Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a stop and frisk, holding that the circumstances of this case did not warrant a level three stop and frisk under People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976).Defendant, who was stopped and frisked after he existed a parked car and walked down the street, filed a motion to suppress drugs found on his person as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Defendant was subsequently convicted of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and directed that the indictment be dismissed, holding that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk of Defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the minimum standard required to justify a stop and frisk under People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976), was not met in this case. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division affirming the summary denial of Defendant's N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 440 motion, holding that the district court's summary denial of Defendant's motion to vacate his conviction was not an abuse of discretion.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of rape and sexual abuse and sentenced to fifty-four years in prison. Several years later, Defendant moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and the discovery of new evidence. County Court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that County Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion without a hearing. View "People v. Hartle" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of rape in the first degree, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to prompt prosecution under the due process clause of the New York Constitution was violated in this case.The complainant reported to the police that she had been raped a few hours earlier by Defendant, whom she identified. The complainant submitted to a sexual assault examination, but Defendant, who was questioned by the police the same day, but refused to provide a DNA sample. Years later, a sample of Defendant's DNA sample was obtained via a buccal swab, which disproved Defendant's claim that he and the complainant had not had sex. More than four years after the complainant reported the assault, the People filed an indictment against Defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the excessive preindictment delay violated his due process right to prompt prosecution. County Court denied the motion, and Defendant was convicted. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the indictment, holding that the delay of the police and prosecutors violated Defendant's constitutional right to a prompt prosecution. View "People v. Regan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division affirming as modified the judgment of supreme court in favor of Plaintiff on her claim that Defendants had violated her due process rights during foreclosure proceedings, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on appeal.Defendants commenced an in rem tax foreclosure proceeding and mailed notice to the publicly-listed owners of the property and publicized the notice in the press. Further, defendant County Treasurer personally contacted the only business located on the property to try to identify any person to inform of the pending foreclosure proceeding. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the in rem proceeding was a nullity and that Defendants had violated her due process rights. Supreme Court granted judgment for Plaintiff. The appellate division modified the judgment by vacating the portion declaring the foreclosure proceeding a nullity and granted Plaintiff relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendants' efforts to identify and inform those persons with interests in the property were sufficient. View "Hetelekides v. County of Ontario" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of one count each of attempted assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree and two counts of criminal contempt, holding that the trial judge committed constitutional error by ordering Defendant handcuffed without placing the special need for such restraints on the record and that the error was not harmless.The trial judge ordered Defendant to be handcuffed when the jury returned to announce its verdict. The judge, however, did not provide an on-the-record, individualized explanation for the restraints. The appellate division affirmed, concluding that any error in Defendant's being handcuffed without any explanation on the record was harmless. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) until the jury returns to the courtroom, publicly announces the verdict and confirms the verdict, the defendant is still presumed innocent and the constitutional prohibition on restraining a defendant without explanation remains in force; and (2) the constitutional error in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring a new trial. View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of leaving the scene of an accident without reporting, holding that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence without proper notice a recording of a call that law enforcement officials intercepted originating from a county jail.While monitoring a wiretap in an unrelated investigation, police officials intercepted the call at issue, which Defendant joined and during which he made statements suggesting his involvement in a fatal hit-and-run accident. Local police obtained a recording of the call from the jail, and Defendant was charged in connection with the evidence. During trial, the trial court entered the jail recording into evidence without providing Defendant notice within fifteen days of arraignment pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 700.70. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the wiretap was an "intercepted communication" within the meaning of CPL 700.05; and (2) the People's failure timely to furnish Defendant with a copy of the eavesdropping warrant and underlying application precluded the admission of the jail recording into evidence at trial. View "People v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, in accordance with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law. (CPL) 730, when a defendant is not in custody, a court has only the authority to either order a competency examination on an out-patient basis or to direct that the defendant be confined in a hospital pending completion of the examination upon proper medical recommendation that such confinement is necessary.Relator filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Wei Li requesting his release after the trial court ordered a CPL article 730 competency examination and remanding Wei Li to the custody of Respondent until completion of the examination. Relator argued that the remand order was unlawful where Wei Li had not been charged with a bail-eligible offense. Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that CPL article 730 provided criminal court authority to hold Wei Li. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals modified the order by converting the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action and granting judgment declaring judgment in accordance with this opinion, holding that the law does not permit remanding a defendant otherwise entitled to release under the law solely because a CPL article 730 competency examination has been ordered. View "People ex rel. Molinaro v. Warden, Rikers Island" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division affirming the conclusion of County Court that N.Y. Corr. Law 168-a(3)(b) required it to designate Defendant a sexually violent offender because he was convicted in Michigan of a felony that required him to register as a sex offender in that state, holding that County Court did not err.Under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), N.Y. Corr. Law 168 et seq., a person convicted of an offense in another jurisdiction must register as a sex offender if the offense satisfies an "essential elements" test or if the offense falls within SORA's foreign registration requirements. At issue was whether section 168-a(3)(b) requires a person subject to SORA's foreign registration requirements to be designated a sexually violent offender regardless of whether the offense in another jurisdiction is violent in nature. The Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative, holding that County Court properly determined that it was required by law to designate Defendant a sexually violent offender because he was convicted of a felony in another jurisdiction that required him to register as a sex offender. View "People v. Talluto" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate term holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of harassment in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to the victim that her children "were going to get a bullet in their heads" and that he was going to firebomb her home and kill her and her family were serious and unequivocal threats of physical harm. The appellate term concluded that Defendant's speech did not constitute a violation of the second-degree harassment statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Defendant threatened the victim with physical contact of a serious nature, with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm her. View "People v. Lagano" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court dismissing the indictment against Defendant under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 210.35(5), holding that the prosecutor was not obligated to instruct the grand jury on the "choice of evils" defense under N.Y. Penal Law 35.05(2).Defendant was charged with second-degree criminal mischief and other offenses for striking and severely injuring a small dog. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the grand jury proceeding was defective because the prosecutor failed to instruct the jury on exculpatory defenses under CPL 210.35(5). Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the indictment based on the prosecutor's failure to instruct on justification under section 35.05(2). The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecutor did not err in not charging the grand jury on justification under section 35.05(2), the "choice of evils" defense. View "People v. Jimenez" on Justia Law