Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions for health care fraud in the fourth degree and grand larceny in the third degree. The primary issue on appeal was the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that defendant's convictions were supported by legally sufficient evidence where defendant knowingly and willfully provided materially false information to Medicaid. The court also held that defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v Khan" on Justia Law

In 2007, defendant was indicted for charges related to the sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, Jane. When Jane was 19 years old, she informed police that she had been sexually assaulted by defendant on three occasions in 2002. When Jane was 14 years old, she underwent a medical examination that revealed she was 12 weeks pregnant, which she eventually claimed was a result of consensual, unprotected intercourse with a 14 year old boy in August 2002. At issue was whether the information that Jane disclosed to the police in 2002 was a "report" to the authorities that was sufficient to bar the availability of the tolling provision in CPL 30.10(3)(f) in connection with the indictment against defendant. The court held that the information Jane shared with the police in 2002 did not activate the statutes of limitations under CPL 30.10(3)(f) because she neither identified defendant as the perpetrator nor reported or revealed any of the sex offenses charged in the indictment. Under these facts, the statutes of limitations for the indicted sex crimes did not begin to run until Jane reached 18 years of age in January 2006. Therefore, the charged offenses were not time barred. View "People v Quinto" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of second-degree kidnapping, second-degree burglary, and other offenses against his former girlfriend. The court held that County Court abused its discretion as a matter of law when it denied defendant's for-cause challenge to a prospective juror who had personal and professional relationships with several of the witnesses expected to testify at defendant's trial. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and a new trial ordered. View "People v Furey" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to first-degree rape in exchange for a promised determinate sentence of nine years imprisonment followed by five years of postrelease supervision. At issue was the enforceability of the appeal waiver. Applying the standard in People v. Lopez, the court held that the record failed to establish that defendant validly waived his right to appeal because the trial court failed to ensure that defendant grasped the minimal information pertaining to the appeal waiver it provided during the plea colloquy. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that testimony concerning complainant's identification of defendant in a lineup should have been suppressed since the People did not meet their burden in establishing probable cause for defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of the judgment of conviction and sentence. View "People v Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of petit larceny. At issue on appeal was whether defendant's swipe of an unlimited MetroCard in return for a fee, although decidedly criminal in nature, constituted larceny. The court held that it did not where there was no basis upon which the petit larceny charge in the accusatory instrument could be upheld. Defendant was not prosecuted under, and the court did not address the applicability of, the theft of services statute. View "People v Hightower" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of attempted rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, and promoting prison contraband in the first degree. On appeal, defendant argued that County Court had failed to articulate a reasonable basis on the record for its determination to restrain him in shackles during the trial. The People appealed County Court's order dismissing the charge of attempted-first degree rape. The Appellate Division reversed, ruling that the use of shackles was reversible error and further held that the trial court had properly dismissed the attempted rape charge. The court held that harmless error analysis was applicable when a trial court had ordered the use of visible shackles without adequate justification articulated on the record under Deck v Missouri. Here, the court held that defendant's shackling during trial was harmless, as was an evidentiary error committed by the trial court. The court also agreed with the People that the count of defendant's indictment charging him with attempted rape should not have been dismissed. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the case remitted for sentencing. View "People v Clyde" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of burglary in the second degree. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the use of leg irons (shackles) on his ankles violated his constitutional rights. The court held that the use of leg irons was a violation of defendant's constitutional rights under Deck v Missouri where the court could not conclude that the shackles were not visible to the jury, or that the jury, seeing the bunting around the defense table and not the prosecutor's, would not have inferred that it was there to hide shackles on defendant's legs. The court also held that the People could not meet their burden of showing that any constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the People conceded that the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and a new trial ordered. View "People v Cruz" on Justia Law

Defendant violated several terms of the youthful offender agreement and, at the subsequent sentencing proceeding, Supreme Court imposed a determinate prison sentence of three and one-half years plus five years of post-release supervision. On appeal, defendant contended that reversal was required under People v Catu. The court held that, having elected to advise defendant of the consequences that might flow from the violation of the youthful offender agreement, Supreme Court referenced only a prison term, omitting any mention of the possibility of post-release supervision, thereby giving defendant an inaccurate impression concerning the sentencing options. Accordingly, the court concluded that reversal and vacatur of the plea was appropriate. View "People v McAlpin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of arson in the first degree, one count relating to a fire set on May 25, 2004 (expectation of pecuniary profit), and the other two counts relating to a fire set on May 30, 2004 (expectation of pecuniary profit and use of an incendiary device). On appeal, defendant argued that the prosecutor repeatedly violated the trial court's Molineux rulings by eliciting evidence of an uncharged arson attempt and of his prior bad acts and associations. Defendant further argued that the elicited expert testimony concerning the origins of the fires was inadmissible under People v. Grutz. The court held that, although the People conceded that certain questions asked by the prosecutor at trial clearly violated the trial court's Molineux rulings, the contested testimony elicited, on the whole, was not significant; the trial court also took steps to minimize the impact of arguably improper testimony or prosecutorial statements during the trial; and in any event, to the extent any evidence subject to the trial court's Molineux rulings was improperly admitted, such error was harmless. The court also held that because the evidence adduced at trial conclusively established, apart from the expert testimony, that the subject fires were intentionally set, it could be argued that the admission of expert testimony was largely unnecessary. In any event, any error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "People v Rivers" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree and appealed the judgment of the conviction, arguing, among other things, that the evidence of the show-up identification of a co-defendant was inadmissible. The Appellate Division ruled that any error was harmless and affirmed Supreme Court's judgment. The court concluded that the victim's testimony concerning his identification of the co-defendant was probative of whether defendant had attacked the victim. This was because the victim's accuracy in identifying the person who, it turned out, had his cell phone was relevant to whether the conditions on the landing of a certain address were conducive to observing the other attacker and accurately identifying him at trial. Thus, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the material testimony or grant a mistrial. View "People v Thomas" on Justia Law