Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ranco Sand and Stone Corporation, the owner of two parcels of contiguous property in an area zoned for residential use, applied to rezone one parcel to heavy industrial use. The Town of Smithtown’s Planning Board, acting as the lead agency under State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), adopted a resolution issuing a positive declaration that rezoning the parcel may have a significant effect on the environment and required Ranco to prepare a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS). Ranco commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against the Town and the members of the Town Board, seeking to annul the positive declaration and requesting mandamus relief directing the Town to process the rezoning application without a DEIS. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding the matter not ripe for judicial review. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the SEQRA positive declaration was the initial step in the decision-making process and did not give rise to a justiciable controversy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Town’s SEQRA positive determination was not ripe for judicial review. View "Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. v. Vecchio" on Justia Law

Petitioner maintained a large outdoor advertising sign on the sign of its building that was grandfathered in as a legal, non-conforming use. In 2008, the building and the sign were demolished. Petitioner applied with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to erect a new support structure and a new sign. The Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner approved the new sign permit. Thereafter, DOB issued the permit. In 2010, the DOB revoked the permits for both the support structure and the sign, as the zoning resolution did not permit display of advertising signs in the zoning district at issue and the new sign did not qualify as a grandfathered replacement. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding arguing that it had relied in good faith on the Commissioner’s approval and subsequently-issued permits in expending substantial funds to install the new sign. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) by relying on the erroneously issued permit for the advertising sign, Petitioner did not acquire a vested right to maintain the sign on its property; and (2) the appropriate procedure to resolve the issue of Petitioner’s good-faith reliance on the erroneously issued permit was an application for a zoning variance. View "Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan" on Justia Law

Petitioner maintained a large outdoor advertising sign on the sign of its building that was grandfathered in as a legal, non-conforming use. In 2008, the building and the sign were demolished. Petitioner applied with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to erect a new support structure and a new sign. The Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner approved the new sign permit. Thereafter, DOB issued the permit. In 2010, the DOB revoked the permits for both the support structure and the sign, as the zoning resolution did not permit display of advertising signs in the zoning district at issue and the new sign did not qualify as a grandfathered replacement. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding arguing that it had relied in good faith on the Commissioner’s approval and subsequently-issued permits in expending substantial funds to install the new sign. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) by relying on the erroneously issued permit for the advertising sign, Petitioner did not acquire a vested right to maintain the sign on its property; and (2) the appropriate procedure to resolve the issue of Petitioner’s good-faith reliance on the erroneously issued permit was an application for a zoning variance. View "Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan" on Justia Law

The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), which regulates taxis and other cars for hire in New York City, engaged in a lengthy process to create the “Taxi of Tomorrow.” The process culminated in rules that established a particular make and model of vehicle as the City’s official taxicab. Petitioners sought to invalidate the rules and obtain a related declaration, arguing that the TLC lacked authority to enact the rules and violated the separation of powers doctrine in doing so. Supreme Court concluded that the rules were invalid because the TLC exceeded its authority under the City Charter and violated the separation of powers by intruding in the City Council’s domain. The Appellate Division reversed and declared that the rules were valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the TLC did not exceed its authority or violate the separation of powers doctrine by enacting the rules. View "Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. N.Y. City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 1990, Appellant was convicted of three counts of rape in the second degree. Prior to his release in 2004, Appellant was adjudicated a risk level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Appellant subsequently violated parole. In 2010, while under civil confinement, Appellant filed a petition for a downward modification of his risk level. After a hearing, County Court denied Appellant’s modification request, concluding that Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to a downward modification. The Appellate Division affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was deprived of due process when County Court failed to grant an adjournment so as to give him access to copies of all the records that the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders reviewed in making an updated recommendation that Appellant’s risk level classification should not be reduced. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant was not prejudiced by the court’s denial of an adjournment to obtain the documents. View "People v. Lashway" on Justia Law

The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) terminated the Section 8 benefits of Petitioners. Petitioners commenced separate N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceedings against NYCHA seeking to annul NYCHA’s determinations as arbitrary and capricious and to reinstate their benefits. NYCHA move to dismiss the proceedings as time barred, arguing that Petitioners did not commence these proceedings within four months of their receipt of their respective “T-3 letters.” Supreme Court denied NYCHA’s motions and granted Petitioners’ petitions, concluding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run because NYCHA failed to show that it mailed all three notices - a warning letter, T-1 letter and T-3 letter - required under a federal consent judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) pursuant to the consent judgment, the statute begins to run upon the tenant’s receipt of the T-3 letter, regardless of whether NYCHA has proven that it mailed other notices required by the consent judgment to be sent before the T-3 letter; and (2) the Appellate Division found in each case that NYCHA established proper mailing of the T-3 letters, and Petitioners did not commence these proceedings within four months of their receipt of the T-3 letters. View "Banos v. Rhea" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied to the New York City Department of Education (DOE) for certification as a school bus driver. The DOE denied Petitioner’s application due to Petitioner’s long record of criminal behavior, a gap in his employment history, and his age at the time of his last conviction. Consequently, the bus company employing Petitioner terminated Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against the DOE contending that the DOE’s denial of his application for certification was arbitrary and capricious. Supreme Court granted the petition to the extent of annulling DOE’s determination and ordering the DOE to approve Petitioner’s application. The Appellate Division reversed, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DOE’s denial of Petitioner’s application for certification was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Dempsey v. New York City Dep’t of Educ." on Justia Law

The 2010 General Permit requires municipal storm sewer systems to develop and implement a Stormwater Management Program in compliance with specifications developed by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to limit the introduction of pollutants into stormwater. After the 2010 General Permit took effect, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and other environmental advocacy groups (collectively, NRDC) brought this hybrid N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action against DEC challenging certain aspects of the 2010 General Permit. The Appellate Division rejected NRDC’s federal and state law challenges to the 2010 General Permit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that NRDC’s challenges to the lawfulness of the 2010 General Permit were without merit. View "Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the validity of a rule promulgated by the New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Respondent) mandating out-of-competition race horse drug testing. Petitioners commenced this hybrid article 78/declaratory judgment proceeding, alleging that the rule, referred to as the Out of Competition Testing Rule (OCTR) was not authorized by Respondent’s enabling legislation. Supreme Court granted the petition, finding that Respondent had acted in excess of its legislatively delegated power. The Appellate Division modified by effectively denying the petition, concluding that the OCTR was, for the most part, valid and that the rule’s promulgation lay within Respondent’s legislatively conferred authority to regulate and supervise race meets at which pari-mutuel wagering is permitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent possesses the power to promulgate rules mandating warrantless, out-of-competition equine testing for proscribed doping agents. View "Ford v. N.Y. State Racing & Wagering Bd." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) adopted Medical Treatment Guidelines, which include a list of pre-authorized medical procedures and set forth limitations on the scope and duration of each procedure. The Guidelines also set forth a variance procedure, under which the medical treatment provider requesting a variance must demonstrate that the requested treatment is medically necessary. In 2009, Claimant received authorization from the Special Fund for Reopened Cases (“the carrier”) for acupuncture for chronic neck and back pain that she suffered as a result of work-related injuries. In 2010, a doctor recommended that Claimant receive additional acupuncture treatment and requested two variances under the newly-created Guidelines. The carrier denied the variance requests. A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge determined that Claimant’s medical provider failed to show that the additional acupuncture treatments were medically necessary, and the Board affirmed. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating the regulations; (2) the variance procedure does not improperly shift the burden to the claimant’s treating physician to prove medical necessity; and (3) the Guidelines do not deny injured workers due process. View "Matter of Kigin v. State Workers' Comp. Bd." on Justia Law