Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In June 2019, the petitioner's 13-year-old daughter, T., disclosed to a friend, a teacher, a police officer, and a caseworker from the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) that the petitioner had struck her with an extension cord. The caseworker took photographs of T.'s injuries, and a physician confirmed that the injuries were consistent with being struck by an extension cord. ACS initiated a Family Court article 10 neglect proceeding against the petitioner and her husband. The Family Court authorized an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), and the case was dismissed in February 2020 after the petitioner complied with the court's conditions.The police officer reported the incident to the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR). In July 2019, ACS determined the report against the petitioner was indicated. The petitioner challenged this determination, but the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) upheld it after an internal review. A fair hearing was held in August 2020, and OCFS concluded that the allegations were substantiated by a fair preponderance of the evidence.The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge OCFS's determination. The Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, which confirmed OCFS's determination, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Appellate Division held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR hearing and that the statutory changes to Social Services Law § 422 did not apply retroactively.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR administrative hearing. It also concluded that the statutory amendments to Social Services Law § 422 (8) (b) (ii) did not apply retroactively to OCFS determinations rendered before the effective date of the amendments. The Court further held that OCFS's determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Matter of Jeter v. Poole" on Justia Law

A couple used marital funds to enhance the husband's Foreign Service pension by buying back credits for his pre-marriage military service. The key issue was whether the portion of the pension related to the pre-marriage military service should be considered separate or marital property.The Supreme Court initially ruled that the value of the Foreign Service pension related to the husband's pre-marriage Navy service was marital property because marital funds were used to buy back the credits. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, holding that the Navy pension credits were the husband's separate property since they were the result of his sole efforts and not due to the wife's contributions. However, the Appellate Division remitted the case to the Supreme Court to calculate the equitable distribution of the marital funds used to purchase the credits. The Supreme Court adjusted the award accordingly, and the wife appealed.The New York Court of Appeals held that the portion of the Foreign Service pension related to the pre-marriage military service is entirely marital property. The court reasoned that the use of marital funds to buy back the Navy service credits transformed them into marital property. The court emphasized that separate property commingled with marital property presumptively becomes marital property. The court reversed the Appellate Division's decision and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings, allowing the husband to claim the value of his separate property contribution. The court also noted that marital property need not be distributed equally and that the trial court must consider various factors in making an equitable distribution. View "Szypula v Szypula" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) does not apply to out-of-state, noncustodial parents seeking custody of their children who are not in custody of New York social services agencies.ICPC is an interstate agreement to follow certain procedures in connection with sending children across state borders "for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption." In 2012, Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) removed Child from the custody of Mother, a New York resident, and placed Child in foster care. In 2013, an application was made under the ICPC to North Carolina, where Father was a resident, for the approval of Father's home as a suitable placement for Child. The North Carolina authority denied the request. In 2017, Father commenced these custody proceedings arguing that it was in Child's best interests to award him sole custody. Family Court dismissed the petitions without a hearing, concluding that the ICPC's requirements did not apply to placement of Child with Father because Child was in the custody of DSS in New York. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ICPC does not apply to out-of-state noncustodial parents seeking custody of their children. View "Matter of D.L. v S.B." on Justia Law

In these appeals concerning two permutations of the issue of whether non-compliance with the signature acknowledgement requirements of Domestic Relations Law (DRL) 236(B)(3) renders a nuptial agreement irrevocably unenforceable the Court of Appeals that the signature must be acknowledged contemporaneously within a reasonable time of signing.In one case on appeal, the wife signed and acknowledged the nuptial agreement with her husband the month after they married. The husband, however, delayed nearly seven years before acknowledging his signature and did so only shortly before he commenced a divorce action. In the other case, the acknowledgments of the parties were made contemporaneously with the signing of the nuptial agreement, but the certificates of acknowledgment were defective. The Supreme Court held (1) in the first case, the husband's acknowledgement was ineffective, and the nuptial agreement was unenforceable; and (2) in the second case, the defect in the certificate was overcome with extrinsic evidence of the official's personal knowledge or proof of identity of the signer. View "Anderson v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Appellate Division concluding that, in appropriate circumstances, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law (DRL) 111(1)(a) permits a court to approve an adoption even absent the consent of an adult adoptee and held that that discretion was not abused in this case.Petitioners commenced this proceeding seeking to adopt Marian, a sixty-six-year-old woman with a profound intellectual disability. Mental Hygiene Legal Services objected to the adoption on the ground that Marian's consent was required under DRL 111(1)(a) and that Marian lacked the capacity to consent. Surrogate's Court did not find that Marian possessed the capacity to consent but concluded that the guardian ad litem had the implied authority to consent on Marian's behalf. The court then approved the adoption petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that DRL 111(1)(a) authorizes a court, in the appropriate exercise of its discretion, to dispense with an adult adoptee's consent to the adoption. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the statute provided express statutory authority to dispense with Marian's consent and that the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that her inability to consent should not prevent this adoption. View "In re Marian T." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals accepted a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals and answered that if an entered divorce judgment grants a spouse an interest in real property pursuant to N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 236, and the spouse does not docket the divorce judgment in the county where the property is located, the spouse's interest is not subject to attachment by a subsequent judgment creditor that has docketed its judgment and seeks to execute against the property.A judgment creditor sought to execute against property that, in a divorce settlement, was to be sold and Wife was to receive a portion of the proceeds. The judgment creditor argued that, because it docketed its judgment before Wife docketed her judgment of divorce, the creditor had priority over Wife with respect to the property. The federal district court concluded that the judgment of divorce did not transform Wife into a judgment creditor of Husband but, rather, worked an equitable distribution of their marital assets. The federal court of appeals certified a question of law to the Court of Appeals, which held that the divorce judgment did not render Wife a judgment creditor of Husband, and therefore, Wife was not subject to the docketing requirements of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203. View "Pangea Capital Management, LLC v. Lakian" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Family Court can find that the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) made “reasonable efforts” toward family reunifications, as required by N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1089, if ACS failed to provide the “reasonable accommodations” required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).Mother, an intellectually disabled individual, moved Family Court for a determination that ACS had not made reasonable efforts to reunite her with her child because ACS had not complied with the ADA by ensuring that she had access to certain services. Family Court responded by requiring ACS to provide the services Mother claimed as “reasonable accommodations” under the ADA. ACS generally provided those services. The Appellate Division determined that ACS had made reasonable efforts to provide Mother with services to facilitate the permanency goal of “return to parent.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the record supported the Family Court’s conclusion that ACS’s efforts met a minimum threshold of reasonableness. View "In re Lacee L." on Justia Law

The Family Court properly found that Respondent willfully violated two temporary orders of protection issued during the pendency of a family offense proceeding and that the court acted within its jurisdiction to enter an order of protection upon those findings.Petitioner filed a family offense petition against Respondent, her husband and the father of her children. Petitioner requested and received a temporary order of protection at her first appearance in Family Court. While the family offense proceeding remained pending, Family Court determined that Respondent had committed two willful violations of two temporary orders. The Family Court thus dismissed the family offense petition but sustained Petitioner’s violation petition and issued a one-year final order or protection precluding Respondent from communicating with Petitioner except as necessary to make arrangements for Respondent’s visitation with the child. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Family Court had jurisdiction to enter the final order of protection; and (2) Respondents’ challenge to Family Court’s finding that he violated the temporary order of protection was without merit. View "Lisa T. v. King E.T." on Justia Law

Family Court does not retain subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to Family Court Act (FCA) article 10-A once the underlying neglect petition brought under article 10 of the FCA has been dismissed for failure to prove neglect.Family Court directed Daughter’s temporary removal from Mother’s custody. The Department of Social Services subsequently filed a FCA article 10 neglect petition. Family Court eventually ruled that the Department failed to prove neglect and dismissed the petition. Family Court, however, did not release Daughter into Mother’s custody and instead held a second permanency hearing. Mother argued that the dismissal of the neglect proceeding against her ended Family Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and should have necessitated her daughter’s immediate return. The Appellate Division affirmed the second permanency hearing order. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the dismissal of a neglect petition operates to discharge a child from placement, terminate all orders regarding supervision, protection or services docketed thereunder, and extinguish Family Court’s jurisdiction over the matter. View "Matter of Jamie J." on Justia Law

Mother retained counsel to represent her in her efforts to obtain child support from Father. The support magistrate entered a support order against Father in the amount of $236 per week. A different magistrate subsequently modified the support order, reducing Father’s child support obligation to $25 per month. Family Court mailed the orders and accompanying findings of fact directly to Mother but did not mail the documents to Mother’s lawyer. Forty-one days after the orders were mailed by Family Court, Mother, through counsel, filed objections. Family Court denied Mother’s objections as untimely and confirmed and continued the Support Magistrate’s orders. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that if a party is represented by counsel, the time requirements set out in Family Court Act 439(e) for objections to a support magistrate’s final order, when the order is served by mail, do not begin to run until the order is mailed to counsel. View "Odunbaku v. Odunbaku" on Justia Law