Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was adjudicated a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement to a secure treatment facility. Petitioner later exercised his annual right to petition for discharge under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 and commenced a proceeding in Oneida County seeking his discharge from confinement. Petitioner then moved to change venue for the annual review hearing to New York County, citing to N.Y. Ment. Hyg. Law 10.08(e). Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that, while N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10.08(e) does allow venue to be changed for annual review hearings, Petitioner failed to establish the requisite good cause in this case. Thereafter, Supreme Court found that Petitioner remained a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement to a secure treatment facility. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) N.Y. Ment. Hyg. Law 10 authorizes a change of venue in article 10 annual hearings upon an appropriate showing of good cause; but (2) Petitioner failed to establish good cause for the change of venue. View "Tyrone D. v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to sex offenses, including sexual abuse in the first decree. When Respondent’s term of imprisonment neared its end, the State commenced a civil commitment proceeding against him pursuant to N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10. After a bench trial, Supreme Court imposed strict and intensive supervision (SIST) rather than confinement. Respondent was required to attend a sex offender treatment program, but due to his failure to cooperate, Respondent was discharged and later arrested. Supreme Court subsequently revoked Respondent’s release on SIST and committed him to a secure treatment facility, determining that the State had proven that Respondent was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement. The Appellate Division affirmed on the merits. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Mental Hygiene Law envisages a distinction between sex offenders who have difficulty controlling their sexual conduct and those who are unable to control it; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Respondent had such an inability to control his behavior that he was likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility. View "State v. Michael M." on Justia Law

In these two matters, the State commenced civil commitment proceedings against Kenneth T. and Donald DD under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10. After trials were held in both cases, it was found that the men had a condition, disease or disorder that prdisposed them to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and resulted in their having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct. Following dispositional hearings, both men were ordered to be confined. The Court of Appeals reversed in both cases, holding (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conclusion that Kenneth T.’s mental conditions resulted in his having serious difficulty in controlling conduct constituting a sex offense; and (2) in Donald DD’s case, Supreme Court erred in using a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, together with testimony concerning Donald DD’s sex crimes, but without evidence of some independent mental abnormality diagnosis, to ground a finding of mental abnormality within the meaning of article 10. View "Matter of State of New York v. Donald DD" on Justia Law

Petitioners were found not responsible for crimes they committed by reason of mental disease or defect. Petitioners were eventually released from confinement into the community, subject to a five-year order of conditions. The New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) later requested that the supervising court extend the order of conditions. In its proposed order, OMH asked the court to include an effective-evaluation provision, which would allow the OMH to seek judicial approval of a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in a secure facility if Petitioners failed to comply with the conditions of their release and refused to undergo voluntary examination. Petitioners sought writs of prohibition barred enforcement of the effective-evaluation provisions, arguing that the provisions were inconsistent with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 330.20(14)’s specific procedure for recommitment orders. The Appellate division granted the petitions, concluding that the effective-evaluation provision was barred by the recommitment provisions in section 330.20(14). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 330.20(14) does not prohibit inclusion of an effective-evaluation provision in an order of conditions. View "Allen B. v. Sproat" on Justia Law

In 1968, Respondent pleaded guilty to rape and robbery. A federal court later vacated Respondent’s convictions. In 1978, Respondent was convicted of rape in the first degree. After Respondent was released on parole, he pleaded guilty in 1996 to rape in the first degree. Prior to Respondent’s release from custody, the State filed a petition under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. Respondent moved to preclude expert testimony relating to both the 1968 charges and an uncharged rape Respondent allegedly committed in 1978. Supreme Court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality qualifying him for civil management under article 10. Supreme Court subsequently ordered Respondent committed to a secure treatment facility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) basis hearsay related to Respondent’s 1968 indictments for rape and robbery met minimum due process requirements and was properly admitted at trial; and (2) basis hearsay about Respondent’s uncharged rape was unreliable and should have been excluded, but its admission was harmless error. View "State v. John S." on Justia Law

Petitioners were two medical providers whose patients included individuals insured by the State’s primary health benefit plan. The State Comptroller reviewed Petitioners’ billing records as part of an audit of billing practices in the health care industry for claims paid by the State. While Petitioners conceded that the State paid eighty percent of the costs of their services, Petitioners challenged the Comptroller’s authority to audit their books. Supreme Court concluded that the Comptroller lacked constitutional authority to audit Petitioners because Petitioners were “not a political subdivision of the State.” The Appellate Division modified Supreme Court’s orders to reinstate the audits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State Constitution does not limit the Comptroller’s authority to audit, as part of its audit of State expenditures, the billing records of private companies that provide health care to beneficiaries of a State insurance program. View "Martin H. Handler, M.D., P.C. v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

Nelson D. was a convicted sex offender who suffered from mental retardation. The State filed a N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 petition seeking to subject Nelson to civil management. After a dispositional hearing, Supreme Court found the State failed to establish that Nelson was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement but concluded that Nelson required strict and intensive supervision and treatment (SIST). Supreme Court ordered Nelson's placement at Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment was an appropriate SIST regimen as authorized under article 10. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) absent a finding of the type of condition that statutorily subjected Appellant to confinement, his placement at Valley Ridge constituted involuntary confinement in violation of article 10; and (2) involuntary commitment, as part of a SIST plan, deprived Nelson of the statutorily proscribed procedures mandated for confinement under article 10. View "State v. Nelson D." on Justia Law

The Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (OMIG) terminated a physician's participation in the Medicaid program on the basis of a Bureau of Professional Medical Conduct (BPMC) consent order, in which the physician pleaded no contest to charges of professional misconduct and agreed to probation. Supreme Court annulled the OMIG's determination. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding (1) the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in barring the physician from treating Medicaid patients when the BPMC permitted him to continue to practice; and (2) the OMIG was required to conduct an independent investigation before excluding a physician from Medicaid on the basis of a BPMC consent order. The Court of Appeals affirmed but for another reason, holding (1) the OMIG is authorized to remove a physician from Medicaid in reliance solely on a consent order between the physician and the BMPC, regardless of whether BPMC chooses to suspend the physician's license or OMIG conducts an independent investigation; but (2) because OMIG did not explain why the BPMC consent order caused it to exclude the physician from the Medicaid program, the agency's determination was arbitrary and capricious. View "Koch v. Sheehan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the facial constitutionality of N.Y. Pub. Health Law 2808(5)(c), which prohibits the withdrawal or transfer of residential health care facility equity or assets in amount exceeding three percent of the facility's most recently reported annual revenue from patient care services without the prior approval of the State Commissioner of Health. Plaintiffs in this case were concerned that the challenged provision would negatively impact nursing homes. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs, concluding that the statute impermissibly ceded legislative policymaking power to a regulatory agency situated in the executive branch and infringed on the substantive due process property interests of facility owners. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the lower courts erred in concluding that the statute was offensive to substantive due process; and (2) the statute does not improperly delegate legislative policy-making power. View "Brightonian Nursing Home v. Daines" on Justia Law

Respondent was an inmate in the custody of the State Department of Corrections and Correctional Services (DOCCS). In 2010, Respondent undertook a month-long hunger strike, contending that he had ceased eating in order to secure transfer to another DOCCS facility and to bring attention to certain claims of mistreatment. After Respondent had lost 11.6 percent of his body weight, DOCCS commenced this proceeding requesting a court order permitting medical personnel to insert a nasogastric tube and take other reasonable steps necessary to provide hydration and nutrition to Respondent. Supreme Court granted DOCCS' motion. Respondent subsequently resumed eating solid food but nevertheless appealed. The Appellate Division concluded the case was moot except for the issue of whether the State violated Respondent's rights by securing the force-feeding order. On that issue, the Appellate Division ruled in favor of DOCCS, concluding that the force-feeding order did not violate Respondent's right to refuse medical treatment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent's rights were not violated by the judicial order permitting the State to feed him by nasogastric tube after his health devolved to the point that his condition became life-threatening. View "Bezio v. Dorsey" on Justia Law