Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Defendant were adjoining landowners. Defendant sought to develop a residential subdivision on his land. The Town approved a plan that required water from the west side of the development to flow into a storm sewer and then into a ditch that was located on Plaintiff's property. Defendant used the ditch without Plaintiff's permission. Because the ditch did not have the capacity to contain the water Defendant diverted, Defendant installed two drainage pipes and routed the water onto Plaintiff's land without Plaintiff's permission, resulting in more than thirty acres of flooded wetland. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant and the Town, alleging trespass and nuisance and seeking damages for the alleged intentional diversion of water onto his property. The trial court returned a verdict for Plaintiff for compensatory damages and awarded punitive damages against Defendant. The appellate division affirmed the punitive damages award. The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the part of the judgment awarding punitive damages, holding that Defendant's behavior did not rise to the level of purposefully causing injury or of moral turpitude. View "Marinaccio v. Town of Clarence" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff's father (Decedent) collapsed and at a health club owned and operated by Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc. (Bally). Ambulance personnel administered shocks to Decedent with an automatic external defibrillator (AED), but he never revived. Plaintiff, as executor of Decedent's estate, brought a wrongful death suit against Bally, alleging that Bally employees negligently failed to use an available AED, or failed to use it within sufficient time, to save Decedent's life. Bally primarily argued that it was immune from liability under the State's Good Samaritan Law. Supreme Court denied Bally's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding (1) N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 627-a imposes an affirmative duty of care upon health clubs so as to give rise to a cognizable cause of action in negligence for failure to operate an available AED; and (2) the complaint stated a cause of action based upon common law negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 627-a does not create an affirmative duty for health clubs to use the AEDs they are required to have available; but (2) Plaintiff pleaded a viable cause of action at common law. View "Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc." on Justia Law

After falling on the street and injuring her leg, Plaintiff commenced this negligence action against Communications Specialists, Inc. (CSI) for creating a hazardous condition in the road by failing to properly pave over a trench CSI cut to install high-speed fiber-optic cable underneath the street. To rebut Plaintiff's testimony that a dip in the trench caused her to fall, CSI subpoenaed a physician who treated Plaintiff shortly after the accident and declared that Plaintiff "tripped over a dog." CSI paid the doctor $10,000 for appearing at trial. Plaintiff's counsel asked the court to charge the jury that, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8001, the doctor was entitled to a witness fee of $15 per day. The court gave the jury a general bias charge but made no specific reference to the payment the doctor received for appearing at trial. The jury found that CSI was negligent but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court should have issued a bias charge specifically tailored to address the payment CSI made to the doctor; but (2) the court's failure to issue such an instruction in this case was harmless. View "Caldwell v. Cablevision Sys. Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants were two owners of an apartment in a condominium (the Tomchinskys) and a company the Tomchinskys hired to renovate their unit (Company). Additional defendants were the condominium, its board of managers, and the Trump Corporation (collectively, the condominium defendants). Plaintiff, an employee of Company, was allegedly injured while working in the Tomchinskys' apartment. Plaintiff sued Defendants, claiming common-law negligence and violations of N.Y. Labor Law. Several parties moved for summary judgment, including Plaintiff, who cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his cause of action alleging a violation of N.Y. Labor Law 241 (6). Supreme Court denied the motions and cross motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed in part, granting the condominium defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims asserted against them. Plaintiff appealed the denial of his cross motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division did not err in affirming Supreme Court's denial of Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability under the Labor Law. View "Guryev v. Tomchinsky" on Justia Law

Twenty passengers of the Ethan Allen, a public vessel operating as a tour boat, were killed and several others were injured when the boat capsized and sank. Claimants, individuals who were injured and the personal representatives of those who died due to the accident, commenced this action against the State alleging that it had been negligent in certifying an unsafe passenger capacity and in failing to require a new stability assessment after the vessel had been modified. The Court of Claims denied Claimants' motion to dismiss the State's affirmative defense of immunity and denied the State's cross-motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified, finding that the inspections were a governmental function but that the State had failed to demonstrate its inspectors had in fact exercised any discretion in certifying the vessel's passenger capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding (1) the inspections at issue here were consistent with those deemed governmental functions; (2) statutory obligations did not create a special duty of care owed by the State to Claimants; and (3) because the State owed no special duty to Claimants, the claim that the State's inspectors failed to certify safe passenger capacity on the vessel must be dismissed. View "Metz v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendant formed and managed a limited liability company for the purpose of entering into a long-term lease on a building in Manhattan. Later, Defendant took sole possession of the property and bought Plaintiffs' membership interests in the LLC. Defendant subsequently assigned the lease to a subsidiary of a development company. Believing that Defendant surreptitiously negotiated the sale with the development company before he bought their interests in the LLC, Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendant, claiming that, by failing to disclose the negotiations with the development company, Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to them. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. A divided Appellate Division modified Supreme Court's order, allowing four of Plaintiffs' claims to proceed - breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and fraud and misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals reversed ad dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, relying on its recent decision in Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de C.V. View "Pappas v. Tzolis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were several dozen national and international citizens who resided in Israel and were injured in rocket attacks allegedly launched by Hizballah during the Second Lebanon War. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB), a defunct bank headquartered in Beirut, claiming that LCB assisted Hizballah in committing the illegal attacks. The lawsuit was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs asserted personal jurisdiction over LCB under New York's long-arm statute. The district court granted LCB's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals accepted questions of law from the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals and answered (1) a foreign bank's maintenance of a correspondent bank account at a financial institution in New York and use of that account to effect dozens of wire transfers on behalf of a foreign client constitutes a "transaction" of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Alien Tort Statute, or for negligence or breach of statutory duty in violation of Israeli law arose from LCB's transaction of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute. View "Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an action for negligence and breach of contract lies against an insurance broker for failure to procure adequate insurance coverage where the insured receive the policy without complaint. Plaintiff commenced this action against its broker for negligence and breach of contract in connection with Defendant's procurement of insufficient insurance. Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that issues of fact existed as to Plaintiff's request for specific coverage. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Plaintiff's failure to read and understand the policy precluded recovery in this action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) because there were issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff requested specific coverage for its employees and whether Defendant failed to secure a policy as requested, summary judgment was inappropriate in this matter; and (2) Plaintiff's failure to read and understand the policy should not be an absolute bar to recovery under the circumstances of this case. View "Am. Bldg. Supply Corp. v. Petrocelli Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff broke her hip when she tripped and fell while rollerblading in her residential neighborhood in the Town of Amherst. Plaintiff and her husband brought a negligence action against the Town. Supreme court granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding that Plaintiff assumed the risk of her injuries. A divided appellate court reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk did not apply to Plaintiff's activity and that a triable issue of fact existed on the question of proximate cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) assumption of the risk did not apply to the fact pattern in this appeal; and (2) Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of proximate causation. View "Custodi v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

This case arose when a tower crane operated by Joy collapsed during construction of a high-rise condominium, killing seven people and injuring dozens, damaging several buildings and destroying one. At issue was the dispute in coverage under the excess policy for "additional insureds" within the meaning of the comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy. The court concluded that there were material issues of fact in this case as to whether the high-rise building under construction was residential or mixed-use; Admiral's other claims related to Joy's alleged misrepresentations in its underwriting submission were properly interposed against Reliance and the owners/developers as well as Joy; the LLC exclusion did not foreclose coverage of those owners/developers that were limited liability companies; and defendants' remaining arguments were without merit. Accordingly, the court held that the order of the Supreme Court, as modified by the Appellate Division, was not properly made. View "Admiral Ins. Co. v Joy Contrs., Inc." on Justia Law