Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose when claimant was working as a phlebotomist for New York Neurologic Associates when a computer monitor fell off a shelf and struck her upper back. At issue was whether the Worker's Compensation Board must infer, from the finding that a claimant withdrew from her employment due to an accident at her work place, that her post-accident loss of wages was attributable to physical limitations caused by the accident. The court held that the Board was not required to draw that inference. The Board could, but need not, infer that the claimant could not find a suitable job because of her disability. The court could not weigh the evidence or reject the Board's choice simply because a contrary determination would have been reasonable. Here, the evidence concerning the types of work that claimant had attempted to find and her lack of success in those endeavors, together with the absence of evidence of attempts to find less physically taxing work, constituted relevant proof adequately supporting the Board's determination. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the decision of the Board reinstated. View "Matter of Zamora v New York Neurologic Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer alleging causes of action for failure to pay wages in violation of Labor Law 190-198 and breach of contract. The employer subsequently appealed the Appellate Division's order, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict because statements in the employment application and employee handbook negated plaintiff's alleged expectation of, or entitlement to, a guarantee or non-discretionary bonus and that the oral agreements respecting the bonus, if, in fact, entered into by the parties, were unenforceable. The court concluded that plaintiff's bonus was "expressly link[ed]" to his "labor or services personally rendered." Further, plaintiff's bonus had been earned and was vested before he left his job; its payment was guaranteed and non-discretionary as a term and condition of his employment. Since plaintiff's bonus therefore constituted "wages" within the meaning of Labor Law 190, the employer's neglect to pay him the bonus violated Labor Law 193, and entitled plaintiff to an award of attorney's fees under Labor Law 198(a-1). The court considered the employer's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Ryan v Kellogg Partners Inst. Servs." on Justia Law

In a workers' compensation action, the court was asked to determine whether the future medical benefits that a compensation carrier had been relieved of paying due to a claimant's successful prosecution of a third-party action were "so speculative that it would be improper to estimate and assess litigation costs against [that] benefit to the carrier." The court concluded that they were, and held that the carrier need only pay its equitable share of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by a claimant once the claimant incurred and paid each medical expense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Matter of Bissell v Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder in a factory while cleaning a product manufactured by his employer. The product in question was a steel "wall module" made by the third party defendant. At issue was plaintiff's claim under Labor Law 240(1) against Bechtel, the purchaser of the wall module, and defendants, the third party defendant's landlords. The court held that section 240(1) did not apply to an injury suffered while cleaning a product in the course of a manufacturing process. Such injuries could hardly be uncommon; the court inferred that it had been generally and correctly understood that the statue did not apply to them. Accordingly, plaintiff's activity was not protected under section 240(1). View "Dahar v Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co." on Justia Law

These cases called upon the court to decide whether petitioners were required to exhaust an available internal appeal procedure before challenging the termination of their probationary employment at the City of New York's Department of Education (DOE). The DOE was obligated by its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the United Federation of Teachers and its own bylaws to afford probationary employees the opportunity for reconsideration of a decision to discontinue their employment. The court held that the DOE's decisions were "final and binding" within the meaning of CPLR 217(1) as of the dates when petitioners' probationary services ended. Petitioners awaited the outcome of the internal reviews provided for under the CBA and the DOE's bylaws before commencing suit. But these reviews "stem[] solely from the [CBA]" and constituted "an optional procedure under which a teacher may ask [DOE] to reconsider and reverse [its] initial decision, ... which was final and which, when made, in all respects terminated the employment of a probationer under Education Law 2573(1)(a);" they were not administrative remedies that petitioners were required to exhaust before litigating the termination of their probationary employment. As a result, petitioners' lawsuits brought more than four months after the dates when their probationary service ended, were time-barred. View "Kahn v New York City Dept. of Educ.; In the Matter of Doreen Nash v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants after he was injured while engaging in demolition work at an apartment building owned by defendant. Plaintiff claimed violations of Labor Law 200, 240(1), and 241. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his section 240(1) cause of action and the denial of his cross-motion on that claim. The court concluded that it could not say as a matter of law that equipment of the kind enumerated in section 240(1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of falling from the top of the dumpster. Consequently, defendants have not demonstrated entitlement to summary judgment. The court agreed, however, that plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment was properly denied because genuine issues of fact remained. View "Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Exum, an employer of Elrac, served a notice of intention to arbitrate on Elrac, seeking uninsured motorist benefits. Elrace petitioned to stay the arbitration. Supreme Court granted the petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, permitting the arbitration to proceed. The court affirmed and held that a self-insured employer whose employee was involved in an automobile accident could not be liable to that employee for uninsured motorist benefits, notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law. View "Matter of Elrac, Inc. v Exum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against 96 Rockaway, LLC, Novalex Contracting Corp., and T-Construction Co., Inc., alleging among other things, violations of Labor Law 240(a) and 241(6). Discovery and a third-party action ensued. T-Construction moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint, and all cross-claims against it. 96 Rockaway and Novalex cross-moved for identical relief. Supreme Court granted defendants' motions, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. The Appellate Division reversed so much of Supreme Court's order as granted defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims, denied the motions, and reinstated those claims. The court held that, given that Labor Law 240(1) should be construed with a common sense approach to the realities of the workplace at issue, defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing that claim. Plaintiff's Labor Law 241(6) cause of action, predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1)(i), failed for similar reasons. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "Salazar v Novalex Contr. Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners brought these Article 78 proceedings to challenge, among other things, their placement on involuntary leave without having been provided a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law 72. At issue was whether Civil Service Law 72, which provided certain procedural safeguards to a public employee when placed on an involuntary leave of absence, applied to employees who were prevented from returning to work following a voluntary absence. The court held that it did and the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the judgment of Supreme Court reinstated. View "Matter of Sheeran v New York State Dept. of Transp.; Matter of Michelle Birnbaum v New York State Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over the arbitration of a collective bargaining agreement that contained a no-layoff clause. The court held that because the clause was not explicit, unambiguous and comprehensive, there was nothing for the Union to grieve or for an arbitrator to decide. Having concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable for reasons of public policy, the court need not reach the issue of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the Village's application to stay the arbitration was granted. View "Matter of Johnson City Professional Firefighters Local 921" on Justia Law