Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession and sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and promptly appealed his conviction arguing that the supreme court erred in its suppression ruling. At issue was whether the People must timely object to defendant's failure to prove standing in order to preserve that issue for appellate review. The court held that the People were required to alert the suppression court if they believed that defendant had failed to meet his burden to establish standing where the preservation requirement served the added purpose of alerting the adverse party of the need to develop a record for appeal. Accordingly, because the People failed to preserve the issue, the appellate division erred in entertaining it and the matter was reversed and remanded.

Defendant was convicted for unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree, criminal mischief in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and possession of burglar's tools. At issue was whether defendant's conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court held that the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction where a rational jury could have found that defendant broke into the vehicle at issue by "popping" out the driver's side door lock, entered the car without consent, unscrewed and ripped apart the driver's side dashboard, and stole the vehicle's light control module; and where defendant's unauthorized entry coupled with multiple acts of vandalism and the theft of a part unquestionably interfered with the owner's possession and use of the vehicle.

Defendant was convicted of second degree assault and weapon possession where he was involved in a fight at a movie theater. At issue was whether the failure of the police to interview witnesses after overhearing two potentially exculpatory statements constituted a Brady v. Maryland violation. Also at issue was whether defendant was improperly precluded during cross-examination from challenging the adequacy of the police investigation. The court declined to impose an affirmative obligation upon the police to obtain exculpatory information for criminal defendants and held that the failure to investigate the sources of the two statements was not a Brady violation. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the use of hearsay statements and precluding defendant from challenging the adequacy and thoroughness of the police investigation where the probative force of the proposed evidence was outweighed by the dangers of speculation, confusion, and prejudice.

Defendant was charged with crimes related to the criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminal possession of marijuana. After a Sandoval hearing and just prior to the commencement of voir dire, the court directed defendant's father to leave the court room due to unavailable seating. At issue was whether defendant's right to a public trial was violated when the trial judge sua sponte closed the court room, specifically ejecting defendant's father during voir dire without considering any alternative accommodations. The court held that such an action violated defendant's right to a public trial where the ability of the public to observe questioning of this sort was important and warranted reversal of defendant's conviction.

In a memorandum opinion, the court addressed whether defense counsel gave implied consent to a mistrial. The court held that there was ample basis on the record for the trial court to conclude that defendants agreed that a mistrial on the undecided charges was the appropriate course of action. The court also held that, because it found no basis to disturb the Appellate Division's factual finding of implied consent, it had no occasion to address the People's alternative argument that there was manifest necessity for the mistrial.

Defendant applied to the Appellate Division for a writ of coram nobis claiming that appellate counsel's representation was deficient because he did not fault defense counsel for failing to argue at his violation of parole ("VOP") hearing. At issue was whether the Appellate Division properly denied the application. The court held that there was no reason for appellate counsel to make an ineffective-assistance argument when counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an issue of uncertain efficacy on the appeal where the arguments that defendant asserted trial counsel should have advanced at the VOP hearing were not so strong that "no reasonable defense lawyer could have found [them]...to be not worth raising."

Defendants appealed the denial of their motions to suppress a gravity knife found on each defendant in separate situations. In People v. Ernest Brannon, the arresting officer testified that he was able to see the hinged top of the knife and observed the outline of a pocketknife but was unable to testify that he suspected or believed that it was a gravity knife. In People v. Jose Fernandez, there was evidence on the record that supported the Appellate Division's conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed where the officer's attention was drawn to defendant who was standing ten to fifteen feet away because the officer saw the "head" of the knife that was sticking out of, and clipped to, defendant's pants pockets and based on his experience, gravity knives were commonly carried in a person's pocket, attached with a clip, with the "head" protruding. At issue was the level of knowledge a police officer must possess before he or she had reasonable suspicion to believe an individual possessed a gravity knife as opposed to other similar knives. The court held that the detaining officer must have reason to believe that the object observed was indeed a gravity knife, based on his or her experience and training and/or observable, identifiable characteristics of the knife. An individual may not be detained merely because he or she was seen in possession of an object that appeared to be a similar, but legal object, such as a pocketknife. Accordingly, the court reversed the Appellate Division in Brannon and granted his motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment. The court then affirmed the Appellate Division in Fernandez.

The Duchess County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed neglect petitions pursuant to Family Court article 10 against respondents, a mother and a father, alleging that father neglected his children because he was an "untreated" sex offender whose crimes involved victims between 13 and 15 years-old and mother allegedly failed to protect the children from father. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondents' children were neglected pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act. The court affirmed the Appellate Division and held that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove neglect where DSS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that father posed an imminent danger to his children and therefore, DSS necessarily failed to prove that mother neglected the children by allowing father to return home.

Several months into a criminal trial on charges related to alleged Medicaid fraud, the supreme court determined that the prosecution failed to meet their obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. Having concluded that defendants could not receive a fair trial under the circumstances, the supreme court dismissed the indictments with prejudice. At issue was whether the prosecution lacked the statutory right to bring appeal from a dismissal of an indictment in response to a discovery violation. The court held that the prosecution had a right to appeal the dismissal of the indictments where CPL 240.70 did not provide an express grant of dismissal power. Accordingly, the court reversed and remitted to the appellate division for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

Defendant was charged with rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim's sexual conduct around the time of the incident pursuant to New York's rape shield law and in disqualifying one juror and failing to discharge another. The court held that the county court appropriately accepted defendant's argument that evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct would be relevant to his defense if the prosecution introduced evidence of her bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed such evidence to him. The court concluded that such evidence would have been relevant to both charges of rape but the prosecutor decided not to offer evidence of bruising. The court also held that although the county court failed to make a probing inquiry regarding a sworn juror's ability to render an impartial verdict, its discharge was not error as such action was authorized by CPL 270.15(4) and that there was no error in refusing to disqualify a prospective juror due to a former professional relationship with the prosecutor where the relationship was distant in time and limited in nature.