Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Merry-Go-Round Playhouse, a not-for profit theater corporation, owned real property that it used to house its staff and summer stock actors. Petitioner filed applications for real property tax exemptions under N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 420-a. The Assessor of the City of Auburn denied the applications. Supreme Court upheld the denial, determining that Petitioner failed to establish that its summer theater was an exempt purpose and that the use of apartment buildings to house its employees was reasonably incidental to its primary purpose. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner established its entitlement to the tax exemption because the use of the property to provide staff housing was reasonably incidental to Petitioner’s primary purpose of encouraging appreciation of the arts through theater. View "Matter of Merry-Go-Round Playhouse, Inc. v. Assessor of City of Auburn" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Education Law permits Nassau County to charge back to the Town of North Hempstead amounts the County paid on behalf of Town residents attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT). The Town commenced this proceeding seeking a declaration that the County lacked authority to charge back FIT expenses to the Town. Supreme Court found that the County was entitled to collect chargebacks from the Town and that the County was entitled to offset the Town’s resulting liability by retaining the amount owed from the Town’s share of County sales tax revenue. The Appellate Division concluded that the County was required to adopt a formal resolution in order to authorize its treasurer to collect the chargebacks and that the County was not entitled to offset the amounts owed by the Town against the sales tax revenue. The Court of Appeals modified to uphold the County’s offsetting of the Town’s liability for FIT chargebacks from sales tax revenue, without requiring the issuance of a new resolution, and as so modified, affirmed. View "Matter of Town of N. Hempstead v. County of Nassau" on Justia Law

Applicants sought approval from the Town of North Hempstead Board of Zoning and Appeals (the Board) to place a full-service restaurant in a storefront that had most recently housed a retail gift shop. Restaurants in this area were permitted subject to the issuance of a conditional use permit. The Board granted the conditional use permit and an area variance from the Town’s parking and loading/unloading restrictions. Colin Realty, LLC (Colin), the owner of a multi-tenant retail building next to the property at issue, commenced this action seeking to annul the Board’s determination and obtain a declaration that the proposed restaurant required a use rather than an area variance from the Town’s parking and loading/unloading restrictions. Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the action. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Board properly considered the application as a request for an area variance rather than a use variance. View "Matter of Colin Realty Co., LLC v. Town of N. Hempstead" on Justia Law

New York City police officers and firefighters appointed on or after July 1, 2009 are tier three members of the New York City Police Pension Fund and the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund. Petitioners filed a complaint alleging that the City of New York unlawfully deducted three percent from the gross annual wages of its tier three police officers and firefighters as mandatory employee pension contributions. At issue in this case was whether N.Y. Retire. & Sox. Sec. Law 480(b) obligates a public employer to pay any portion of a tier three public employee’s statutorily required pension contribution. The Appellate Division answered that question in the positive. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 480(b) only encompasses temporary programs in place as of 1974 for tier one and two members of a public employee retirement system. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 2012, in an effort to combat obesity among residents of New York City, the New York City Board of Health amended the City Health Code so as to restrict the size of cups and containers used by food service establishments for the provision of sugary drinks. The proposed rule, referred to as the “Portion Cap Rule,” was to go into effect in 2013. Six not-for-profit and labor organizations challenged the Portion Cap Rule. Supreme Court, New York City declared the rule invalid and permanently enjoined its implementation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in adopting the Portion Cap Rule, the Board of Health exceeded its regulatory authority and engaged in law-making, thereby infringing upon legislative jurisdiction. View "New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

The Village of Kings Point adopted a proposal to build a facility in Kings Point Park. Plaintiffs filed an action against the Village, its Mayor and its Board of Trustees seeking to enjoin the Village’s proposed project and its current use of a portion of the Park for storage as unlawful uses of parkland in violation of the public trust doctrine. The State then filed an action against the Village seeking relief with respect to the Village’s proposed project. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the State and Plaintiffs, permanently enjoining Defendants from proceeding with the project and from obstructing existing access to the Park and directing the Village to remove the materials being stored in the Park. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the causes of action challenging the proposed project were not barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the continuing wrong doctrine applied to toll the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the ongoing use of parkland alleged to violate the public trust doctrine. View "Capruso v. Village of Kings Point" on Justia Law

Appellant-attorney was criminally prosecuted along with Judge Doe on violations of the campaign finance law. The criminal proceeding was eventually terminated, and the records were sealed. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct subsequently began an investigation into possible judicial misconduct by Judge Doe in the underlying criminal proceeding. Supreme Court granted the Commission’s motion to release the sealed records from the underlying criminal proceeding for use in the investigation. Appellant filed an application to vacate the release order, which Supreme Court denied. Appellant appealed. Meanwhile, the Commission censured Judge Doe for misconduct arising from her judicial election campaign. The Appellate Division dismissed Appellant’s appeal as moot and ordered that the records be resealed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the order dismissing the appeal as moot and upheld the Commission’s authority to request and receive Appellant’s sealed records, holding that the Commission is authorized to request and receive records sealed under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 160.50 for its use in investigations. View "State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct v. Rubenstein" on Justia Law

After the Town of Islip discontinued the practice of permanently assigning Town-owned vehicles, or “take home” vehicles, to certain employees, the union representing the employees declared that employee use of a Town-owned vehicle for personal purposes was a mandatory subject of bargaining and filed an improper practice charge with the New York State Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB determined that the Town violated N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 209-a(1)(d) by canceling “take home” vehicle assignments without negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that PERB reasonably determined that the Town engaged in an improper practice when it unilaterally discontinued the permanent assignment of “take home” vehicles to employees. View "Town of Islip v. State Pub. Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioners were found not responsible for crimes they committed by reason of mental disease or defect. Petitioners were eventually released from confinement into the community, subject to a five-year order of conditions. The New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) later requested that the supervising court extend the order of conditions. In its proposed order, OMH asked the court to include an effective-evaluation provision, which would allow the OMH to seek judicial approval of a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility if Petitioners failed to comply with the conditions of their release and refused to undergo voluntary examination. Petitioners sought writs of prohibition barred enforcement of the effective-evaluation provisions, arguing that the provisions were inconsistent with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 330.20(14)’s specific procedure for recommitment orders. The Appellate division granted the petitions, concluding that the effective-evaluation provision was barred by the recommitment provisions in section 330.20(14). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 330.20(14) does not prohibit inclusion of an effective-evaluation provision in an order of conditions. View "Allen B. v. Sproat" on Justia Law

Petitioners and other members of the East Meadow Teachers Association displayed picketing signs from their cars parked where parents were dropping their children off at Woodland Middle School. The Board of Education of the East Meadow Union Free School District (District) charged Petitioners with misconduct related to the demonstration, claiming that Petitioners created a safety risk by parking their cars so that students had to be dropped off in the middle of the street instead of at curbside. Petitioners were found guilty of misconduct. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings against them violated their right to free speech. Supreme Court denied the petitions. The Appellate Division reversed after applying the two-part balancing test set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the picketing demonstration was a form of speech protected by the First Amendment; but (2) Petitioners’ interests in engaging in constitutionally protected speech in the particular manner they employed on the day in question were outweighed by the District’s interests in safeguarding students and maintaining effective operations at the middle school. View "Santer v. Bd. of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law