Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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While being treated at South Nassau Communities Hospital by medical professionals employed by Island Medical Physicians, P.C. (collectively, Defendants), Lorraine Walsh was treated with medication that impaired her ability to safely operate an automobile. Afterwards, Walsh drove herself from the Hospital and was involved in an accident that injured Edwin Davis. Davis and his wife (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action against Defendants. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendants did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs to warn Walsh that the medication Defendants gave to Walsh either impaired or could have impaired her ability to safely operate a motor vehicle following her departure from the Hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified by denying Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint, holding that where a medical provider has administered to a patient medication that impairs or could impair the patient’s ability operate an automobile safely, the medical provider has a duty to third parties to warn the patient of that danger. View "Davis v. S. Nassau Communities Hosp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs (collectively, “Pegasus”) sued one defendant (“VarigLog”) for breach of contract and conversion and sought to hold other defendants (“MP defendants”) liable for VarigLog’s conduct on an alter ego theory. Pegasus served a notice to produce documents seeking electronically stores information (ESI) concerning Pegasus’s claims and VarigLog’s relationship with the MP defendants. VarigLog’s production was unsatisfactory to Pegasus. Supreme Court appointed a discovery referee to assist Pegasus and VarigLog in resolving the dispute. During the conferences it was established that computer crashes resulted in the loss of much of the ESI, and that data recovery efforts had proven unsuccessful. Pegasus moved for the imposition of spoliation sanctions against VarigLog and the MP defendants. Supreme Court granted the motion, concluding that the evidence was negligently destroyed. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division erred in determining that Pegasus had not attempted to make a showing that the destroyed documents were relevant to its claim. Remanded to the trial court for a determination as to whether the evidence was relevant to the claims asserted against Defendants and for the imposition of an appropriate sanction should the trial court decide that a sanction is warranted. View "Pegasus Aviation I, Inc. v Varig Logistica S.A." on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts, Injury Law
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The common thread among these three appeals was that an individual tripped on a defect in a sidewalk or stairway and was injured but was prevented from going to trial on the ground that the defect was characterized as too trivial to be actionable. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division in two of the three cases, holding (1) a defendant seeking dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the alleged defect is trivial must make a prima facie showing that the defect is physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses; (2) in the first case, the Appellate Division properly ruled that the defect was not actionable; (3) in the second case, the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the defect was nonactionable, as a material triable issue of fact existed regarding whether the defect was trivial; and (4) in the third case, the Appellate Division erred in holding that the alleged defect was trivial, as the defendant failed to meet its initial burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as matter of law, and therefore, the burden did not shift to the plaintiff to establish the existence of a material triable issue of fact. View "Hutchinson v. Sheridan Hill House Corp." on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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The Cheyne structured investment vehicle (SIV) issued several classes of notes that received top credit ratings. The rated notes at issue in this case were originally purchased by Allianz Dresdner Daily Asset Fund (DAF), sold to a branch of Dresdner Bank AG (Dresdner), and ultimately acquired by Commerzbank AG through its merger with Dresdner. Commerzbank brought a common-law fraud claim against various defendants involved in the issuance of the rated notes. A federal district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part, concluding that DAF had not assigned to Dresdner any tort causes of action connected to the notes, and therefore, Commerzbank had no standing to sue. Commerzbank appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals a question of law in order to determine the resolution of the standing issue. The Court of Appeals held that, because SAF’s sale of the notes, did not, under New York law, effectuate an assignment of the fraud claim Commerzbank sought to pursue, Commerzbank failed to raise a question of fact regarding standing. View "Commonwealth of Pa. Pub. Sch. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Jesse Stipley (the decedent), a seventeen-year-old high school student, was killed in an automobile accident. During an authorized autopsy, the medical examiner removed, among other organs, the decedent’s brain, fixed it in formalin, and placed it in the autopsy room for further examination by a neuropathologist. The decedent’s body was subsequently retrieved from the mortuary, and a funeral was held. Approximately three months later, the decedent’s family discovered that the decedent’s brain had been retained by the medical examiner. Plaintiffs, the decedent’s family, commenced this action against the City of New York alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from the mishandling and withholding of their son’s brain. Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict as to liability. After a trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $1 million in damages. That amount was subsequently reduced. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a medical examiner is not legally required to notify next of kin that organs, tissues or other specimens have been removed from the body during a lawful autopsy and retained by the medical examiner after such an autopsy. View "Shipley v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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In June 2008, Plaintiff brought an action in a federal district court alleging violations of her federal and state constitutional rights and asserting common law negligence claims. The district dismissed several of Plaintiff’s claims. On September 30, 2011, the court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims. Plaintiff appealed. Because Plaintiff failed to file her brief and appendix by an extended deadline, the Second Circuit dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal by mandate issued on August 28, 2012, effective July 10, 2012. On June 25, 2012, Plaintiff commenced the instant action in Supreme Court. Defendants moved to dismiss the state action as untimely, contending that the six-month tolling period provided by N.Y. C.P.L.R. 205(a) had already expired. Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff’s federal action terminated on September 30, 2011, thus rejecting Plaintiff’s contention that her federal action terminated with the Second Circuit’s dismissal of her appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, where an appeal is taken as of right, the prior action terminates for purposes of section 205(a) when the nondiscretionary appeal is “exhausted,” either by a determination on the merits or by dismissal of the appeal. View "Malay v. City of Syracuse" on Justia Law

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The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), on behalf of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), retained P.A.L. Environmental Safety Corp. (PAL) to perform asbestos removal from electrical cables underneath city streets. PAL contracted with IMS Safety Inc. (IMS) to serve as site safety consultant. Plaintiff, an asbestos handler employed by PAL, sustained work-related injuries after falling through an uncovered manhole. Plaintiff commenced this action against IMS, the City of New York, NYCTA, and MTA alleging violations of the Labor Law and common law negligence. Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint against all defendants, concluding that Plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries because he disregarded his supervisor’s instructions. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding (1) IMS was not a statutory agent subject to liability; and (2) Plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division, holding (1) the Appellate Division erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries; and (2) Plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether IMS, as a potential statutory agent, had the authority to supervise that portion of the work that brought about Plaintiff’s injury. Remitted to Supreme Court. View "Barreto v. Metro. Transit Auth." on Justia Law

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Phillip Khalil was employed with Front, Inc. for approximately seven years. Khalil later informed Front that he intended to resign to take a position with Eckersley O’Callaghan Structural Design (EOC), one of Front’s competitors. Front, however, terminated Khalil’s employment upon discovering that he worked on several side projects for Front’s competitors, including EOC, in violation of the terms of his employment contract. Front retained Meister Seelig & Fein LLP (MSF), whose attorney sent a letter to Khalil making certain demands. The attorey then sent a letter to EOC making demands nearly identical to those made in the letter to Khalil. Khalil and EOC failed to comply with Front’s demands. Front subsequently commenced an action against Khalil and EOC alleging, inter alia, civil conspiracy and misappropriation of trade secrets. Khalil commenced a third-party action against MSF and its attorney (collectively, MSF), asserting a cause of action for libel per se based upon statements made by MSF in its letter to Khalil. Supreme Court determined that the letter to Khalil was absolutely privileged and dismissed the third-party action against MSF. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the letters were written in the preliminary stages of an anticipated action, they were properly subject to a qualified privilege. View "Front, Inc. v. Khalil" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was a police officer with the New York City Police Department when she was injured while loading wooden police barriers onto a police flatbed truck. Plaintiff sued the City of New York and the New York City Police Department seeking damages, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law (GML) 205-e for failure to comply with N.Y. Labor Law 27-a, otherwise known as the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA). Plaintiff based her claims, in part, on the alleged unsafe and dangerous condition of the truck. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the general duty clause of Labor Law section 27-a(3)(a)(1) could not serve as a statutory predicate to Plaintiff’s GML 205-e cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion in part, concluding that Labor Law 27-a(3)(a)(1) may serve as a predicate for a violation of GML 205-e. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PESHA’s general duty clause serves as a predicate to Plaintiff’s GML 205-e cause of action for damages. View "Gammons v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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After Plaintiff, Jandy Coleson, applied for an order of protection from her husband, Samuel Coleson (Coleson), New York City police officers escorted Plaintiff to a safe house and assured Plaintiff that Coleson had been arrested and was going to be sentenced to prison “for a while.” Two days later, Coleson stabbed Plaintiff in the back. Plaintiff’s son witnessed Coleson chasing Plaintiff with the knife. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her son, commenced this negligence action against the City of New York and the NYPD (together, the City). Plaintiffs also alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress, arguing that the child was in the zone of danger during the incident. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment for the City, concluding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that the City assumed an affirmative duty to protect Plaintiff from attacks by her husband; and (2) based on the lack of a special relationship, the claim’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should also be dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the acts of the police officers in this case were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to justifiable reliance. View "Coleson v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law