causing the death of a man by holding him in a headlock. Defendant appealed, arguing that several of the trial court's rulings in admitting and excluding evidence related to the issue of the duration of the headlock were in error. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant as to one of the trial court's contested rulings, reversed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court's refusal to permit Defendant to refresh his witness's recollection with a statement the witness had previously given was was reversible error.View "People v. Oddone" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea bargain, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five-year and five-year terms of imprisonment, to be served consecutively. Defendant moved to vacate the judgment of conviction and set aside his sentence on the ground that the five-year sentence was illegal. In support of his motion, Defendant enclosed a letter from a prison official indicating that Defendant's minimum legal sentence for this count of first-degree robbery was ten years. The county court denied the motion. The Appellate Division vacated Defendant's sentence and remitted the matter. Defendant was subsequently resentenced to concurrent determinate prison terms of twenty-five years and ten years. Defendant appealed, arguing that the county court could not legally resentence him to ten years in prison for robbery in the first degree because he originally pleaded guilty to this crime in exchange for a five-year incarceratory term. The Appellate Division disagreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the judge's modification of Defendant's sentence was proper.View "People v. Collier" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with multiple counts of murder and other offenses arising from a mass shooting at a screening of "Batman" at a movie theater in Colorado. The Colorado state court presiding over the criminal charges issued an order limiting pretrial publicity in the case by either side, including the police. Law subsequently took possession of a notebook that Petitioner had mailed to a psychiatrist before the shootings. Respondent, a New York-based reporter, published an article describing the contents of the notebook. Petitioner filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that law enforcement had violated the pretrial publicity orders by communicating with Respondent. Thereafter, Petitioner successfully sought in the Colorado court a certificate to compel Winter to testify or otherwise provide evidence regarding the identity of the sources that supplied Respondent with the information about Petitioner's notebook. The New York Supreme Court then granted Petitioner's request for the issuance of a subpoena compelling Respondent to testify in Colorado. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, based on the New York Constitution, the Shield Law, and existing case law, a New York court could not compel Respondent to reveal the identity of the sources. View "Holmes v. Winter" on Justia Law

A person commits burglary in the second degree if a person unlawfully enters a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein. In this case, Defendant was convicted of two counts of burglary in the second degree for committing a burglary in the non-residential part of a building used partly for residential purposes. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence supported his burglary convictions but that they were third degree, not second degree. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of burglary in the second degree. View "People v. McCray" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three robbery counts and one assault count. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain her convictions because, inter alia, the stolen items were not recovered from her possession, and therefore, the jury could not reasonably infer that she threatened or used force to retain possession of the property. The Appellate Division agreed with Defendant reduced her robbery convictions to petit larceny. The Court of Appeals reinstated Defendant’s robbery convictions, holding that there was ample evidence to support a reasonable inference that Defendant stole merchandise and threatened or used force to prevent or overcome resistance to her possession of that property. View "People v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In People v. Syville, the Court of Appeals held that coram nobis may be used to assert a claim that appellate rights were extinguished by ineffective assistance. At issue in these three cases was whether Syville entitled defendants to a writ of error coram nobis in order to pursue untimely appeals. The Court of Appeals held that, under Syville, only defendants who could not have reasonably discovered counsel’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal are entitled to utilize the coram nobis procedure, and the common-law recourse is not available to defendants who are in a position to discover the failure to file a timely notice of appeal. View "People v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Both Defendants in this case were required to register as a sex offenders pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). At issue in these cases was the SORA risk assessment guidelines promulgated by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders. The Court of Appeals held (1) guidelines factor 3, which is based on the number of victims involved in an offender’s crime, permits the scoring of points based on the number of different children depicted in the child pornography files possessed by a child pornography offender; (2) a position statement issued by the Board on the evaluation of child pornography cases under SORA does not prohibit a SORA court from assigning points to an offender under factor 3 and factor 7 (which accounts for the increased risk of sexual recidivism posed by an offender whose crime is directed at a stranger); and (3) where an offender requests a downward departure in a SORA case the offender must prove the facts supporting a downward departure by a preponderance of the evidence. View "People v. Gillotti" on Justia Law